Increases in process water flows will be needed as the current program of increasing pile power levels continues. The future process water flows that will be required are known to be beyond the present maximum capacities of component parts of the water system. It is desirable to determine the present maximum capacities of each major component part so that plans can be mode for modifications and/or additions to the present equipment to meet future required flows. The apparent hydraulic limit of the present piles is about 68,000 gpm. This figure is based on a tube inlet pressure of 400 psi, a tube flow of 34 gpm, and 2,000 effective tubes. In this document the results of tests and calculations to determine the present maximum capacities of each major component part of the 100-B water system will be presented. Emergency steam operated pumps will not be considered as it is doubtful of year around operation of a steam driven pump could be economically justified. Some possible ways to increase the process water flows of each component part of the water system to the ultimate of 68,000 gpm are given.

Varying amounts of radiation decomposition during storage in the dry form have been found in the cases of C{sup 14}-labeled valine, norvaline, norleucine, choline chloride, calcium glycolate and cholesterol. These data indicate that investigators using labeled organic compounds should make frequent checks of the purity of these compounds in order to exclude the possibility of the presence of decomposition products.

The targets and probes will be introduced 6-inches below the median plane so that adequate mechanical support can be effectively utilized without reducing the aperture. Probe heads will be of such configuration as to allow monitoring of any desired vertical strip of the aperture. It is probable that some space will be available in the quadrants after first performance tests have been on the machine. No targets or probes will be located in that 1-foot x 4-foot aperture initially. Provision will be made for driving the inner radius targets on the west tangent tank into the aperture during acceleration. The drive mechanism will locate the target (within an adjustable radius) in 1/2 a second. Because of the asymmetry in geometry of pole tip magnets with respect to the magnet yokes and the curvature of the quadrants, it will be difficult to remove positive charged meson beams. A re-entrant side plate on the inside radius of the west tangent tank is under study. While such a plate would provide a location for bending magnets and collimators for positive particles and would simplify the construction of some beam monitoring probes, its presence may introduce a first harmonic distortion in the magnet field …

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This report discusses the proposal to expand the existing 224-U Building from an instantaneous rate of 13.5 tons of uranium per day to 18.5 tons per day. This is to be accomplished by the installation of two additional 8{prime} calcining kettles (or pots) available through the Atomic Energy Commission from Luckey, Ohio. It is the purpose of this report to present calculations and recommendations upon which design work is proceeding. This expansion is to utilize existing facilities of 224-U whenever possible and this report forms a record of the methods used in evaluating equipment and systems. Included are analysis of pot ventilation and pot unloading, stress analysis of the new pots, radiation hazard calculations and a composite schematic.

All foreseeable emergencies are adequately forestalled by installing in the reactor areas of the Savannah River Plant a number of pieces of auxiliary equipment. This precaution is taken in order to prevent permanent damage to the main equipment and to contain the radioactive material in the restricted areas of the plant. However, in the unlikely event of failure of some pieces of the main and/or auxiliary equipment, it is necessary that the operators take coordinated emergency action in order to prevent damage and hazard. In some cases swift action is called for. Because there are many pieces of equipment, all of which can conceivably be said to be subject to failure or faulty operation, one could postulate an astronomical number of failure incidents, each one different. But many of these would be highly improbable or call for the same emergency action. On the master incident sheet, Table 1, there are defined twenty such incidents, which represent a fair cross section of the possibilities. In compiling this table, the authors have kept in mind all of the worst reactor accidents that have occurred in the US and Canada and those minor equipment failures that have occurred at SRP before the startup …

On July 16, 1953 I discussed with P.J. Clough and J.H. Durant the NRC progress on providing bond layers for extended surface fuel elements. The corrosion testing of four uranium samples, nickel coated by an NRC technique, came to an abrupt and premature end as a result of failures in the testing equipment. The coatings were ruined in the mishap. Similarly coated samples are in the process of being prepared. The corrosion tests will be re-initiated upon completion of the samples.