Japan's global current account surplus is expected to reach $150 billion in 1993, up substantially from a modest $36 billion in 1990. The movement of Japan's current account surplus in this period is, perhaps, more dramatic as a share of GDP, going from a substantial 3.6 percent in 1987, down to a modest 1.2 percent in 1990, and up again to about 3.1 percent in 1992. Japan's growing surplus is criticized as a consequence of that country's barriers to trade, and as a drag on the economic recovery of the world economy.

The Clinton Administration and the 103rd Congress are in the early stages of a major review of U.S. trade, international and security relations with Japan, the principal U.S. ally and trading partner in Asia. A number of recent developments have raised tensions in this mutually beneficial relationship, which is still characterized by deepening economic interdependence and close political and security cooperation. These include the end of the Cold War, which has eliminated a common military threat; the recent renewed rise in Japan's trade surplus after several years of decline; and increasing international assertiveness by Japan, sometimes in conflict with U.S. policy.

Japan's current political instability began in July 1993, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) -- in power since 1955 - was voted out and replaced by a fragile multiparty coalition government under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa. The new government faced turmoil in April 1994, when Hosokawa suddenly resigned amid a personal financial scandal. Then-deputy prime minister/foreign minister Tsutomu Hata succeeded, but only at the head of a minority government after the Socialist party, a key coalition partner, quit the Hata coalition. Although beset by its own internal squabbles, the LDP remained the single largest party in Japan's bicameral Diet, or parliament. In late June, Hata was forced to resign under threat of an LDP-led no-confidence motion.

The Japanese economy has been in recession for three years, making it the longest recession in Japan's post-war experience. Groups within and outside Japan are calling on Japan to adopt aggressive fiscal policy measures to boost the Japanese economy and to aid in the recovery of the world economy. Japan has enacted a number of limited measures to stimulate, but it is unlikely to move more aggressively to adopt deficit-financing measures to stimulate its economy for a number of reasons: political and government leaders oppose deficit financing in principle; and under present economic conditions, Japanese officials are more concerned with the effects a fiscal stimulus program will have on the yen, on Japan's trade account, and on its economic recovery.