Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses air cargo screening. In 2008, about 7.3 billion pounds of cargo was transported on U.S. passenger flights--approximately 58 percent of which was transported domestically (domestic cargo) and 42 percent of which was transported on flights arriving in the United States from a foreign location (inbound cargo). The 2009 Christmas Day plot to detonate an explosive device during an international flight bound for Detroit provided a vivid reminder that terrorists continue to view passenger aircraft as attractive targets. According to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the security threat posed by terrorists introducing explosive devices in air cargo shipments is significant, and the risk and likelihood of such an attack directed at passenger aircraft is high. To help enhance the security of air cargo, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) mandated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft--including the domestic and inbound flights of foreign and U.S. passenger operations--by February 2009, and 100 percent of such cargo by August 2010. The 9/11 Commission Act defines screening for …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Billions of pounds of cargo are transported on U.S. passenger flights annually. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal agency responsible for securing the air cargo system. The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August 2010. As requested, GAO reviewed TSA's progress in meeting the act's screening mandate, and any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo transported within and from the United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for the United States). GAO reviewed TSA's policies and procedures, interviewed TSA officials and air cargo industry stakeholders, and conducted site visits at five U.S. airports, selected based on size, among other factors."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 highlighted the importance of detecting improvised explosive devices on passengers. This testimony focuses on (1) the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to procure and deploy advanced imaging technology (AIT), and related challenges; and (2) TSA's efforts to strengthen screening procedures and technology in other areas of aviation security, and related challenges. This testimony is based on related products GAO issued from March 2009 through January 2010, selected updates conducted from December 2009 through March 2010 on the AIT procurement, and ongoing work on air cargo security. For the ongoing work and updates, GAO obtained information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA and interviewed senior TSA officials regarding air cargo security and the procurement, deployment, operational testing, and assessment of costs and benefits of the AIT."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The National Weather Service's (NWS) weather products are a vital component of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic control system. In addition to providing aviation weather products developed at its own facilities, NWS also provides on-site staff at each of FAA's en route centers--the facilities that control high-altitude flight outside the airport tower and terminal areas. NWS's on-site staff is called a center weather service unit. For several years, NWS and FAA have been exploring options for improving the aviation weather services provided at en route centers. GAO agreed to (1) determine the status of the agencies' efforts to restructure aviation weather services, (2) assess the agencies' progress in establishing performance baselines in order to measure the effect of any changes, and (3) evaluate plans to address key challenges. To do so, GAO evaluated agency progress and plans and compared agency efforts with leading practices."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The B-2 bomber is a low-observable, long-range strike aircraft capable of entering heavily defended areas to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons. The B-2 currently uses an ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite communications system, but because of aging military satellites, the Air Force determined a new communications system was needed. As a result, the Air Force began an incremental acquisition approach for replacing the B-2's existing UHF satellite communications system with an extremely high frequency (EHF) communications capability. The first increment, which is expected to begin production in late fiscal year 2011, is designed to upgrade computer system speed and storage capacity. The second increment is expected to provide secure, survivable strategic communications connectivity, thus allowing B-2 pilots to receive emergency action messages during strategic operations--an EHF capability that U.S. Strategic Command has stated it needs by fiscal year 2016. The third increment is intended to enable the EHF system to connect with the Global Information Grid. The focus of our review was the second increment, which is scheduled to enter the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase in early fiscal year 20131 and has an estimated total …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "To assist law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requires financial institutions to file suspicious activity reports (SAR) to inform the federal government of transactions related to possible violations of law or regulation. Depository institutions have been concerned about the resources required to file SARs and the extent to which SARs are used. The Subcommittee asked GAO to discuss our February 2009 report on suspicious activity reporting. Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) factors affecting the number of SARs filed, (2) actions agencies have taken to improve the usefulness of SARs, (3) federal agencies' use of SARs, and (4) the effectiveness of the process used to revise SAR forms. To respond to the request, GAO relied primarily on the February 2009 report titled Bank Secrecy Act: Suspicious Activity Report Use Is Increasing, but FinCEN Needs to Further Develop and Document Its Form Revision Process (GAO-09-226), and updated it with additional information provided by FinCEN. In that report, GAO recommended that FinCEN work to further develop a strategy that fully incorporates certain GAO-identified practices to enhance …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Cost growth and schedule delays are prevalent problems in acquiring defense weapon systems. Manufacturing systems has proven difficult, particularly as programs transition to production. In December 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued an updated version of its acquisition policy that reflects earlier consideration of manufacturing risks. A joint defense and industry group developed manufacturing readiness levels (MRL) to support assessments of manufacturing risks. Use of MRLs on all weapon acquisition programs has been proposed. In response to a congressional request, this report assesses the manufacturing problems faced by DOD, how MRLs can address manufacturing problems, how MRLs compare to manufacturing best practices of leading commercial firms, and challenges and barriers to implementing MRLs at DOD. In conducting our work, we contacted DOD, military services, and contractors; held interviews with leading commercial firms; reviewed program documents and policy proposals; and spoke with manufacturing experts."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As the number of biological labs increases, so too do the safety risks for lab workers. Data on these risks--collected through a safety reporting system (SRS) from reports of hazards, incidents, and accidents--can support safety efforts. However, no such system exists for all biological labs, and a limited system--managed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)--applies to only a subset of these labs. While a national SRS has been proposed, design and implementation are complex. In this context, GAO was asked to identify lessons from (1) the literature and (2) case studies; and to apply those lessons to (3) assess CDC and APHIS's theft, loss, or release (TLR) system for select agents, such as anthrax, and (4) suggest design and implementation considerations for a labwide SRS. To do its work, GAO analyzed SRS literature; conducted case studies of SRSs in aviation, commercial nuclear, and health care industries; and interviewed agency officials and biosafety specialists."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Biomonitoring, which measures chemicals in people's tissues or body fluids, has shown that the U.S. population is widely exposed to chemicals used in everyday products. Some of these have the potential to cause cancer or birth defects. Moreover, children may be more vulnerable to harm from these chemicals than adults. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to control chemicals that pose unreasonable health risks. One crucial tool in this process is chemical risk assessment, which involves determining the extent to which populations will be exposed to a chemical and assessing how this exposure affects human health This testimony, based on GAO's prior work, reviews the (1) extent to which EPA incorporates information from biomonitoring studies into its assessments of chemicals, (2) steps that EPA has taken to improve the usefulness of biomonitoring data, and (3) extent to which EPA has the authority under TSCA to require chemical companies to develop and submit biomonitoring data to EPA."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. government has a history of employing health surveillance to help limit malady, loss of life, and economic impact of diseases. Recent legislation and presidential directives have called for a robust and integrated biosurveillance capability; that is, the ability to provide early detection and situational awareness of potentially catastrophic biological events. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act directed GAO to report on the state of biosurveillance and resource use in federal, state, local, and tribal governments. This report is one in a series responding to that mandate. This report addresses (1) federal efforts that support a national biosurveillance capability and (2) the extent to which mechanisms are in place to guide the development of a national biosurveillance capability. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed federal biosurveillance programs, plans, and strategies and interviewed agency officials from components of 12 federal departments with biosurveillance responsibilities."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Federal and tribal lands on the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico are vulnerable to illegal cross-border activity. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--through its U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol)--is responsible for securing these lands, while the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture (USDA) manage natural resources and protect the public. GAO was asked to examine the extent that (1) border security threats have changed on federal lands; (2) federal agencies operating on these lands have shared threat information and communications; and (3) federal agencies have coordinated budgets, resources, and strategies. GAO reviewed interagency agreements and threat assessments; analyzed enforcement data from 2007 through 2009; and interviewed officials at headquarters and two Border Patrol sectors selected due to high volume of illegal cross-border activity (Tucson) and limited ability to detect this activity (Spokane). GAO's observations cannot be generalized to all sectors but provide insights. