In Part I, this CRS report discusses the policy on “one China” since the United States began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II documents the evolution of the “one China” principle as articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. The U.S. policy on “one China” has evolved to cover three issues: sovereignty, peaceful resolution, and cross-strait dialogue.

Despite apparently consistent statements in over three decades, the "one China" policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Questions have arisen about the policy itself and about the policy in relation to U.S. interests regarding peace and stability. This report discusses U.S. policy on the "one China" policy in regards to three major issues: sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in preventing conflict across the Taiwan Strait have been challenged by China's military modernization and Taiwanese moves toward independence that have been perceived in Beijing as provocative. This report describes these issues in detail, including relevant legislation.

In Part I, this CRS report discusses the policy on “one China” since the United States began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II documents the evolution of the “one China” principle as articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. The U.S. policy on “one China” has evolved to cover three issues: sovereignty, peaceful resolution, and cross-strait dialogue.

In Part I, this CRS report discusses the policy on “one China” since the United States began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II documents the evolution of the “one China” principle as articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. The U.S. policy on “one China” has evolved to cover three issues: sovereignty, peaceful resolution, and cross-strait dialogue.

This report discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation.

This report discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation.

This report discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation.

This report discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation.

This report discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation.

This report discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation.

This report discusses U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress. It also lists sales of major defense articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the President, proposed in Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and notified to Congress since 1990. Based on unclassified notices, reports, and interviews, this list includes the date of notification, major item proposed for sale, and estimated value of the defense package.

This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or the Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979 when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the “one China” policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the “Six Assurances” made to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. In addition, the United States has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC’s missile firings in 1995-1996. However, there is no defense treaty or alliance with Taiwan.

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The United States military has been building up forces on the U.S. territory of Guam to increase deterrence and power projection for possible responses to crises and disasters, counter-terrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. But the defense buildup on Guam is moderate. China has concerns about the defense buildup. Guam's role has increased with plans to withdraw some U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea. This report describes in brief detail the various cooperative efforts, including financial efforts, undertaken by the U.S. and the above nations.

After several years of negotiations, Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the international organization that sets rules for most international trade, on January 1, 2002. China fought to allow Taiwan to join the WTO only as a “separate customs territory” and only after China obtained membership (which it did in December 2001). Trade and investment relations between China and Taiwan have boomed in recent years; China has replaced the United States as Taiwan’s export market. However, political tensions between China and Taiwan remain high. In an effort to further boost U.S.-Taiwan economic ties (and to lessen Taiwan’s growing economic dependency on the mainland), some Members of Congress have indicated support for a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement (FTA). This report will be updated as events warrant.

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