Resale price maintenance occurs when manufacturers control the prices charged by wholesalers or retailers of their products. In Japan, such activities are prohibited, although certain exemptions are allowed. The U.S. concern over the practice is that it could allow Japanese firms to generate a secure profit base in their home market in order to finance aggressive price competition abroad.

American companies are facing increased competitive pressures from foreign firms. Many observers feel that U.S. firms lag behind their foreign competitors in the development, application, and marketing of new technologies and techniques. The Japanese industrial enterprise is characterized by a large proportion of private sector financing and many other factors, which this report analyzes at length. The question being debated by Congress is whether or not U.S. government programs and policies are an acceptable and effective means of supporting the efforts of American industries to operate in a manner consistent with success in world markets.

This report discusses the issues of the U.S.-Japanese trade relations of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, and the Clinton Administration.

This report describes recent changes in U.S. burdensharing relationships with NATO, Japan and South Korea and, in the process, identifies some implications for U.S. foreign policy.

This report provides information and analysis for use by Members of Congress as they deliberate on the Japanese response to the Gulf crisis and, perhaps more important, what it may mean for future U.S.-Japanese relations. The first chapter briefly reviews Japanese government actions in response to the crisis, from August 1990 to February 1991. A second section examines in detail the various factors and constraints that affected Japanese policy. The final section offers conclusions and examines implications of the episode for future U.S.-Japanese relations. Published sources for the report are cited in footnotes.

Japan is positioned to deploy its troops overseas for the first time since World War II. Under a controversial peacekeeping operations (PKO) bill passed by the Japanese Diet (parliament) on June 15, 1992, Japan is allowed to dispatch Self-Defense Forces (SDF) soldiers abroad for noncombat service with United Nations peacekeeping forces (PKF). [1] The politically sensitive PKO legislation comes two years after Japan was stung by international criticism for its failure to send troops to the Persian Gulf, even just for noncombat support. The day after the passage of the bill, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa pledged an early dispatch of SDF personnel to Cambodia.

Japan's sea shipment of a ton of plutonium from France to Japan on Nov. 7, 1992, faced strong public opposition, as did a previous one in 1984, from various public interest groups, independent analysts, and Members of Congress. The shipment arrived safely in Tokyo Jan. 4, 1993. Several more shipments at intervals of about 3 years are expected. While the plutonium is owned by Japanese utilities, it was produced from uranium enriched in the United States and supplied under a U.S.-Japan agreement for nuclear cooperation, revised in 1988. Although the agreement ties some strings to what Japan can do with nuclear imports from the United States, it also in effect gives to Japan a 30-year advance consent to ship plutonium subject to informing the United States.

In the 1980s, Japan's economy posted strong economic growth, in stark contrast to the more pedestrian growth other developed economies experienced. In this period, referred to as the "bubble" economy, Japan experienced a sharp increase in the values of land and stocks. The fast paced growth came to a halt in 1991, however, as the Ministry of Finance grew concerned over prospects of a rising rate of inflation, and, accordingly, tightened the nation's money supply. Since then, Japanese economic growth has fallen sharply and the economy has experienced asset deflation, rising levels of unemployment, and falling corporate profits and investments.

The Japanese economy has been in recession for three years, making it the longest recession in Japan's post-war experience. Groups within and outside Japan are calling on Japan to adopt aggressive fiscal policy measures to boost the Japanese economy and to aid in the recovery of the world economy. Japan has enacted a number of limited measures to stimulate, but it is unlikely to move more aggressively to adopt deficit-financing measures to stimulate its economy for a number of reasons: political and government leaders oppose deficit financing in principle; and under present economic conditions, Japanese officials are more concerned with the effects a fiscal stimulus program will have on the yen, on Japan's trade account, and on its economic recovery.

Japan's top 21 banks have reported Y13.6 trillion (US$136 billion) in non-performing loans, but experts consider the true figure to be in the range of Y40 to Y60 trillion (US$400 to US$600 billion). If 90, Japan's banks may take five to seven more years to write off their bad loans and restore health to their balance sheets. Current write-offs are being financed primarily by sales of stocks held by banks whose values have appreciated. This problem of bad loans is depressing Japan's economic growth rate and making resolution of trade disputes and further opening of Japan's financial markets more difficult.

Elections for half of the 252 seats of the upper house of Japan's Diet (parliament) will be held in late July 1992. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) appears unlikely to regain the majority it lost in the previous upper house election in July 1989. It appears that continued, but sometimes difficult, cooperation between the LDP and some of the smaller opposition parties is one likely result of the 1992 election. On the other hand, there is a possibility that significant political changes, such as the formation of a coalition government or even a reorganization of the political parties, could result from an opposition victory. As of early June, there are two large sources of uncertainty regarding the upcoming election: first, the LDP could dissolve the lower house and hold a lower house election on the same day as the upper house election, which would alter all calculations of likely outcomes; and second, political scandals which would probably hit the LDP hardest could be brought to light before the election.

Japan's banking sector currently is carrying between $400 billion and $800 billion in non-performing loans that threaten the solvency of certain financial institutions and weaken the Japanese financial system. This problem is of interest to the United States because the stability of Japan's banking system affects the health of that nation's economy, its rate of economic growth, and international capital flows. This, in turn, may affect American exports to, imports from, and investments in Japan. It also has affected Japanese investments in the United States and may affect the resolution of issues being negotiated or recently agreed to with that nation under the Framework Talks.

