Declassified and heavily redacted intelligence report. From Executive Summary: "In June 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden perpetrated the largest and most damaging public release of classified information in U.S. intelligence history. In August 2014, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) directed Committee staff to carry out a comprehensive review of the unauthorized disclosures. The aim of the review was to allow the Committee to explain to other Members of Congress--and, where possible, the American people--how this breach occurred, what the U.S> Government knows about the man who committed it, and whether the security shortfalls it highlighted had been remedied."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is charged with developing and acquiring equipment to detect nuclear and radiological materials to support federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. Also within DHS, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the lead for operating systems to detect nuclear and radiological materials entering the country at U.S. ports of entry. In 2005, DNDO began working on the cargo advanced automated radiography system (CAARS) intending that it be used by CBP to detect certain nuclear materials in vehicles and containers at U.S. ports of entry. However, in 2007 DNDO decided to cancel the acquisition phase of the program and convert it to a research and development program. GAO was asked to examine events that led to DNDO's decision to cancel the acquisition phase of the program and provide lessons learned from DNDO's experience. This statement is based on prior GAO reports from March 2006 through July 2010 and ongoing work reviewing DHS efforts to develop radiography technology. For ongoing work, GAO reviewed CAARS planning documents and interviewed DHS, DNDO, and CBP officials. GAO provided a draft of the information …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the Department of Defense's (DOD) separation requirements for enlisted servicemembers diagnosed with personality disorders and the military services' compliance with these requirements. DOD requires that all enlisted servicemembers, including those serving in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), be physically and psychologically suitable for military service. Enlisted servicemembers who fail to meet this standard may be involuntarily separated from the military. One psychological condition that can render an enlisted servicemember unsuitable for military service is a personality disorder, which is defined as a long-standing, inflexible pattern of behavior that deviates markedly from expected behavior, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, and leads to distress or impairment. Although a personality disorder by itself does not make enlisted servicemembers unsuitable for military service, DOD policy allows for involuntary separation from the military if a servicemember's disorder is severe enough that it interferes with his or her ability to function in the military. DOD data show that from November 1, 2001, through June 30, 2007, about 26,000 enlisted servicemembers were separated from the military because of a personality disorder. Of these …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses small business participation in Gulf Coast rebuilding after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Federal agencies directly awarded $20.5 billion in contracts nationwide between fiscal years 2005 and 2011 for recovery efforts related to these hurricanes. These contracts are subject to federal procurement regulations and, in most cases, are generally subject to certain goals to increase participation by small businesses. This statement is based on a report we issued in July 2010, which discussed the extent to which Gulf Coast small businesses received federal contract funds for recovery efforts, with data on contract funds updated through fiscal year 2011 where possible. More specifically, the statement discusses (1) the amounts that small businesses nationwide and small businesses in four Gulf Coast states received directly from federal agencies through contracts for relief and recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; and (2) the extent to which four agencies--the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DOD) excluding the Corps, and General Services Administration (GSA)--monitored subcontracting accomplishment information as required for selected contracts."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated several efforts over the years to address its long-standing financial management weaknesses and ultimately achieve unqualified (clean) opinions on its financial statements. In 2005, the DOD Comptroller first issued the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan for improving financial management and reporting. In May 2010, the DOD Comptroller issued the FIAR Guidance to provide standardized guidance to DOD components for developing Financial Improvement Plans (FIP) to implement the FIAR Plan. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) progress made by the DOD Comptroller in developing and issuing the FIAR Guidance, (2) challenges faced by DOD components in implementing the FIAR Guidance, and (3) improvements needed in DOD's oversight and monitoring of FIAR implementation efforts. This statement is based on four audits that were undertaken at the request of this subcommittee and other congressional requesters to evaluate the progress DOD is making in implementing its FIAR Plan and FIAR Guidance. GAO addresses findings and recommendations from two reports being issued this week (GAO-11-830 and GAO-11-851) and preliminary information from two ongoing audits. Each audit demonstrates some of the challenges DOD faces in improving …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since October 1994, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im) has had statutory authority to provide loans, guarantees, and insurance to help finance U.S. exports of defense articles and services, provided that it determines these items are nonlethal and meant primarily for civilian use (dual-use). These exports, referred to as "dual-use" exports, include such items as vehicles that are used by the military primarily for civilian or humanitarian purposes. Legislation providing this authority requires us to report annually on the end uses of the dual-use exports financed by Ex-Im during the second preceding fiscal year. This report covers Ex-Im financing for dual-use exports in fiscal years 2007 through 2009."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program began in 1996 with an acquisition strategy that called for a competitive engine acquisition program. The program planned to first develop and procure the F135 primary engine and, with a few years lag time, develop the F136 second (or alternate) engine to compete with the F135 engine for future procurements and life-cycle support activities. The Department of Defense (DOD) requested funding for both engines annually as the JSF program progressed until the fiscal year 2007 budget submission, at which point the DOD stopped requesting funding for the F136 alternate engine. Defense officials believe that the operational risks of relying on a single engine supplier are low and do not justify the extra costs to maintain a second engine source. DOD further states that there is no guarantee that having an engine competition will create enough long-term savings to outweigh the up-front costs and now intends to acquire only the F135 primary engine. However, Congress has continued to fund the alternate engine development program annually through fiscal year 2010. According to the Secretary of Defense, DOD would need an additional $2.9 billion in …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "To reduce spending on durable medical equipment (DME) and related items, under federal law the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is phasing in, with several rounds of bidding, a competitive bidding program (CBP) for certain DME and other items. Because of numerous concerns, the Medicare Improvements for Patient and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) terminated the CBP round 1 supplier contracts and required CMS to repeat the CBP round 1, the rebid that began in 2009. In November 2009, GAO issued the report Medicare: CMS Working to Address Problems from Round 1 of the Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program (GAO-10-27) that documented problems in CMS's implementation of CBP round 1. This statement discusses some of the problems GAO identified and how CMS has or plans to address them in the ongoing CBP rebid bidding process, particularly (1) the bid submission information provided to suppliers, (2) the electronic bid submission system, and (3) the bid disqualification notification process. For the 2009 report, GAO reviewed data provided by CMS and relevant laws and regulations, and interviewed CMS officials. For this statement, GAO also obtained select information on …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses our recent work on the federal government's efforts to increase contracting opportunities for small businesses. This work covered (1) the Offices of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) at federal agencies, (2) federal mentor-protege programs, and (3) the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Procurement Center Representatives (PCR) and Commercial Market Representatives (CMR). More specifically, to increase small businesses' visibility within federal agencies, in 1978 Congress amended the Small Business Act to require that all federal agencies with procurement powers establish an OSDBU, which would advocate for small businesses in a variety of ways. The act further requires that OSDBU directors be responsible only to and report directly to agency heads or their deputies. The purpose of this provision is to help ensure that OSDBU directors have direct access to their agencies' top decision makers in order to advocate effectively. The functions an OSDBU may perform include administering a mentor-protege program. Under such programs, mentors--businesses, typically experienced prime contractors--provide technical, managerial, and other business development assistance to eligible small businesses, or proteges. In return, the programs provide incentives for mentor participation, such as credit toward subcontracting goals. …