Report that discusses the legal definition of the term "educational," as well as the constitutional implications of that definition.

Report that discusses the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), a free trade agreement that includes nations on both sides of the Pacific. Topics include similar trade partnerships, the importance of Asia to U.S. trade and security interests, and U.S. participation in the TPP.

Report discussing the National Drug Control Strategy, the National Drug Control Budget, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) evaluation of the National Drug Control Strategy implementation. It also provides an analysis of selected legislative and oversight issues that Congress may consider when debating the reauthorization of ONDCP.

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "To verify license applicants' identity, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have procedures that may detect counterfeit documents. For example, all states are now verifying key personal information, such as Social Security numbers (SSN) through online queries to a Social Security Administration (SSA) database, a significant increase from about a decade ago. This effort helps ensure that the identity information presented belongs to a valid identity and also is not associated with a deceased person. Additionally, most states verify non-citizen applicants' immigration documents with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure these individuals have lawful status in the United States. Many states are also using facial recognition techniques to better detect attempts to obtain a license under another's identity. While most states have taken steps required by the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Act), officials in some states indicated that they may not comply with certain provisions--such as re-verifying SSNs for license renewals--because of state laws or concerns that these requirements are unnecessary and burdensome."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Labor and IGs from employing departments and agencies have consistently reported similar FECA program management challenges, such as oversight and information technology, and have linked these to increased program costs through improper payments. For example, one IG reported in 2007 that its department could not appropriately manage its long-term rolls and contain improper payments because staff assigned to this task spent no more than 10 percent of their time managing cases. Additionally, citing ongoing program weaknesses—mostly related to oversight—IGs have reported avoidable costs at employing departments and agencies, which one department reported were as high as $41 million in 2011. Above and beyond the actions departments and agencies can take to address these challenges, some IGs have also reported that legislative reform is necessary to better manage the program. In an effort to alleviate the impact of management challenges, IGs collectively made over 200 recommendations since 1994, mainly to improve FECA’s oversight, and most of these recommendations have been implemented."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since our 2004 report, Open World has taken a number of steps to address our recommendations on financial management controls, and has also generally followed leading financial management practices. For example, to address our recommendations, Open World (1) contracted with an independent public accountant to perform an assessment of its ability to be audited; (2) developed Financial Procedures and Directives guidance that covers key activities such as grants; (3) developed the Grant Procedures document, which enhanced accountability for its grantees; (4) submitted its financial statements to an annual financial statement audit since fiscal year 2005, resulting in clean audit opinions since fiscal year 2006; (5) established an audit committee, comprised of independent members that have financial and programmatic knowledge, which also reviews management's annual assessment of its internal controls; and (6) developed guidelines for grantees to calculate and report the estimated value of U.S. volunteers' contributed services, and also disclosed this value as part of its annual budget justification. Open World's financial management controls also generally followed leading practices for financial accountability. For example, Open World (1) developed appropriate policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms with respect to each …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Although the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) enforces compliance with mandatory federal safety standards, it is also required by law to rely on voluntary safety standards when it determines that the standard adequately addresses the product hazard and is likely to have substantial compliance. Voluntary standards—developed by industry, consumer, and government participants through a consensus process—cover many of the thousands of types of products in CPSC’s jurisdiction. Compliance with voluntary standards is not routinely tracked, but it is generally considered to be high by industry participants. Compliance with these standards also depends on industry and legal factors, such as retailer requirements to demonstrate proof of compliance with voluntary safety standards and risk of liability in product liability lawsuits."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Recent data show variations in the material readiness of different types of ships, but do not reveal any clear trends of improvement or decline for the period from 2008 to 2012. The Navy uses a variety of means to collect, analyze, and track the material readiness of its surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships. Three data sources the Navy uses to provide information on the material readiness of ships are: casualty reports, which reflect equipment malfunctions; Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy (DRRS-N) reports; and Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) material inspection reports. These data sources can be viewed as complementary, together providing data on both the current and life cycle material readiness of the surface force. INSURV and casualty report data show that the material readiness of amphibious warfare ships is lower than that of frigates and destroyers. However, there is no clear upward or downward trend in material readiness across the entire Navy surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships. From 2010 to March 2012, INSURV data indicated a slight improvement in the material readiness of the surface combatant and amphibious warfare fleet, but over that …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Outpatient medical appointment wait times reported by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), are unreliable. Wait times for outpatient medical appointments--referred to as medical appointments--are calculated as the number of days elapsed from the desired date, which is defined as the date on which the patient or health care provider wants the patient to be seen. The reliability of reported wait time performance measures is dependent on the consistency with which schedulers record the desired date in the scheduling system in accordance with VHA's scheduling policy. However, VHA's scheduling policy and training documents for recording desired date are unclear and do not ensure consistent use of the desired date. Some schedulers at Veterans Affairs medical centers (VAMC) that GAO visited did not record the desired date correctly. For example, three schedulers changed the desired date based on appointment availability; this would have resulted in a reported wait time that was shorter than the patient actually experienced. VHA officials acknowledged limitations of measuring wait times based on desired date, and described additional information used to monitor veterans' access to medical appointments, …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, we found that 68 of the 71 programs that responded to our survey reported that they experienced funding instability, faced workforce shortfalls, or that their planned capabilities changed after initiation. Most respondentsreported a combination of these challenges. We have previously reported that these challenges increase the likelihood acquisition programs will cost more and take longer to deliver capabilities than expected. Although DHS largely does not have reliable cost estimates and realistic schedules to accurately measure program performance, we used our survey results, cost information DHS provided to Congress, and an internal DHS review to identify 42 programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both. Further, using DHS's future-years funding plans - which aggregate funding levels to produce total project costs - we gained insight into the magnitude of the cost growth for 16 of the 42 programs. The total project costs for these 16 programs increased from $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011, an aggregate increase of 166 percent."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, based on our work to date, we have found that"