This report surveys U.S. automobile policy in the 1980s in order to clarify the effects of foreign lobbying. The conclusion is that the success of Japanese and other foreign lobbying on automobile policy has been mixed. Some decisions have gone their way; others have not. Their success is partly because they have aligned their efforts with those of powerful domestic interests.

Both the Bush Administration and the new Japanese Government headed by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa had given considerable importance to the President,s planned trip to Tokyo in late November, now postponed in the interest of attending to domestic concerns.

The prospects for Japan-U.S. relations in a rapidly changing minternational environment were explored in depth in a September 27, 1991, CRS seminar entitled "The Future of U.S.-Japan Relations: Global Partnership or Strategic, Rivalry?" A full transcript of the proceedings was published in February 1992 by the House Committee on Ways and Means as a Committee Print. This report summarizes the principal findings of that seminar.

Taiwan and Japan might seem to be two similar island economies when viewed from this side of the Pacific, but they are strikingly dissimilar. Over the twentieth century, their relationship with one another has shifted from colonial to mutual growth and recognition to the current anomaly of an intense economic interchange accompanied by severed diplomatic ties. Between Taiwan and Japan, the private sector is taking the lead in developing a relationship that is both mutually beneficial and strained.

Discussions in Japan in May 1992 related to potential agreements at the September 1992 Russian-Japanese summit were keyed to the central question, Will the barriers to significant commercial cooperation involving Russia, Japan and the United States in Russian Siberia be removed? [1] From these discussions among key Japanese industrialists, bankers, government officials and academics who influence policy, came a tentative "yes", if four conditions are met. A positive outcome would thus seem more likely than at any previous time. Such an outcome would likely promote profitable trade and investment, creating jobs in U.S. enterprises and serve as a vehicle for mutually beneficial U.S.-Japanese cooperation.

This list of readings focuses on the current state of the U.S. economic relationship with Japan. A general, introductory section is followed by citations discussing specific Japanese business practices and trade policies which have an impact on the relationship. The bibliography also describes trade trends in specific sectors (including commentaries on the semiconductor agreement) and concludes with a section on policy options.

The Clinton Administration and the 103rd Congress are in the early stages of a major review of U.S. trade, international and security relations with Japan, the principal U.S. ally and trading partner in Asia. A number of recent developments have raised tensions in this mutually beneficial relationship, which is still characterized by deepening economic interdependence and close political and security cooperation. These include the end of the Cold War, which has eliminated a common military threat; the recent renewed rise in Japan's trade surplus after several years of decline; and increasing international assertiveness by Japan, sometimes in conflict with U.S. policy.

Japan has quickly risen to prominence as a donor of official development assistance (ODA), providing volumes of aid on par with the United States since the late 1980s. Originally a tool to bolster Japan's postwar economic recovery, Japanese aid has gradually assumed importance as a foreign policy tool. Faced with increased pressure from the international community to play a greater role in meeting global challenges and lacking the military and diplomatic resources of other nations, Japan has increasingly turned to its foreign aid as a source of world influence.

Japanese officials interviewed for this project in May-early June 1993 were generally sanguine about relations with the United States at the start of the Clinton Administration, but the Administrations's strong emphasis on U.S.- Japan trade issues in recent months deepened their pessimism over the near term prospects of U.S.-Japan relations. They were uncertain whether U.S.- Japanese talks on trade issues prior to the Clinton-Miyazawa summit of July 1993 would reflect a basic change in U.S. trade policy that in term would alter their generally pessimistic outlook.

Japan, as an issue, has entered the debate over U.S. approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in several ways. The Clinton Administration has argued that Americans should support NAFTA because if it fails to pass Congress, Japan will rush to negotiate a similar arrangement with Mexico. Proponents of NAFTA also have argued that since Japan opposes NAFTA (because of its presumed protectionism and the benefits it provides to North American businesses), it must be "good for America." Opponents of NAFTA argue that the agreement would provide opportunities for Japanese manufacturers to invest in Mexico and export unfettered to the American market. Also, they assert that NAFTA would be like previous trade agreements, particularly with Japan, that have ended up hurting the U.S. economy. In either case, the effects of NAFTA on Japan would likely be small.

The U.S. officials interviewed for this study see little chance of an immediate improvement in U.S. relations with Japan over the next year. Trends in the United States and Japan in recent years have led to deepening U.S. frustrations, especially over economic issues. These developments have combined with fundamental changes (notably the collapse of the USSR) affecting U.S.-Japanese political-military ties to lead many U.S. officials to question the allocation of costs and benefits in the U.S.-Japan relationship and to press for arrangements that will alter the allocation in the interests of the United States. U.S. officials assume that their Japanese counterparts are undertaking similar reassessments.

This report examines: (1) the definition(s) of managed trade, (2) the underlying economic arguments for and against such policies, (3) past U.S. experiences with managed trade, (4) perceptions that Japan is somehow "different" from other trading nations and warrants a distinctive approach to resolving trade disputes, (5) the implications of the Administration's current results oriented approach to U.S.-Japan trade issues, and (6) alternative proposals offered in Congress to resolve trade disputes with Japan.