This report reviews data that the Administration has provided to Congress on the costs of U.S. forces based abroad and on the value of host nation support contributions. It analyzes the data in order to assess potential defense budget savings from measures now under congressional consideration. The report concludes that, because of shortcomings in the data, estimates of savings in the U.S. defense budget from increased host nation contributions are often overstated. Some commonly accepted assertions frequently cited in the congressional burdensharing debate, therefore, are of doubtful validity.

This report presents documentation of the status and trends in the driftnet fleet (Asian fishing vessels carrying large driftnet fishing gear), a summary of the industry and governmental plans for the near future, and an assessment of possible fleet adaptations to the moratorium from a political/economic perspective.

From objectives and scope of work: The objective of this report is to provide a comprehensive review of the biology and population status of sea turtles potentially subject to entanglement in North Pacific high-seas driftnet fisheries. The report will assist National Marine Fisheries Service efforts to assess the impacts of the driftnet fisheries on threatened and endangered sea turtle populations.

Japan's war reparations following World War II came in two stages. In the first, 1946-1949, U.S. and allied governments arranged for U.S. occupation authorities to ship about $160 million in Japanese industrial equipment to China, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the British colonies in East Asia.

This report surveys U.S. automobile policy in the 1980s in order to clarify the effects of foreign lobbying. The conclusion is that the success of Japanese and other foreign lobbying on automobile policy has been mixed. Some decisions have gone their way; others have not. Their success is partly because they have aligned their efforts with those of powerful domestic interests.

Some indirect measures of Japan's import barriers indicate that Japan's import behavior is unusual, but some do not. Japan's trade surplus is large, but the United States exports as much to that market as it does to other major industrialized nations. Japan's imports of manufactures, however, are low relative to levels in other industrialized nations.

President Clinton proposed to Prime Minister Miyazawa the idea of a framework for U.S.-Japanese negotiations during their April 13, 1993 meeting in Washington. The two leaders agreed to instruct subordinates to prepare details of such a framework in time for presentation in July in Tokyo when the President would meet with the Prime Minister and the other G-7 leaders at the annual economic summit.

ave Japan's trade concessions resulted in more U.S. exports? One premise of the more results-oriented trade policy toward Japan now being pursued is that past concessions have not caused U.S. exports to Japan to rise. The only success story seems to be that of semiconductors in which a specific goal of 20 percent of the Japanese market was set and attained.

None

This report contains a list of readings focuses on the current state of the U.S. economic relationship with Japan. A general, introductory section is followed by citations discussing specific Japanese business practices and trade policies which have an impact on the relationship. The bibliography also describes trade trends in specific sectors (including commentaries on the semiconductor agreement) and concludes with a section on policy options.

With Japan the United States has had one of its most important and most difficult trading relationships. Japan ranks second to Canada as the largest U.S. export market. It is also the second largest single source of imports to the United States. Trade issues are likely to become even more important as the whole U.S.-Japanese relationship changes in the post-Cold War period. How each country views and reacts to the other is changing as economic issues replace foreign policy and national security issues as the driving force of the relationship.

As a result of an initiative by Australia in 1989, the United States joined with eleven other Asia/Pacific nations in creating APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization. This report discusses the annual Ministerial Meeting of APEC in Seattle, held from November 17 - 19, 1993.

Japan's global current account surplus is expected to reach $150 billion in 1993, up substantially from a modest $36 billion in 1990. The movement of Japan's current account surplus in this period is, perhaps, more dramatic as a share of GDP, going from a substantial 3.6 percent in 1987, down to a modest 1.2 percent in 1990, and up again to about 3.1 percent in 1992. Japan's growing surplus is criticized as a consequence of that country's barriers to trade, and as a drag on the economic recovery of the world economy.

This report provides information and analysis for use by Members of Congress as they deliberate on the Japanese response to the Gulf crisis and, perhaps more important, what it may mean for future U.S.-Japanese relations. The first chapter briefly reviews Japanese government actions in response to the crisis, from August 1990 to February 1991. A second section examines in detail the various factors and constraints that affected Japanese policy. The final section offers conclusions and examines implications of the episode for future U.S.-Japanese relations. Published sources for the report are cited in footnotes.

In the 1980s, Japan's economy posted strong economic growth, in stark contrast to the more pedestrian growth other developed economies experienced. In this period, referred to as the "bubble" economy, Japan experienced a sharp increase in the values of land and stocks. The fast paced growth came to a halt in 1991, however, as the Ministry of Finance grew concerned over prospects of a rising rate of inflation, and, accordingly, tightened the nation's money supply. Since then, Japanese economic growth has fallen sharply and the economy has experienced asset deflation, rising levels of unemployment, and falling corporate profits and investments.

This report examines: (1) the definition(s) of managed trade, (2) the underlying economic arguments for and against such policies, (3) past U.S. experiences with managed trade, (4) perceptions that Japan is somehow "different" from other trading nations and warrants a distinctive approach to resolving trade disputes, (5) the implications of the Administration's current results oriented approach to U.S.-Japan trade issues, and (6) alternative proposals offered in Congress to resolve trade disputes with Japan.

A prominent feature of Japan's capitalism consists of families of companies called keiretsu that are linked by crossholdings of stock shares, intra-group financing, and certain coordinating mechanisms. Two types of keiretsu exist: large horizontally organized industrial conglomerates, such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo, and vertically integrated manufacturers, such as Toyota, Nippon Steel, and Matsushita Electric. They have become a contentious issue in U.S. trade negotiations with Japan for several reasons.

Both the Bush Administration and the new Japanese Government headed by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa had given considerable importance to the President,s planned trip to Tokyo in late November, now postponed in the interest of attending to domestic concerns.

Japan's top 21 banks have reported Y13.6 trillion (US$136 billion) in non-performing loans, but experts consider the true figure to be in the range of Y40 to Y60 trillion (US$400 to US$600 billion). If 90, Japan's banks may take five to seven more years to write off their bad loans and restore health to their balance sheets. Current write-offs are being financed primarily by sales of stocks held by banks whose values have appreciated. This problem of bad loans is depressing Japan's economic growth rate and making resolution of trade disputes and further opening of Japan's financial markets more difficult.

None

None

Japan-U.S. relations are more uncertain and subject to greater strain today than at any time since World War II. Longstanding military allies and increasingly interdependent economic partners, Japan and the United States have worked closely together to build a strong, multifaceted relationship based on democratic values and interests in world stability and development. But Japan today is our foremost economic and technological competitor. It consistently runs the largest annual international trade surplus with the U.S. ($59 billion in 1993). The end of the Cold War, lackluster international economic conditions, and the focus on economic issues in U.S. politics have raised new questions about the appropriate U.S. policy toward this Asian ally.

Japan-U.S. relations are more uncertain and subject to greater strain today than at any time since World War II. Longstanding military allies and increasingly interdependent economic partners, Japan and the United States have worked closely together to build a strong, multifaceted relationship based on democratic values and interests in world stability and development. But Japan today is our foremost economic and technological competitor.

American companies are facing increased competitive pressures from foreign firms. Many observers feel that U.S. firms lag behind their foreign competitors in the development, application, and marketing of new technologies and techniques. The Japanese industrial enterprise is characterized by a large proportion of private sector financing and many other factors, which this report analyzes at length. The question being debated by Congress is whether or not U.S. government programs and policies are an acceptable and effective means of supporting the efforts of American industries to operate in a manner consistent with success in world markets.