This report presents recorded test data for Tests LLR-S0, LLR-3, LLR-4A, and LLR-5 of the thermal Fuels Behavior Program PBF/LOFT Lead Rod Test Series.

Power calibration and preconditioning data plots for PBF/LOFT Lead Rod Test Series, indicating the time after start of power calibration in hours with each variable.

"The program concerning Acoustic Emission/Flaw Relationships for Inservice Monitoring of LWRs was entitled in FY76 with the objective of validating the application of acoustic emission (AE) to monitor nuclear reactor pressure-containing components during operation to detect cracking."

Eighteen electronic drawings detailing hardware from the sensor through the two console racks for the acoustic emission instrument system.

Dataset documenting the software programs used in the acoustic emission (AE) instruments systems developed under the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) / Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) AE program.

Bouguer gravity anomaly map derived from the data set and accompanying the report to document the data sources and the procedures used in the reduction of the data.

The purposes of this report are to document the data sources and the procedures used in the reduction of the data and to present a Bouguer gravity anomaly map derived from the data set.

From section 1: In the quantitative system probability estimates performed in this study, component behavior data in the form of failure rates and repair times are required as inputs to the system models. Since the goal of this study is risk assessment, as opposed to reliability analysis, larger errors (e.g. order of magnitude type accuracy) can be tolerated in the quantified results. This has important implications on the treatment of available data. In standard reliability analysis, point values (i.e., "best-estimates") are generally used for both data and results in quantifying the system model. In risk assessment, since results accurate to about an order of magnitude are sufficient, data and results using random variable and probabilistic approaches, can be usefully employed. The base of applicable failure rate data is thus significantly broadened since data with large error spreads and uncertainties can now be utilized. The data and associated material that were assembled for use in this study and that are presented here are to be used in the random variable framework (which will be described). The data and the accompanying framework are deemed sufficient for the study's needs. Care must be taken, however, since this data may not be sufficiently detailed, …

From introduction: In conventional safety analyses, a suitable design basis, including redundancy, is specified to assure a minimum level of operability of ESFs, and the likelihood or consequences of total failure of ESFs are not considered further. In this study all failures are considered possible, but appropriate probabilities are assigned to them. Thus, many potential accident sequences are described in the following discussions as if they will surely occur, with no reservations expressed as to their likelihood or significance. However, most of these sequences have such low probability that they do not contribute to the overall risk from reactor accidents. In fact, in order to make an overall risk assessment, a major task of this study was to identify the sequences that are the dominant contributors to risk. In this study the initial failures or initiating events that could lead to significant consequences were examined to varying degrees. Those that seemed to contribute significantly to potential risks were analyzed in considerable detail; those that did not, received less detailed consideration. This is discussed more fully in section 3 of this appendix.