A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Plan sponsors and participants paid a range of fees for services, though smaller plans typically paid higher fees as a percentage of plan assets. For example, the average amount sponsors of small plans reported paying for recordkeeping and administrative services was 1.33 percent of assets annually, compared with 0.15 percent paid by sponsors of large plans. Larger plans were more likely to pass recordkeeping fees along to participants, but when fees were passed along to participants in small plans, those in large plans paid lower fees than those in small plans. Participants also paid for investment and plan consulting fees—through fees deducted from their plan assets—in more instances than sponsors."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Most lobbyists were able to provide documentation to demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements. This finding is similar to GAO’s results from prior reviews. There are no specific requirements for lobbyists to create or maintain documentation related to disclosure reports they file under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 as amended (LDA). Nonetheless, and similar to last year’s results, for two key elements of the reports (income and expenses), GAO estimates that lobbyists could provide documentation to support approximately 93 percent of the disclosure reports for the third and fourth quarters of 2010 and the first and second quarters of 2011. According to documentation lobbyists provided for income and expenses, GAO estimates that the amounts disclosed were properly reported and supported for 63 percent of the quarterly lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports. For lobbyists and lobbying firms listed on the LD-2 report, an estimated 86 percent filed year-end 2010 or midyear 2011 reports of federal political campaign contributions (LD-203) reports as required. For LD-203 political contributions reports, GAO estimates that a minimum of 4 percent of all LD-203 reports omitted one or more reportable political contributions that were …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "While there have been efficiency gains and efforts to improve service, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) faced challenges providing telephone service and responding to correspondence, continuing trends experienced in recent years. In 2012, 82 percent of individual taxpayers filed their returns electronically (e-filed), reducing IRS's processing costs. IRS also increased calls answered using automated service and added a variety of self service tools, which helped gain efficiencies. However, IRS's level of telephone service (the percentage of callers seeking live assistance who receive it) declined to 68 percent. In addition, of the 21 million pieces of paper correspondence IRS received, about 40 percent were considered overage (meaning that IRS did not respond within 45 days of receipt), an increase compared to last year. While IRS plans to continue to pursue efficiency gains, its strategy for future years does not specifically address how it plans to reverse these negative trends. Reversing the declines in telephone and correspondence services may require IRS to consider difficult tradeoffs, such as reassessing which phone calls IRS should answer with a live assistor and which it should not because automated services are available."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Census Bureau’s (Bureau) early planning and preparation efforts for the 2020 Census are consistent with most leading practices in each of the three management areas GAO reviewed. For example, with respect to its effort to transform its decennial organization, top Bureau leadership has been driving the transformation, and the agency has focused on a key set of principles as it begins to roll-out the strategy to staff. Furthermore, the Bureau has created a timeline to build momentum and show progress. At the same time, however, the amount of change-related activity the Bureau is considering as part of its reorganization of its decennial directorate may not be aligned with the resources the Bureau has allocated to plan, coordinate, and carry it out, and, as a result, the planned transformation efforts may not be sustainable or successful."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "According to U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) officials, to inform timely design decisions, research on new methods to improve the cost effectiveness of the 2020 Census must be accomplished early enough in the decade to confirm their likely impact on both cost and quality. Three key efforts--(1) the use of the Internet as a response option, (2) a potential move towards targeted address canvassing, and (3) the possible use of administrative records to replace data collected during census field operations--present the Bureau with potential opportunities to reduce costs while maintaining quality. The Bureau's 2020 Research and Testing Program has 14 fiscal year 2012 projects focused on informing design decisions related to the three key efforts. Bureau officials are also aware that the changes they are testing come with many risks, and for each project the Bureau has identified a number of risks and prioritized them from high to low. However, the Bureau has not developed mitigation or contingency plans for these project risks. For example, there are several risks, including tight time frames and accurate cost information, without mitigation and contingency plans. Additionally, GAO found that the …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Overall, the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Bureau) planning efforts for 2020 are off to a good start, as the Bureau made noteworthy progress within each of the four lessons learned from the 2010 Census. Still, additional steps will be needed within each of the lessons learned in order to sustain those reforms."