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Suspect counterfeit and bogus—part numbers that are not associated with any authentic parts—military-grade electronic parts can be found on Internet purchasing platforms, as none of the 16 parts vendors provided to GAO were legitimate. “Suspect counterfeit,” which applies to the first two categories of parts that were tested, is the strongest term used by an independent testing lab, signifying a potential violation of intellectual property rights, copyrights, or trademark laws, or misrepresentation to defraud or deceive. After submitting requests for quotes on both platforms, GAO received responses from 396 vendors, of which 334 were located in China; 25 in the United States; and 37 in other countries, including the United Kingdom and Japan. Of the 16 parts purchased, vendors usually responded within a day. GAO selected the first of any vendor among those offering the lowest prices that provided enough information to purchase a given part, generally within 2 weeks. Under GAO’s selection methodology, all 16 parts were provided by vendors in China."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, we found the following:"

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In March 2012, GAO issued a report on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Medicare Advantage (MA) quality bonus payment demonstration—a demonstration CMS initiated rather than implementing the quality bonus program established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Compared to the PPACA quality bonus program, CMS’s demonstration increases the number of plans eligible for a bonus, enlarges the size of payments for some plans, and accelerates payment phase-in. CMS stated that the demonstration’s research goal is to test whether scaling bonus payments to quality scores MA plans receive increases the speed and degree of annual quality improvements for plans compared with what would have occurred under PPACA. GAO reported that CMS’s Office of the Actuary estimated that the demonstration would cost $8.35 billion over 10 years—an amount greater than the combined budgetary impact of all Medicare demonstrations conducted since 1995. In addition, GAO also found several shortcomings of the demonstration design that preclude a credible evaluation of its effectiveness in achieving CMS’s stated research goal. In July 2012, GAO sent a letter to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), the head …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since GAO first identified the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Personnel Security Clearance Program as a high-risk area, DOD, in conjunction with Congress and executive agency leadership, took actions that resulted in significant progress toward improving the processing of security clearances. Congress held more than 14 oversight hearings to help oversee key legislation, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which helped focus attention and sustain momentum of the governmentwide reform effort. In addition, the committed and collaborative efforts of DOD, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as leaders of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council) demonstrated commitment to and created a vision for the reform effort, which led to significant improvements in the timeliness of processing security clearances. As a result, in 2011, GAO removed DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program from its high-risk list because of the agency’s progress in improving timeliness, development of tools and metrics to assess quality, and commitment to sustaining progress. Specifically, GAO found that DOD met the 60-day statutory …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Last year, GAO testified that though acquisition problems still existed in many space programs, the Department of Defense (DOD) was beginning to launch satellites that had long been lagging behind schedule and it had taken positive actions to instill better practices and more focused leadership for space. Progress has continued. Over the past year, DOD launched the first Navy Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite; the first, after a nine-year delay, of six Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites; and the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite—all of which will bring important capability to the warfighter. While these launches represent solid progress, there have also been some drawbacks. For instance, the second Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite experienced technical problems that could shorten its operational lifetime. The cost of the first two GPS III satellites is at least18 percent higher than first estimated, up to $1.6 billion today. A 1-year delay is expected by SBIRS program officials on production of the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites along with a $438 million cost overrun. And, a termination of the Defense Weather Satellite System …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Projects that received credit assistance through the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT), tend to be large, high-cost highway projects. As of April 2012, DOT has executed 27 TIFIA credit agreements for 26 projects with project sponsors such as state DOTs and transit agencies. Overall, DOT has provided nearly $9.1 billion in credit assistance through 26 loans and one loan guarantee. By mode, there are 17 highway, 5 transit, and 4 intermodal projects. Most projects have a total cost of over $1 billion. DOT monitors individual credit agreements but does not systematically assess whether its TIFIA portfolio as a whole is achieving the program’s goals of leveraging federal funds and encouraging private co-investment. DOT has identified goals and objectives for the TIFIA program, but its limited use of performance measures makes it difficult to determine the degree to which the program is meeting these goals and objectives. Given that DOT already collects project data, it could use these data to better evaluate the program’s overall progress toward meeting its goals."