A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The biomedical research organizations of the Department of Defense (DOD) use a coordinated approach to plan combat casualty care research and development, but not all of DOD's nonmedical research organizations share information early in the research process. GAO has previously reported that federal agencies can enhance and sustain collaboration of efforts by using key practices, such as agreeing on roles and responsibilities and establishing the means to operate across organizational boundaries. In 2010, DOD established a planning committee to coordinate the efforts of organizations conducting combat casualty care research. The committee developed a draft charter in 2010 identifying members respective roles and responsibilities. DOD issued the final charter in early January 2013, while GAO was conducting its review. DOD also facilitated operation across organizational boundaries by colocating most of the organizations conducting combat casualty care research. However, DOD organizations that typically do not conduct biomedical research, such as the Army Research Laboratory, are not involved in DOD's efforts to coordinate this research. When these organizations conduct research relevant to combat casualty care they do not always share information with appropriate officials early in the research process, …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "At least 852 schools, or 11 percent of U.S. colleges and universities, had agreements to provide debit or prepaid card services to their students as of July 2013, and most offered students the ability to receive federal student aid and other payments on a card. These schools were disproportionately large; their enrollments constituted about 40 percent of all postsecondary students. However, the percentage of students enrolled in their schools' college card programs was unknown. In the majority of agreements, the schools also outsourced to their card provider the process for paying financial aid and other funds via college cards and other methods. Some schools also used college cards as student identification. The dominant provider was Higher One, a nonbank financial firm that had a 57 percent market share in 2013, as measured by number of card agreements."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DHS's and the Coast Guard did not meet the SAFE Port Act's requirement that IOCs be established at high-priority ports by October 2009, in part because the Coast Guard was not appropriated funds to establish the IOCs until 14 months after enactment of the law, and the definition of an IOC was evolving during this period. However, the Coast Guard plans to establish IOCs at all 35 of its sectors. According to the Coast Guard's analysis of sector status reports, none of its sectors have achieved IOCs with full operating capability. According to the Coast Guard’s Chief of IOC Implementation, as well as its Information Sharing Executive Agent, continued support is needed from DHS to increase port-partner participation and the success of the IOC initiative. DHS has recently begun to support efforts to increase port-partner participation and further IOC implementation, such as facilitating the review of an IOC management directive. It is too early to determine, though, if and when IOCs will achieve their intended goal of sharing information and coordinating operations with port partners."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In brief, GAO found that (1) VHA's reported outpatient medical appointment wait times are unreliable, (2) there was inconsistent implementation of certain elements of VHA's scheduling policy that could result in increased wait times or delays in scheduling timely medical appointments, and (3) VHA is implementing or piloting a number of initiatives to improve veterans' access to medical appointments. Specifically, VHA's reported outpatient medical appointment wait times are unreliable because of problems with correctly recording the appointment desired date--the date on which the patient or provider would like the appointment to be scheduled--in the VistA scheduling system. Since, at the time of our review, VHA measured medical appointment wait times as the number of days elapsed from the desired date, the reliability of reported wait time performance is dependent on the consistency with which VA medical centers (VAMC) schedulers record the desired date in the VistA scheduling system. However, aspects of VHA's scheduling policy and related training documents on how to determine and record the desired date are unclear and do not ensure replicable and reliable recording of the desired date by the large number of staff across …

A statement of record issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury—use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the records GAO reviewed. GAO also found that the civilian IC elements either under- or over-reported the amount of contract obligations by more than 10 percent …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) continues to incur unsustainable operating deficits, has not made required payments of $11.1 billion to prefund retiree health benefits, and has reached its $15 billion borrowing limit. Thus far, USPS has been able to operate within these constraints, but now faces a critical shortage of liquidity that threatens its financial solvency and ability to finance needed capital investment. USPS had an almost 25 percent decline in total mail volume and net losses totaling $40 billion since fiscal year 2006. While USPS achieved about $15 billion in savings and reduced its workforce by about 168,000 over this period, its debt and unfunded benefit liabilities grew to $96 billion by the end of fiscal year 2012. USPS expects mail volume and revenue to continue decreasing as online bill communication and e-commerce expand."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) identified various drivers for the close to $3 billion increase in the estimated cost of the Plutonium Disposition program's two construction projects—the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and the Waste Solidification Building (WSB). These drivers included DOE's approval of the MOX facility's cost and schedule estimates before design was complete and schedule delays in construction of the WSB. According to NNSA, the cost of critical system components for the MOX facility averaged 60 percent higher than estimated as a result of approval of estimates before design was complete."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO's prior work has identified a number of lessons from federal responses to seasonal influenza vaccine shortages and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic that carry implications for future influenza seasons or another influenza pandemic. These lessons include the value of planning that involves the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); the importance of effective communication among all levels of government and with the public; and the difficulty of matching vaccine supply with the public's demand for it. First, planning is critical to an effective response, and it particularly helped in responding to the H1N1 pandemic. Planning activities, such as exercises and interagency meetings, built relationships that positioned the government to respond effectively. Second, clear and consistent communication, especially regarding the availability of vaccine, is key. The failure to effectively manage public expectations of vaccine availability can undermine government credibility and contribute to individuals' failure to seek or receive an influenza vaccination. Recognizing the importance of sharing updated information, HHS's influenza website includes a vaccine finder for individuals, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) website helps providers find vaccine available for purchase. Third, predicting all of …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "During fiscal year 2011, OFS addressed several of the internal control issues related to the significant deficiency we reported for fiscal year 2010 concerning its accounting and financial reporting processes. However, remaining uncorrected control deficiencies along with other control deficiencies that we identified in this area in fiscal year 2011 collectively represented a continuing significant deficiency in OFS’s internal control over its accounting and financial reporting processes. Specifically, while OFS improved its review and approval process for preparing its financial statements, notes, and Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) for TARP for fiscal year 2011, we continued to identify incorrect amounts and inconsistent disclosures in OFS’s draft financial statements, notes, and MD&A that were significant, but not material, and that were not detected by OFS. For fiscal year 2011, we also identified deficiencies in other OFS accounting and financial reporting procedures related to: (1) recording of noncash transactions, (2) recording of warrant adjustments, and (3) accounting for Public-Private Investment Fund (PPIF) equity distributions."