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Because of delays and cost increases, the General Services Administration (GSA) canceled the authorized 41-courtroom Los Angeles (L.A.), California, courthouse project in 2006. Since then, GSA and the judiciary have been slow to agree upon how to proceed with the project, for which about $366 million in appropriated funds remains available. In 2012, with the judiciary’s support, GSA issued a request for proposal for contractors to design and build a 24-courtoom, 32-chamber courthouse, which would be used in conjunction with 25 existing courtrooms in the Roybal Courthouse. However, this new plan will not address one of the principal justifications for the original project—that the L.A. Court be centralized at one site. Instead, it would increase the distance between the Roybal Courthouse and the planned second court location and the distance to the federal detention center from which prisoners must be transported."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since the fall of 2010, State has sanctioned 13 foreign firms under the ISA—2 for investments in Iran’s energy sector and 11 for supplying refined petroleum products."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Little is known about the extent of transit agencies' compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) paratransit service requirements. FTA does receive some assurance that agencies are complying with federal statutes and regulations, including ADA paratransit requirements, because transit agencies that receive FTA funding are required to self-certify and assure that they are complying with the Department of Transportation's ADA regulations. Additionally, FTA conducts specialized ADA paratransit compliance reviews that examine multiple aspects of an agency's paratransit services; however, few transit agencies are selected for review each year. FTA generally relies on complaints, media reports, experience with an agency, and other information to select agencies for review, but does not have documented criteria for selecting agencies. This informal selection process does not align with federal guidance on internal controls related to communication, documentation, and monitoring. Lastly, according to FTA officials, all finalized ADA paratransit compliance review reports are to be available on FTA's website, but GAO identified nine final review reports--conducted from 2004 to 2010--that have not been posted to FTA's website."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The four main U.S. agency Afghan development programs and accounts have similar goals and activities and hence overlap to some degree. In fiscal year 2011, the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and other smaller accounts administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), administered by the Department of Defense (DOD), funded similar activities related to agriculture; democracy and governance; education and health; energy and electricity; economic growth; and transportation. Both funded activities in 33 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces and in 249 of Afghanistan's 399 districts. The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), administered by DOD, and the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), administered by DOD and the Department of State (State), also funded efforts in some of the same categories of assistance as ESF and CERP in fiscal year 2011. According to agency officials, these overlapping development efforts can be beneficial, provided that agencies leverage their respective expertise and coordinate efforts."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and the Department of Defense (DOD) have reported expanding their civilian presence in Afghanistan and took steps to improve their ability to track that presence. Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more than tripled their civilian presence from 320 to 1,142. However, although State could report total Chief of Mission numbers by agency, in mid-2011 GAO identified discrepancies in State’s data system used to capture more-detailed staffing information such as location and position type. State began taking steps in the fall of 2011 to improve the reliability of its data system. Also, DOD reported expanding its overall civilian presence from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011 to help assist U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The extent to which DOD’s data is reliable is unknown due to omissions and double counting, among other things. In a 2009 report, GAO noted similar data issues and recommended DOD improve data concerning deployed civilians. DOD concurred with the recommendation and expects the issues will be addressed by a new tracking system to be completed in fiscal …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "U.S. government (USG), non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel perform various roles in the ANP training program. These roles include: (1) serving as advisors and mentors to build ministerial capacity in areas such as financial and human resource management at the Afghan Ministry of Interior; (2) serving as mentors and trainers to develop Afghan commanders’ abilities to operate training sites and provide training to ANP recruits in areas such as criminal investigation, weapons, survival skills, and physical fitness; and (3) serving as embedded mentors to help deployed ANP units develop civilian policing skills. DOD contractor personnel also provide maintenance, logistics, and security support at training sites.As of November 2011, about 778 USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel provided ANP training and mentoring at 23 NATO-managed sites. Approximately 66 percent of these trainers and mentors were non-USG coalition personnel, 21 percent were USG personnel, and the remaining 13 percent were DOD contractor personnel. In addition, about 2,825 DOD contractor personnel provided maintenance, logistics, and security services at 12 NATO-managed training sites."