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "A number of factors—both external and internal to the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA)—have contributed to the increase in processing timeframes and subsequent growth in the backlog of veterans’ disability compensation claims. As the population of new veterans has swelled in recent years, the annual number of claims received by VBA has gone up. Compared to the past, these claims have a higher number of disabling conditions, and some of these conditions, such as traumatic brain injuries, make their assessment complex. Moreover, due to new regulations that have established eligibility for benefits for new diseases associated with Agent Orange exposure, VBA adjudicated 260,000 previously denied and new claims. Beyond these external factors, issues with the design and implementation of the compensation program have contributed to timeliness challenges. For example, the law requires the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to assist veterans in obtaining records that support their claim. However, VBA officials said that lengthy timeframes in obtaining military records—particularly for members of the National Guard and Reserve—and Social Security Administration (SSA) medical records impact VA’s duty to assist, possibly delaying a decision on a veteran’s disability claim. …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In September 2010, as directed by the Travel Promotion Act, the Secretary of Commerce appointed a board of 11 directors to govern CTP. Board members represent private and public sector areas related to travel and tourism—including lodging, city and state convention and visitors’ bureaus, small business, travel distributors, airlines, and others. Subsequently, under the direction of the board, CTP was incorporated in November 2010 as a nonprofit corporation in Washington, D.C. Once incorporated, CTP was able to initiate operating activities such as hiring staff and entering into contracts. Thus, the board conducted a search and hired a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in May 2011. By December 2011, other senior staff positions had been filled. With the CEO in place, CTP began operations and has worked to develop strategic objectives, establish an organizational structure, and plan programmatic activities."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken some steps to examine its headquarters resources for efficiencies, but additional opportunities for cost savings may exist by further consolidating organizations and centralizing functions. For purposes of the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency initiative, DOD components were asked to focus in particular on headquarters and administrative functions, support activities, and other overhead in their portfolios. DOD’s fiscal year 2012 budget request included several efficiencies related to headquarters organizations or personnel. GAO found that these efficiencies generally fell into two categories: (1) consolidating or eliminating organizations based on geographic proximity or span of control and (2) centralizing overlapping functions and services. The DOD efficiencies that GAO reviewed to reduce headquarters resources are expected by DOD to save about $2.9 billion through fiscal year 2016, less than 2 percent of the $178 billion in savings DOD projected departmentwide. GAO’s work indicates that DOD may be able to find additional efficiencies by further examining opportunities to consolidate organizations or centralize functions at headquarters. DOD may not have identified all areas where reductions in headquarters personnel and operating costs could be achieved because the …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "On February 17th, Chairman Lieberman and Senator Warner introduced S. 2129, entitled “Reforming and Consolidating Government Act of 2012”, a bill renewing the Presidential authority to propose government organizational changes and obtain congressional approval through an expedited process. From 1932 to 1984, Congress provided the President with some form of reorganization authority. S. 2129 renews most of the statutory framework as it existed before the authority lapsed in 1984. However, S. 2129 proposes noteworthy changes, both in terms of eliminating restrictions on the scope of a President’s plan and placing additional requirements on such plans."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "From fiscal years 2006 to 2010, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) reported more than a doubling of National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) member agencies’ funding for nanotechnology environmental, health, and safety (EHS) research––from approximately $38 million to $90 million. Reported EHS research funding also rose as a percentage of total nanotechnology funding over the same period, ending at about 5 percent in 2010. However, GAO identified several reporting problems that raise concerns about the quality of EHS funding data reported. For example, for 18 percent of the 2010 projects GAO reviewed that were reported as EHS research, it was not clear that the projects were primarily directed at EHS risks. In addition, NNI member agencies did not always report funding using comparable data. The absence of detailed guidance on how agencies should report funding for their nanotechnology research has contributed to these problems, as GAO also reported in 2008 and made a related recommendation."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "During our audit of CFPB’s fiscal year 2011 financial statements, we identified seven internal control issues that could adversely affect CFPB’s ability to meet its internal control objectives. We do not consider these issues to represent material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in relation to CFPB’s financial statements. Nonetheless, we believe they warrant management’s attention and action. These issues concern necessary controls to ensure"

Report that covers concerns and issues relating to governance, elections, election fraud/nepotism, human rights, and Afghan culture in Afghanistan. It discusses the pros and cons of U.S.A. intervention in the shaping of these endeavors.