As a result of an initiative by Australia in 1989, the United States joined with eleven other Asia/Pacific nations in creating APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization. This report discusses the annual Ministerial Meeting of APEC in Seattle, held from November 17 - 19, 1993.

From objectives and scope of work: The objective of this report is to provide a comprehensive review of the biology and population status of sea turtles potentially subject to entanglement in North Pacific high-seas driftnet fisheries. The report will assist National Marine Fisheries Service efforts to assess the impacts of the driftnet fisheries on threatened and endangered sea turtle populations.

This report presents documentation of the status and trends in the driftnet fleet (Asian fishing vessels carrying large driftnet fishing gear), a summary of the industry and governmental plans for the near future, and an assessment of possible fleet adaptations to the moratorium from a political/economic perspective.

Japan, as an issue, has entered the debate over U.S. approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in several ways. The Clinton Administration has argued that Americans should support NAFTA because if it fails to pass Congress, Japan will rush to negotiate a similar arrangement with Mexico. Proponents of NAFTA also have argued that since Japan opposes NAFTA (because of its presumed protectionism and the benefits it provides to North American businesses), it must be "good for America." Opponents of NAFTA argue that the agreement would provide opportunities for Japanese manufacturers to invest in Mexico and export unfettered to the American market. Also, they assert that NAFTA would be like previous trade agreements, particularly with Japan, that have ended up hurting the U.S. economy. In either case, the effects of NAFTA on Japan would likely be small.

The Clinton Administration and the 103rd Congress are in the early stages of a major review of U.S. trade, international and security relations with Japan, the principal U.S. ally and trading partner in Asia. A number of recent developments have raised tensions in this mutually beneficial relationship, which is still characterized by deepening economic interdependence and close political and security cooperation. These include the end of the Cold War, which has eliminated a common military threat; the recent renewed rise in Japan's trade surplus after several years of decline; and increasing international assertiveness by Japan, sometimes in conflict with U.S. policy.

The U.S. officials interviewed for this study see little chance of an immediate improvement in U.S. relations with Japan over the next year. Trends in the United States and Japan in recent years have led to deepening U.S. frustrations, especially over economic issues. These developments have combined with fundamental changes (notably the collapse of the USSR) affecting U.S.-Japanese political-military ties to lead many U.S. officials to question the allocation of costs and benefits in the U.S.-Japan relationship and to press for arrangements that will alter the allocation in the interests of the United States. U.S. officials assume that their Japanese counterparts are undertaking similar reassessments.

ave Japan's trade concessions resulted in more U.S. exports? One premise of the more results-oriented trade policy toward Japan now being pursued is that past concessions have not caused U.S. exports to Japan to rise. The only success story seems to be that of semiconductors in which a specific goal of 20 percent of the Japanese market was set and attained.

On May 25, 1989, President Bush proposed that the United States undertake the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), a series of discussions with Japan to address certain fundamental Japanese economic policies and business practices that the United States claims impede U.S. exports and investments. The SII was, in part, a Bush Administration response to the stubborn U.S. trade deficit and other problems that have caused friction in the U.S. trading relationship with Japan. It was also a response to congressional pressure to deal more aggressively with Japanese unfair trade practices and to calls from critics to adopt a "managed" trade policy toward Japan.

This report discusses the issues of the U.S.-Japanese trade relations of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, and the Clinton Administration.

On May 25, 1989, President Bush proposed that the United States undertake the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), a series of discussions with Japan to address certain fundamental Japanese economic policies and business practices that the United States claims impede U.S. exports and investments. The SII was, in part, a Bush Administration response to the stubborn U.S. trade deficit and other problems that have caused friction in the U.S. trading relationship with Japan. It was also a response to congressional pressure to deal more aggressively with Japanese unfair trade practices and to calls from critics to adopt a "managed" trade policy toward Japan.

President Clinton proposed to Prime Minister Miyazawa the idea of a framework for U.S.-Japanese negotiations during their April 13, 1993 meeting in Washington. The two leaders agreed to instruct subordinates to prepare details of such a framework in time for presentation in July in Tokyo when the President would meet with the Prime Minister and the other G-7 leaders at the annual economic summit.

This report surveys U.S. automobile policy in the 1980s in order to clarify the effects of foreign lobbying. The conclusion is that the success of Japanese and other foreign lobbying on automobile policy has been mixed. Some decisions have gone their way; others have not. Their success is partly because they have aligned their efforts with those of powerful domestic interests.

Japanese officials interviewed for this project in May-early June 1993 were generally sanguine about relations with the United States at the start of the Clinton Administration, but the Administrations's strong emphasis on U.S.- Japan trade issues in recent months deepened their pessimism over the near term prospects of U.S.-Japan relations. They were uncertain whether U.S.- Japanese talks on trade issues prior to the Clinton-Miyazawa summit of July 1993 would reflect a basic change in U.S. trade policy that in term would alter their generally pessimistic outlook.

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With Japan the United States has had one of its most important and most difficult trading relationships. Japan ranks second to Canada as the largest U.S. export market. It is also the second largest single source of imports to the United States. Trade issues are likely to become even more important as the whole U.S.-Japanese relationship changes in the post-Cold War period. How each country views and reacts to the other is changing as economic issues replace foreign policy and national security issues as the driving force of the relationship.

Japan has quickly risen to prominence as a donor of official development assistance (ODA), providing volumes of aid on par with the United States since the late 1980s. Originally a tool to bolster Japan's postwar economic recovery, Japanese aid has gradually assumed importance as a foreign policy tool. Faced with increased pressure from the international community to play a greater role in meeting global challenges and lacking the military and diplomatic resources of other nations, Japan has increasingly turned to its foreign aid as a source of world influence.

Japan's global current account surplus is expected to reach $150 billion in 1993, up substantially from a modest $36 billion in 1990. The movement of Japan's current account surplus in this period is, perhaps, more dramatic as a share of GDP, going from a substantial 3.6 percent in 1987, down to a modest 1.2 percent in 1990, and up again to about 3.1 percent in 1992. Japan's growing surplus is criticized as a consequence of that country's barriers to trade, and as a drag on the economic recovery of the world economy.

Some indirect measures of Japan's import barriers indicate that Japan's import behavior is unusual, but some do not. Japan's trade surplus is large, but the United States exports as much to that market as it does to other major industrialized nations. Japan's imports of manufactures, however, are low relative to levels in other industrialized nations.

Japan's sea shipment of a ton of plutonium from France to Japan on Nov. 7, 1992, faced strong public opposition, as did a previous one in 1984, from various public interest groups, independent analysts, and Members of Congress. The shipment arrived safely in Tokyo Jan. 4, 1993. Several more shipments at intervals of about 3 years are expected. While the plutonium is owned by Japanese utilities, it was produced from uranium enriched in the United States and supplied under a U.S.-Japan agreement for nuclear cooperation, revised in 1988. Although the agreement ties some strings to what Japan can do with nuclear imports from the United States, it also in effect gives to Japan a 30-year advance consent to ship plutonium subject to informing the United States.