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) report progress developing capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), but tools used to assess the performance of ANSF units have changed several times. In April 2012, DOD reported progress increasing the number and capability of ANSF, with 7 percent of army units and 9 percent of police units rated at the highest level of capability. GAO has previously found the tools used by DOD and NATO to assess ANSF reliable enough to support broad statements regarding capability. However, issues related to these tools exist. When GAO reported on ANA capability in January 2011, the highest capability rating level was “independent”—meaning that a unit was capable of executing the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition forces. As of August 2011, the highest level had changed to “independent with advisors”—meaning that a unit was capable of executing its mission and can call for coalition forces when necessary. DOD reports, these changes, as well as the elimination of certain requirements for validating units, were partly responsible for the increase in ANSF units rated at the highest …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has experienced systemic challenges that have hindered its ability to manage and oversee contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan. Key challenges include gaps in planning for the use of contractors and assistance recipients and having visibility into their numbers. For example, GAO reported in April 2010 that, absent strategic planning for its use of contractors, individual offices within USAID often made case-by-case decisions on using contractors to support contract or grant administration and risks, such as possible conflicts of interest, were not always addressed. While having reliable data on contractors and assistance recipients is a starting point for informing agency decisions and ensuring proper management, GAO has also reported on limitations in USAID’s visibility into the number and value of contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan, as well as the number of personnel working under them. USAID, along with other agencies, has not implemented GAO’s recommendation to address such limitations. USAID, however, has taken other actions to mitigate risks associated with awarding contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan. In June 2011, GAO reported on USAID’s vendor vetting program, then in its …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Budget Control Act of 2011, amending the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, establishes limits on discretionary spending for fiscal years 2012 through 2021. In addition, the Act specifies additional limits on discretionary spending and automatic reductions in direct spending because legislation was not enacted that would reduce projected deficits by at least $1.2 trillion by the end of fiscal year 2021. Among other things, the Budget Control Act requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to calculate, and the President to order, a sequestration of discretionary and direct spending on January 2, 2013, to achieve reductions for that fiscal year."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Older electricity generating units—those that began operating in or before 1978—provided 45 percent of electricity from fossil fuel units in 2010 but produced a disproportionate share of emissions, both in aggregate and per unit of electricity generated. Overall, in 2010 older units contributed 75 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions, 64 percent of nitrogen oxides emissions, and 54 percent of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel units. For each unit of electricity generated, older units collectively emitted about 3.6 times as much sulfur dioxide, 2.1 times as much nitrogen oxides, and 1.3 times as much carbon dioxide as newer units. The difference in emissions between older units and their newer counterparts may be attributed to a number of factors. First, 93 percent of the electricity produced by older fossil fuel units in 2010 was generated by coal-fired units. Compared with natural gas units, coal-fired units produced over 90 times as much sulfur dioxide, twice as much carbon dioxide and over five times as much nitrogen oxides per unit of electricity, largely because coal contains more sulfur and carbon than natural gas. Second, fewer older units have installed emissions controls, …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Contracting officials from Air Force and Interior generally did not perform lease versus purchase analyses for selected contracts. Based on contract file reviews and discussions with contracting officials, we found that analyses were not performed and that contracting officials had not considered the alternative acquisition method for 24 of the 32 selected contracts. For the 8 contracts with lease versus purchase analyses, 5 were documented in the contract files and 3 were performed but were not documented, according to contracting officials. In most cases, contract files