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 2005, the Department of State (State) began issuing electronic passports (e-passports) with embedded computer chips that store information identical to that printed in the passport. By agreement with State, the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) produces blank e-passport books. Two foreign companies are used by GPO to produce e-passport covers, including the computer chips embedded in them. At U.S. ports of entry, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspects passports. GAO was asked to examine potential risks to national security posed by using foreign suppliers for U.S. e-passport computer chips. This report specifically examines the following two risks: (1) Can the computer chips used in U.S. e-passports be altered or forged to fraudulently enter the United States? (2) What risk could malicious code on the U.S. e-passport computer chip pose to national security? To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials at State, GPO, and DHS relating to the U.S. e-passport design and manufacturing and e-passport inspection systems and procedures."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The United States and Canada share a border of nearly 5,525 miles. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for securing the borders while facilitating trade and travel. CBP launched the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program in 2002 to expedite processing for pre-vetted, low-risk shipments. GAO was requested to assess U.S.-Canadian border delays. This report addresses the following for U.S. northern border land ports of entry: (1) the extent to which wait times data are reliable and reported trends in wait times, (2) any actions CBP has taken to reduce wait times and any challenges that remain, and (3) the extent to which CBP and FAST participants experience the benefits of the FAST program. GAO analyzed CBP information and data on staffing, infrastructure, wait times, training, and the FAST program from 2003 through 2009 to analyze operations. GAO visited six northern border land ports, which were primarily selected based on commercial traffic volume. GAO interviewed importers, trade organizations, and border stakeholders. The results are not generalizable, but provide insights."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The challenges of securing the U.S.-Canadian border involve the coordination of multiple partners. The results of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to integrate border security among its components and across federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners are unclear. GAO was asked to address the extent to which DHS has (1) improved coordination with state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners; (2) progressed in addressing past federal coordination challenges; and (3) progressed in securing the northern border and used coordination efforts to address existing vulnerabilities. GAO reviewed interagency agreements, strategies, and operational documents that address DHS's reported northern border vulnerabilities such as terrorism. GAO visited four Border Patrol sectors, selected based on threat, and interviewed officials from federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian agencies operating within these sectors. While these results cannot be generalized, they provided insights on border security coordination."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In July 2008, the Department of State (State) began issuing passport cards as a lower-cost alternative to passports for U.S. citizens to meet Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative requirements. In October 2008, State began issuing the second generation border crossing card (BCC) based on the architecture of the passport card. GAO was asked to examine the effectiveness of the physical and electronic security features of the passport card and second generation BCC. This report addresses: (1) How effectively State's development process--including testing and evaluation--for the passport card and second generation BCC mitigates the risk of fraudulent use? (2) How are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers using the cards' security features to prevent fraudulent use at land ports of entry? To conduct this work, GAO evaluated the security features of passport cards and second generation BCCs against international standards and guidance and results from testing and evaluation and observed the inspection of these cards at five land ports of entry (POE)."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) has had long-standing difficulties developing and delivering space systems on time and within budget. Some programs have been delayed by years and cost billions of dollars more than their initial estimates. Attempts to reform DOD space acquisitions in the past have sought to leverage commercial approaches or rely more on the commercial sector to meet DOD needs. These efforts have not been successful and, in some cases, have exacerbated problems, particularly with respect to oversight. In view of past challenges with adopting commercial approaches, Congress requested an examination of the following questions: (1) What are the differences between commercial and national security space system missions, requirements, and technology development? (2) What acquisition practices adopted by commercial companies could be used for national security space system acquisitions? (3) Which acquisition practices adopted by commercial companies may not be readily adaptable for national security space system acquisitions?"

