This report examines India-Iran relations and U.S. interests. India's growing energy needs and its relatively benign view of Iran's intentions will likely cause policy differences between New Delhi and Washington. India seeks positive ties with Iran and is unlikely to downgrade its relationship with Tehran at the behest of external powers, but it is unlikely that the two will develop a broad and deep strategic alliance. India-Iran relations are also unlikely to derail the further development of close and productive U.S.-India relations on a number of fronts.

The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA) was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and advanced conventional weapons technology, particularly from Russia. Section 6 of the INA bans U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station (ISS) unless the U.S. President determines that Russia is taking steps to prevent such proliferation. The ISS is currently under construction in orbit. According to current plans, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will become dependent on Russia for certain ISS crew-related services beginning in April 2006 for which NASA must pay. Thus, the INA could significantly affect the U.S. utilization of ISS. This report outlines the history of INA, its effect on Russian and Iranian proliferation, its impact on the ISS program, and options for resolving associated issues. It will not be updated.

The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178), as originally enacted, prohibited the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) from purchasing Russian goods and services for the U.S.-led International Space Station (ISS) unless the President certified that Russia was not proliferating certain technologies to Iran. On July 12, 2005, the Bush Administration submitted to Congress an amendment to allow NASA to purchase goods and services from Russia to support the ISS. That presented a classic policy dilemma. Without access to Russian spacecraft, the U.S. use of the ISS could be extremely limited. Yet Russian entities were continuing proliferation activities relating to missile proliferation according to the Department of State. This report explains the Bush Administration proposal and resulting congressional action.

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This report discusses India's nonproliferation record and reported transfers to Iran of limited nuclear, chemical, and missile-related materials. Members of Congress have questioned whether India's cooperation with Iran might affect U.S. and other efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Iran’s nuclear program since 2003 have revealed significant undeclared activities with potential applications for nuclear weapons, including uranium enrichment facilities and plutonium separation efforts. Ever on the brink of being declared in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has allowed IAEA inspectors access only when pressed. Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities in exchange for promises of assistance from Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3). Negotiations with the EU-3 are ongoing, although, on August 1, 2005, Iran told the IAEA of its plans to resume uranium conversion, regardless of what the EU-3 offer. This report will be updated as needed.

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Inspections in 2003 and 2004 of Iran’s nuclear program revealed significant undeclared activities with potential applications for nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uncovered two uranium enrichment programs (centrifuges and lasers) and plutonium separation efforts. Iran has been pressured to give up its enrichment and reprocessing activities and has declared twice (November 2003 and November 2004) that it would halt all such activities in exchange for technical cooperation with Germany, France, and the UK. It is not clear whether Iran is buying time for a clandestine program or effectively using its program as a bargaining chip for wider economic gain. Iran signed an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement in December 2003 but has not yet ratified it. Ever on the brink of being declared in violation of the NPT, Iran has allowed IAEA inspectors access only when pressed. After several months, Iran recently agreed to let inspectors visit a military site: Parchin. This report, which is updated as needed, analyzes the significance of the IAEA’s findings for a possible Iranian nuclear weapons program.

This report examines various issues regard Iran and its nuclear program.International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed two decades’ worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive activities in negotiations with Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3), which broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement and reported Iran’s case to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. The Security Council called upon Iran to resuspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued its enrichment activities, failing to meet deadline after deadline. The Security Council passed UNSCR 1696 on July 31, 2006, and on December 23, 2006, the Security Council adopted limited sanctions under UNSCR 1737. The next deadline is February 23, 2007.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. The Security Council called upon Iran to take steps requested of it by the IAEA Board in February -- reinstate its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued enrichment activities and failed to meet the Security Council's request.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. The Security Council called upon Iran to take steps requested of it by the IAEA Board in February -- reinstate its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued enrichment activities and failed to meet the Security Council's request.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. The Security Council called upon Iran to take steps requested of it by the IAEA Board in February -- resuspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued enrichment activities and failed to meet the Security Council's request.

Since 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Iran’s nuclear program have revealed significant undeclared activities with potential applications for nuclear weapons, including uranium enrichment facilities and plutonium separation efforts. Also since 2003, Iran has been negotiating with Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3) for a wide range of assistance in exchange for a halt to such activities. Yet, most evidence indicates that Iran has never completely suspended its enrichment activities, raising the question of whether Iran is buying time to build nuclear weapons.

This report examines various issues regard Iran and its nuclear program.International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed two decades’ worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities in exchange for promises of assistance from Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3), but negotiations broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement (GOV/2005/77) and voted (GOV/2006/14) on February 4 to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council issued a presidential statement on March 29 that called upon Iran to reinstitute its voluntary suspension of enrichment and reprocessing and asked the IAEA to report on Iran’s compliance by April 28. On April 11, Iranian officials announced that they had enriched some uranium to 3.5% enrichment (fuel-grade).

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. The Security Council called upon Iran to take steps requested of it by the IAEA Board in February -- reinstate its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued enrichment activities and failed to meet the Security Council's request.

The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA) was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and advanced conventional weapons technology, particularly from Russia. Section 6 of the INA bans U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station (ISS) unless the U.S. President determines that Russia is taking steps to prevent such proliferation. The ISS is currently under construction in orbit. According to current plans, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will become dependent on Russia for certain ISS crew-related services beginning in April 2006 for which NASA must pay. Thus, the INA could significantly affect U.S. utilization of ISS. This report outlines the history of INA, its effect on Russian and Iranian proliferation, its impact on the ISS program, and options for resolving associated issues.

This report discusses the political future of various countries in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region. A change in the leadership in these countries could significantly affect their policies toward the United States and their willingness to cooperate with the United States in achieving the stability needed to advance U.S. interests in this important region.