did not contain basic information to make lease or purchase decisions, such as the length of time the equipment would be used. Even files containing documentation of analyses generally did not address the full range of criteria specified in the FAR. For example, the analyses typically lacked a discussion of the financial and operating advantages of alternate approaches that would help contracting officials determine the appropriate acquisition method. Contracting officials noted that their decision to lease or purchase equipment often depends on the nature of the requirement, such as a short-term need for equipment, based on documents or other correspondence from the …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The three lead Air Force major commands—Air Mobility Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, and Air Combat Command—all utilize training requirements review boards composed of subject-matter experts to determine training requirements for specific aircraft. These boards determine which training requirements can be completed in live or virtual environments based upon factors such as specific combatant command mission requirements and the capabilities of fielded simulators and networks. All three commands use a combination of live and virtual approaches, but the mix varies by aircraft. For example, Air Combat Command specifies that approximately 25 percent of its training requirements could be met virtually. The other two commands conduct approximately 50 percent of their training virtually."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) receives thousands of air passenger screening complaints through five mechanisms, but does not have an agencywide policy or consistent processes to guide receipt and use of such information. For example, from October 2009 through June 2012, TSA received more than 39,000 screening complaints through its TSA Contact Center (TCC). However, the data from the five mechanisms do not reflect the full nature and extent of complaints because local TSA staff have discretion in implementing TSA's complaint processes, including how they receive and document complaints. For example, comment cards are used at four of the six airports GAO contacted, but TSA does not have a policy requiring that complaints submitted using the cards be tracked or reported centrally. A consistent policy to guide all TSA efforts to receive and document complaints would improve TSA's oversight of these activities and help ensure consistent implementation. TSA also uses TCC data to inform the public about air passenger screening complaints, monitor operational effectiveness of airport security checkpoints, and make changes as needed. However, TSA does not use data from its other four mechanisms, in part …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, TSA receives thousands of air passenger screening complaints through five central mechanisms, but does not have an agencywide policy, consistent processes, or a focal point to guide receipt and use of such information. Also, while the agency has several methods to inform passengers about its complaint processes, it does not have an agencywide policy or mechanism to ensure consistent use of these methods among commercial airports. In addition, TSA's complaint resolution processes do not fully conform to standards of independence to ensure that these processes are fair, impartial, and credible, but the agency is taking steps to improve independence. To address these issues, we made four recommendations to TSA with which the agency concurred, and it indicated actions it is taking in response. Finally, TSA officials stated that the agency is undertaking efforts to focus its resources and improve the passenger experience at security checkpoints by applying new intelligence-driven, risk-based screening procedures, including expanding its Pre✓™ program. TSA plans to have this program in place at 35 airports by the end of the calendar year and estimates that it has screened more than 4 million passengers …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not maintain complete information on New Source Review (NSR) permits issued to fossil fuel electricity generating units. State and local permitting agencies track the NSR permits they issue, but EPA does not maintain complete or centralized information on permits, despite a 2006 recommendation by the National Research Council that it do so. EPA maintains several databases that compile data on draft and issued NSR permits, but these sources are incomplete and thus cannot be used to identify all of the NSR permits that have been issued nationwide. In addition, EPA has the opportunity to review and comment on every draft NSR permit issued by state and local permitting agencies, but it does not compile data on whether the permitting agencies address EPA’s comments in final permits. The absence of more complete information on NSR permitting makes it difficult to know which units have obtained NSR permits or to assess how state and local permitting agencies vary from EPA in their interpretations of NSR requirements."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In a review of 30 major ATC acquisition programs, all of which will contribute to the transition to NextGen, GAO found that costs for 11 of the 30 programs have increased from their initial estimates by a total of $4.2 billion and 15 programs experienced delays. The 11 acquisitions that experienced cost increases account for over 60 percent of FAA’s total acquisition costs ($11 billion of $17.7 billion) for the 30 programs. The 15 acquisitions that experienced schedule delays, of which 10 also had cost increases, ranged from 2 months to more than 14 years and averaged 48 months."