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This letter highlights the results of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government (CFS) for fiscal years 2009 and 2008. GAO is required by the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 to perform an annual audit of the CFS."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This letter formally transmits the results of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government (CFS) for fiscal years 2009 and 2008. GAO is required by the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 to perform an annual audit of the CFS."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The federal government's reliance on leased space underscores the need to physically secure this space and help safeguard employees, visitors, and government assets. In April 2010 the Interagency Security Committee (ISC), comprised of 47 federal agencies and departments and chaired by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities (the 2010 standards) which supersede previous ISC standards. In response to Congress' direction to review ISC standards for leased space, this report (1) identifies challenges that exist in protecting leased space and (2) examines how the 2010 standards address these challenges. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed federal officials from ISC, four federal departments selected as case studies based on their large square footage of leased space, and the Federal Protective Service (FPS). GAO also consulted prior work on federal real property and physical security, including key practices in facility protection."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In connection with fulfilling our requirement to audit the financial statements of the U.S. government, we audited and reported on the Schedules of Federal Debt Managed by the Bureau of the Public Debt (BPD) for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2009 and 2008. As part of these audits, we performed a review of the general and application information security controls over key BPD financial systems. As we reported in connection with our audit of the Schedules of Federal Debt for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2009 and 2008, we concluded that BPD maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt related to financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regulations as of September 30, 2009, that provided reasonable assurance that misstatements, losses, or noncompliance material in relation to the Schedule of Federal Debt would be prevented or detected on a timely basis. However, we found deficiencies involving information security controls that we do not consider to be significant deficiencies. With regard to financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, BPD mitigated the potential effect of such …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Business Systems Modernization (BSM) program is a multi-billion dollar, high risk, highly complex effort that involves the development and delivery of a number of modernized systems that are intended to replace the agency's aging business and tax processing systems. As required, IRS submitted its fiscal year 2010 expenditure plan in November 2009 to the House and Senate appropriations committees, requesting approximately $254 million from the BSM account. GAO's objectives in reviewing the expenditure plan were to (1) determine whether it satisfies the applicable legislative conditions, (2) determine IRS's progress in implementing prior expenditure plan review recommendations, and (3) provide additional observations about the plan and the BSM program. To accomplish the objectives, GAO analyzed the plan, reviewed related documentation, and interviewed IRS officials."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 1995, GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) multibillion dollar business systems modernization program as high risk, and it continues to do so today. To assist in addressing DOD's modernization challenges, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (the act) requires the department to, among other things, report specific information about business system investments, including (1) milestones and actual performance against specified measures and any revisions and (2) actions taken to certify that a modernization investment involving more than $1 million meets defined conditions before obligating funds. The act also directs GAO to review each report. As agreed, GAO focused on the fiscal year 2010 report's compliance with, among other things, these provisions of the act. To do so, GAO compared DOD's report to the act's reporting requirements, interviewed DOD officials, analyzed relevant documentation, and leveraged prior GAO reports."

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This document is an E-supplement to GAO-10-390. The 2000 elections in Maine and Arizona were the first in the nation's history where candidates seeking state legislative seats had the option to fully fund their campaigns with public moneys. In 2003, GAO reviewed the public financing programs in Maine and Arizona and found the programs' goals were to (1) increase electoral competition; (2) increase voter choice; (3) curb increases in campaign costs; (4) reduce interest group influence; and (5) increase voter participation. GAO reported that while the number of candidates who participated in the programs increased from 2000 to 2002, it was too soon to determine the extent to which these five goals of the programs were being met. Senate Report 110-129 directed GAO to update its 2003 report. This report: (1) provides data on candidate participation and (2) describes changes in five goals of Maine's and Arizona's programs in the 2000 through 2008 elections and the extent to which changes could be attributed to the programs. To address its objectives, GAO analyzed available data about candidate participation, election outcomes, and campaign spending for the 1996 through …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The 2000 elections in Maine and Arizona were the first in the nation's history where candidates seeking state legislative seats had the option to fully fund their campaigns with public moneys. In 2003, GAO reviewed the public financing programs in Maine and Arizona and found the programs' goals were to (1) increase electoral competition; (2) increase voter choice; (3) curb increases in campaign costs; (4) reduce interest group influence; and (5) increase voter participation. GAO reported that while the number of candidates who participated in the programs increased from 2000 to 2002, it was too soon to determine the extent to which these five goals of the programs were being met. Senate Report 110-129 directed GAO to update its 2003 report. This report: (1) provides data on candidate participation and (2) describes changes in five goals of Maine's and Arizona's programs in the 2000 through 2008 elections and the extent to which changes could be attributed to the programs. To address its objectives, GAO analyzed available data about candidate participation, election outcomes, and campaign spending for the 1996 through 2008 legislative elections in both states, reviewed …