A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The number of people in the United States exposed to significant airport noise has steadily declined from roughly 7 million people in 1975 to about 309,000 today. This change reflects large decreases in the size of areas that are exposed to significant airport noise and is primarily due to improvements in aircraft technology."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 2003, the Departments of Justice (Justice) and the Treasury (Treasury) have taken some steps to explore coordinating forfeiture program efforts, including sharing a website for posting notifications and pursuing a contract for seizure efforts abroad. However, limited progress has been made to consolidate the management of their assets. According to department officials, when Congress established the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in 1992, it recognized the differences in the programs' missions, which warranted creating separate programs, and this encouraged independent operational decisions that eventually created differences between the programs. There are some differences between the programs, but both departments seize similar assets such as vehicles. Nevertheless, the departments have not assessed the feasibility of consolidation, including whether such efforts would be cost-effective, and continue to duplicate efforts by separately managing and disposing of their seized and forfeited property. Specifically, Justice and Treasury maintain four separate information technology (IT) asset tracking systems, which perform similar functions to support their respective asset forfeiture program activities. In addition, both departments procure separate national contracts for the management of real property and they separately store assets seized under each program that …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and its business lines and offices are in different stages of their implementation of Safety Management Systems (SMS). FAA finalized its agency-wide implementation plan in April 2012, and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) has completed its SMS implementation, but other FAA SMS efforts are in the early stages. FAA business lines, such as the Aviation Safety Organization (AVS) and the Office of Airports (ARP), have SMS guidance and plans largely in place and have begun to integrate related practices into their operations, but many implementation tasks remain incomplete, and officials and experts project that full SMS implementation could take many years."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken actions to validate the science underlying its behavior-based passenger screening program, the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT, program, but more work remains. GAO reported in May 2010 that (1) TSA deployed SPOT before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators to reliably identify passengers who may pose a risk; and (2) it is unknown if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist related activity, although there is other evidence that terrorists have transited through SPOT airports. GAO recommended in May 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the ongoing validation study on the SPOT program to determine whether it is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the program. DHS concurred and subsequently revised its validation study to include an independent expert review. DHS's study, completed in April 2011, found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees; however, DHS noted limitations …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approved the Generation-3 (Gen-3) acquisition in October 2009, but it did not fully engage in the early phases of its acquisition framework to ensure that the acquisition was grounded in a justified mission need and that it pursued an optimal solution. Critical processes in the early phases of DHS's framework are designed to (1) justify a mission need that warrants investment of resources and (2) select an optimal solution by evaluating viable alternatives based on risk, costs, and benefits. BioWatch program officials said that these early acquisition efforts were less comprehensive and systematic than the DHS framework calls for because there was already departmental consensus around the solution. Without a systematic effort to justify the need for the acquisition in the context of its costs, benefits, and risks, DHS has pursued goals and requirements for Gen-3 with limited assurance that they represent an optimal solution. Reevaluating the mission need and systematically analyzing alternatives could provide better assurance of an optimal solution."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the White House have acted to strengthen biosurveillance consistent with prior GAO recommendations made from December 2009 through October 2011.In August 2012, DHS issued a strategic plan for its National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) that officials say was written in coordination with federal partners and designed to respond to GAO’s December 2009 findings that NBIC did not have key resources to carry out its mission, in part due to collaboration issues it faced. In July 2012, the White House released the National Strategy for Biosurveillance, which describes guiding principles, core functions, and enablers for strengthening biosurveillance. In June 2010, GAO recommended a national biosurveillance strategy to provide a unifying framework for building and maintaining a national biosurveillance capability. In October 2011, GAO also recommended the strategy account for the need to leverage resources and respond to challenges while partnering with nonfederal entities. The July 2012 strategy partially responds to the issues GAO called for such a strategy to address, but does not fully address them, as discussed below. A strategic implementation plan is to be published within 120 days of strategy …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Certain countries and visa categories are subject to higher levels of fraud. In fiscal year 2010, almost 60 percent of confirmed fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) involved applicants from Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico. Department of State (State) officials told GAO that fraud most commonly involves applicants for temporary visits to the United States who submit false documentation to overcome the presumption that they intend to illegally immigrate. Fraud is also perpetrated for immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visa categories such as temporary worker visas and student visas. In response to State efforts to combat visa fraud, unscrupulous visa applicants adapt their strategies, and as a result, fraud trends evolve over time."