A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Multiple U.S. agencies and international partners are engaged in efforts to assist Pakistan in countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but face a variety of ongoing challenges. The agencies providing counter-IED assistance to Pakistan are primarily the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ). The following table identifies the types of assistance these U.S. agencies have provided and the corresponding objectives of Pakistan’s National Counter-IED Strategy. According to U.S. officials, U.S. agencies have encountered ongoing challenges to their efforts to assist Pakistan, such as delays in obtaining visas and in the delivery of equipment. U.S. officials have also identified broader challenges to Pakistan’s ability to counter IEDs, including the extreme difficulty of interdicting smugglers along its porous border with Afghanistan. In addition, though Pakistan developed a National Counter-IED Strategy in June 2011, it has yet to finalize an implementation plan for carrying out the strategy."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO's analysis of resources devoted to the Department of Defense's (DOD) geographic combatant commands shows that authorized military and civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs have grown considerably over the last decade due to the addition of two new commands and increases in authorized positions at theater special operations commands. Data provided by the commands shows that authorized military and civilian positions increased by about 50 percent from fiscal years 2001 through 2012, to about 10,100 authorized positions. In addition, mission and headquarters support-costs at the combatant commands more than doubled from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, to about $1.1 billion. Both authorized military and civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs at the service component commands supporting the combatant commands also increased. Data on the number of personnel performing contract services across the combatant commands and service component commands varied or was unavailable, and thus trends could not be identified."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In GAO’s audits of the Congressional Award Foundation’s (Foundation) financial statements for fiscal years 2012 and 2011, it found that the Foundation’s financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. GAO also identified no material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting, and no reportable noncompliance with laws and regulations it tested."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Information on the overall effectiveness (or impact) of the CDBG and HOME programs is limited. According to HUD officials, the agency has faced challenges in evaluating the impact of CDBG and HOME because, among other things, such an evaluation would have to compare neighborhoods that received program assistance with those that did not. Our previous work has also identified the difficulties of evaluating the impact of block grant programs that do not represent a uniform package of activities or desired outcomes across the country, as well as the common problem of attributing differences in communities’ outcomes to the effect of a program in the absence of controls for other explanations. As a result, few comprehensive studies on the impact of the CDBG and HOME programs exist, but studies that focused on specific activities have generally found that each of the programs has made positive contributions. We identified two studies that attempted to examine the overall impact of the CDBG program on communities, but both studies encountered evaluation challenges due to the program’s design. For example, a 1995 study that HUD considers the most comprehensive evaluation of CDBG suggests …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Many State Partnership Program stakeholders, including State Partnership Program Coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and combatant command officials, cited benefits to the program, but the program lacks a comprehensive oversight framework that includes clear program goals, objectives, and metrics to measure progress against those goals, which limits the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and Congress’ ability to assess whether the program is an effective and efficient use of resources. The benefits described by all stakeholders focused on the program’s contributions to meeting their specific missions, such as building security relationships, providing experience to guardsmen, and supporting combatant commands’ missions. Goals, objectives, and metrics to measure progress are necessary for management oversight, and National Guard Bureau officials told GAO that they recognize the need to update the program’s goals and develop metrics and have initiated efforts in these areas. Officials expect completion of these efforts in summer 2012. Until program goals and metrics are implemented, DOD cannot fully assess or adequately oversee the program."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Temporary Assistance for Needy Families' (TANF) role in providing cash assistance has evolved; fewer eligible families receive cash assistance and the composition of the caseload has changed. GAO noted in 2010 that 87 percent of the dramatic decline from 1995 through 2005 in the number of families receiving cash assistance was due a decline in eligible families participating in TANF, rather than increased incomes. Changes to state TANF programs, such as mandatory work requirements and lower benefits, account in part for this decline. Relatively modest caseload increases in recent years nationwide, as well as decreases in some states, have raised questions about TANF's responsiveness to changing economic conditions. GAO also reported in 2011 that the composition of the TANF caseload has changed, with about 40 percent of cases now comprised of children only, with the adult not receiving benefits, and little known nationwide about state policies for aiding these children. Potential options to better understand TANF's role as a cash assistance program may include: improving information on the extent to which states provide cash assistance to eligible low-income families, and requiring states to include more information--for …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Unemployment rates for workers of all ages have risen dramatically since the start of the recent recession in December 2007, and workers age 55 and over have faced particularly long periods of unemployment. The seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate for older workers increased from 3.1 percent in December 2007 to a high of 7.6 percent in February 2010, before it decreased to 6.0 percent in April 2012. As in prior recessions, smaller percentages of workers age 55 and over became unemployed in comparison with younger workers. Some researchers attribute older workers’ lower unemployment rates to the fact that older workers tend to have longer job tenure, and are consequently less likely to be laid off than younger workers."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) pension program design and management do not adequately ensure that only veterans with financial need receive pension benefits. While the pension program is means tested, there is no prohibition on transferring assets prior to applying for benefits. Other means-tested programs, such as Medicaid, conduct a look-back review to determine if an individual has transferred assets at less than fair market value, and if so, may deny benefits for a period of time, known as the penalty period. This control helps ensure that only those in financial need receive benefits. In contrast, VA pension claimants can transfer assets for less than fair market value immediately prior to applying and be approved for benefits. For example, GAO identified a case where a claimant transferred over a million dollars less than 3 months prior to applying and was granted benefits. Also, VA’s process for assessing initial eligibility is inadequate in several key respects. The application form does not ask for some sources of income and assets such as private retirement income, annuities, and trusts. As a result, VA lacks complete information on a …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Transactions within virtual economies or using virtual currencies could produce taxable income in various ways, depending on the facts and circumstances of each transaction. For example, transactions within a "closed-flow" virtual currency system do not produce taxable income because a virtual currency can be used only to purchase virtual goods or services. An example of a closed-flow transaction is the purchase of items to use within an online game. In an "openflow" system, a taxpayer who receives virtual currency as payment for real goods or services may have earned taxable income since the virtual currency can be exchanged for real goods or services or readily exchanged for governmentissued currency, such as U.S. dollars."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since GAO’s 2007 review, the Army has taken steps to improve its use of reset in targeting equipment shortages. In 2007, GAO noted that the Army’s reset implementation strategy did not specifically target shortages of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to mitigate operational risk. GAO recommended that the Army act to ensure that its reset priorities address equipment shortages in the near term to ensure that the needs of deploying units could be met. The Department of Defense (DOD) did not concur, and stated that there was no need to reassess its approaches to equipment reset. However, in 2008, the Army issued its Depot Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan, noted that filling materiel shortages within warfighting units is a key challenge facing the depot maintenance enterprise, and called for changes in programs and policies to address materiel shortages within warfighting units. Further, recognizing that retrograde operations—the return of equipment from theater to the United States—are essential to facilitating depot level reset and redistribution of equipment, the Army in 2010 developed the retrograde, reset, and redistribution (R3) initiative to …