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) 9.5 percent population growth from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 exceeded the 7 percent increase in its rated capacity, and BOP projects continued population growth. Growth was most concentrated among male inmates, and in 2011, 48 percent of the inmates BOP housed were sentenced for drugs. From fiscal years 2006 through 2011, BOP increased its rated capacity by about 8,300 beds as a result of opening 5 new facilities and closing 4 minimum security camps, but because of the population expansion, crowding (or population in excess of rated capacity) increased from 36 to 39 percent. In 2011 crowding was most severe (55 percent) in highest security facilities. BOP’s 2020 long-range capacity plan projects continued growth in the federal prison population from fiscal years 2012 through 2020, with systemwide crowding exceeding 45 percent through 2018."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Civilian agencies did not fully comply with statutory requirements for compiling fiscal year 2011 service contract inventories. For example, because the information is not currently readily available, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed the 49 agencies that were required to submit inventories to defer the collection of three statutorily required data elements for each contract--the role the services played in achieving agency objectives, the total dollar amount invoiced for services under the contracts, and the number and work locations of contractor and subcontractor personnel. Progress, however, is being made to collect this information for future inventories. OMB directed agencies to start collecting information on the role services play in achieving agency objectives for new contracts awarded on or after March 1, 2012. A proposed Federal Acquisition Regulation rule was published in April 2011 to start collecting the remaining two data elements directly from contractors. We also found several instances where agencies significantly underreported obligations in their inventories, either because they misinterpreted or did not follow OMB guidance. For example, the General Services Administration underreported obligations by approximately $6.4 billion. Without complete and accurate service …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "From fiscal years 2005 through 2011, the physical condition of the Coast Guard's legacy vessels was generally poor. A primary Coast Guard measure of a vessel's condition--the operational percent of time free of major casualties--shows that the high endurance cutters, medium endurance cutters, and patrol boats generally remained well below target levels from fiscal years 2005 through 2011."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The planned cost and schedule of the Coast Guard's portfolio of major acquisitions is unknown because of outdated acquisition program baselines and uncertainty surrounding affordability. The Coast Guard's approved baselines, which reflect cost and schedule estimates, indicate the estimated total acquisition cost of Coast Guard major acquisitions could be as much as $35.3 billion--an increase of approximately 41 percent over the original baselines. However, the approved baselines for 10 of 16 programs do not reflect current cost and schedule plans because programs have breached the cost or schedule estimates in those baselines, changed in scope, or do not expect to receive funding to execute baselines as planned. Furthermore, a continued mismatch between resources needed to support all approved baselines and expected funding levels has required the Coast Guard to make decisions about which programs to fund and which programs not to fund as part of its annual budget process. Both DHS and the Coast Guard have acknowledged this resource challenge, but efforts to address this challenge have not yet resulted in a clear strategy for moving forward."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "On September 7, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a final rule establishing a transitional work permit program in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) for foreign workers not otherwise admissible under federal law. The final rule addressed key requirements of the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (CNRA); for example, the rule sets the permit allocations for fiscal years 2011 and 2012. As of July 2012, DHS had processed about half of the petitions for work permits that employers submitted in fiscal year 2012. The DHS decision on its permit allocation for fiscal year 2013 and a Department of Labor (DOL) decision on whether and when to extend the transition period, both required by CNRA, are both pending."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "While the number of community banks and credit unions has declined in recent years, they have remained important lenders to small businesses and other local customers. From 1985 through 2010, the number of banks under $10 billion in assets and credit unions declined by over 50 percent to 7,551 and 7,339, respectively. The decline resulted largely from consolidations, which were facilitated by changes in federal law that made it easier for banks and credit unions to expand geographically. Another factor that may have contributed to consolidations is economies of scale, which refer to how an institution's size is related to its costs. Although the existence of economies of scale in banking has been subject to debate, some recent research suggests that banks can save costs by expanding. Despite the decline in their number, community banks and credit unions have maintained their relationship-banking model, relying on their relationships with customers and local knowledge to make loans. Such institutions can use their relationship-based information to make loans to small businesses and other borrowers that larger banks may not make because of their general reliance on more automated processes. …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Agreement would provide decreasing assistance, totaling approximately $215 million through fiscal year 2024 and includes the following:"

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The November 2011 memorandum that discussed the management of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program was prepared based primarily on the observations of the former Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), a division of the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). The memorandum was intended to highlight various challenges that have hindered ISCD efforts to implement the CFATS program. According to the former Director, the challenges facing ISCD included not having a fully developed direction and plan for implementing the program, hiring staff without establishing need, and inconsistent ISCD leadership—factors that the Director believed place the CFATS program at risk. These challenges centered on three main areas: (1) human capital issues, including problems hiring, training, and managing ISCD staff; (2) mission issues, including problems reviewing facility plans to mitigate security vulnerabilities; and (3) administrative issues, including concerns about NPPD and IP not supporting ISCD’s management and administrative functions."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The November 2011 memorandum that discussed the management of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program was prepared based primarily on the observations of the former Director of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), a division of the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). The memorandum was intended to highlight various challenges that have hindered ISCD efforts to implement the CFATS program. According to the former Director, the challenges facing ISCD included not having a fully developed direction and plan for implementing the program, hiring staff without establishing need, and inconsistent ISCD leadership--factors that the Director believed place the CFATS program at risk. These challenges centered on three main areas: (1) human capital issues, including problems hiring, training, and managing ISCD staff; (2) mission issues, including problems reviewing facility plans to mitigate security vulnerabilities; and (3) administrative issues, including concerns about NPPD and IP not supporting ISCD's management and administrative functions."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, according to FMS officials, FMS considers both TOP and the cross-servicing program to be fully mature in that all key elements of the programs have been implemented. As such, FMS's current and future efforts will focus on enhancements that will (1) for TOP, facilitate its ability to increase federal nontax debt collections through additional offsets and (2) for the cross-servicing program, enable it to collect such debt more efficiently and effectively. Further, FMS is considering a number of initiatives intended to improve centralized collection of delinquent federal nontax debt. These initiatives primarily involve increasing the amount of debt subject to collection by FMS, bolstering FMS's set of debt collection tools, and enhancing FMS's internal operations and interactions with referring federal agencies. Several of FMS's initiatives, which are in the early stages of development, could, if approved and effectively implemented, address long-standing concerns about FMS's centralized debt collection program."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense's (DOD) assessment of potential governance options for its Military Health System (MHS) did not provide complete information on the options' total cost impact and their strengths and weaknesses. As part of DOD's assessment, it identified 13 potential governance options for the MHS and included a limited analysis of the options' estimated costs savings and their strengths and weaknesses. All of the options would create a shared services concept to consolidate common services, such as medical logistics, acquisition, and facility planning, under the control of a single entity. DOD selected an option that would create a defense health agency to, among other things, assume the responsibility for creating and managing shared services, and leave the longstanding military chain of command intact with the services in control of the military hospitals. The National Defense Authorization Act (Act) for Fiscal Year 2012 required DOD to submit a report to congressional committees that would, among other things, estimate the cost savings and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each option. Using key principles derived from federal guidance, including cost estimating and economic analysis documents, GAO determined …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "According to DOD data, over 500,000 passengers used the space-available travel program from fiscal years 2009 through 2011. DOD data show that the five most-used air terminals have limited seats available. Specifically, seats for the three most-traveled destinations from each terminal were near capacity in Fiscal Year 2011. While there were some unused seats for space-available travel, these may be seats on routes with less-desirable destinations or during less-popular travel months. Additionally, DOD officials indicated that existing challenges with usage of the space-available travel program, adherence to DOD's original intent for the program, and air terminal logistics and maintenance would be exacerbated if the number of eligible passengers were to increase."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, we found that DOD's fiscal year 2013 corrosion budget report to Congress (1) included some, but not all of the six mandated elements; (2) included a funding request that equals DOD's fiscal year 2013 stated requirements for corrosion activities and projects; and (3) lacked information needed to calculate the potential cost avoidance. First, DOD included three of the six mandated elements, did not include two of the elements, and one of the elements was not applicable this year. For example, DOD included the most recent annual corrosion reports of the military departments, attached in an annex. However, it did not include the funds requested in the budget compared to the funding requirements for the fiscal year covered by the report or the previous fiscal year. Second, DOD officials stated that the fiscal year 2013 budget request and the fiscal year 2013 funding requirements for activities and projects are the same this year--$9.1 million. According to these officials, DOD does not have any fiscal year 2013 unfunded requirements for corrosion activities and projects. Third, we did not calculate the cost avoidance DOD could achieve with its fiscal …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk in 2003, DHS has made progress addressing management challenges and senior department officials have demonstrated commitment and top leadership support for addressing the department's management challenges. However, the department has significant work ahead to achieve positive outcomes in resolving high-risk issues. For example, DHS faces challenges in modernizing its financial systems, implementing acquisition management controls, and improving employee satisfaction survey results, among other things. As DHS continues to mature as an organization, it will be important for the department to continue to strengthen its management functions, since the effectiveness of these functions affects its ability to fulfill its homeland security and other missions."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DHS reported taking some steps to assess the realignment of its regional/field office structure. Since submitting an initial plan to Congress in 2004 that outlined regionalization, consolidation, and colocation opportunities, DHS officials said the agency considered the potential implementation of a unified regional field office structure through two major initiatives--the 2004 I-Staff review and the department's 2010 BUR. However, the I-Staff Regional Concept of Operations was not finalized or adopted, and in April 2012 a senior DHS official involved in the BUR effort stated that DHS no longer intends to implement the BUR recommendation related to regionalization because it is no longer the department's preferred approach. DHS had limited or no documentation related to either of these reviews, including the resulting key decisions from the efforts. As a result, we are unable to determine the extent to which DHS has fully considered the realignment of its regional/field office structure, including costs and benefits, since 2004. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for clear documentation of significant events, which include assumptions and methods surrounding key decisions, and the standards also state that this documentation should be …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not know the total amount its components invest in research and development (R&D) and does not have policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across the department. According to DHS, its Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and U. S. Coast Guard are the only components that conduct R&D and, according to GAO’s analysis, these are the only components that report budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as part of the budget process. However, GAO identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by other DHS components. For example, S&T reported receiving $50 million in reimbursements from other DHS components to conduct R&D. Further, 10 components obligated $55 million for R&D contracts to third parties and $151 million to Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories for R&D-related projects, but these were not reported as R&D to OMB. According to DHS, it is difficult to identify all R&D investments across the department because DHS does not have a department wide policy defining R&D …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees reported having lower average morale than the average for the rest of the federal government, but morale varied across components and employee groups within the department. Data from the 2011 Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS)--a tool that measures employees' perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agencies--showed that DHS employees had 4.5 percentage points lower job satisfaction and 7.0 percentage points lower engagement in their work overall. Engagement is the extent to which employees are immersed in their work and spending extra effort on job performance. Moreover, within most demographic groups available for comparison, DHS employees scored lower on average satisfaction and engagement than the average for the rest of the federal government. For example, within most pay categories DHS employees reported lower satisfaction and engagement than non-DHS employees in the same pay groups. Levels of satisfaction and engagement varied across components, with some components reporting scores above the non-DHS averages. Several components with lower morale, such as Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement …