Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The transportation sector accounts for roughly two thirds of the nation's petroleum consumption and one quarter of the total U.S. energy use. Several steps have been taken during the last 25 years either to reduce petroleum consumption or to increase fuel diversity in the transportation sector, including tax incentives, mandates for alternative fuel vehicles, and laws to promote automobile fuel efficiency. This testimony discusses the extent of alternative fuel vehicle acquisition and fuel use, some of the barriers inhibiting greater use of alternative fuels and vehicles, and the federal tax incentives used to promote the use of alternative motor fuels and vehicles. So far, alternative fuels and vehicles have not made much of a dent in the conventional fuel and vehicle dominance of the U.S. vehicle fleet, primarily because of fundamental economic obstacles, such as the relatively low price of oil, insufficient availability of alternative fuel refueling infrastructure, and the relatively high cost of some alternative fuel vehicles. As GAO reported in February 2000 (RCED-00-59), any significant increase in the use of alternative motor fuels and vehicles by the general public will depend on the following two factors: …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The military's ability to carry out its mission depends on its having adequate supplies of spare parts on hand for maintenance and repairs. Shortages are a key indicator that the billions of dollars being spent on these parts are not being used effectively, efficiently, and economically. Despite additional funding from Congress, the Army still has concerns about spare parts shortages. Spare parts shortages for the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters have harmed operations and lowered morale among maintenance personnel. Cannibalization of parts from one aircraft to another is an inefficient practice that results in double work for the maintenance personnel, masks parts shortages, and lowers morale. Parts were unavailable for various reasons, including higher-than-expected demand for parts, delays in obtaining parts from contractors, and problems with overhaul and maintenance. Another factor contributing to the shortage was the Army's inability to obtain parts for these aging aircraft from the original manufacturers, which sometimes had gone out of business. The Army and the Defense Logistics Agency have efforts planned or underway to improve the availability of aviation spare parts. Once these initiatives are further along, GAO will review …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Passengers on the same commercial airline flight may pay very different fares. This situation has led to dissatisfaction among some passengers who believe that airline ticketing practices are unfair. To reduce their cost of flying, some passengers have tried to use "hidden-city" and "back-to-back" ticketing. Hidden-city ticketing occurs when a passenger books a flight to one city but purposely deplanes at an intermediate city. Though never intending to make the last leg of the flight, the passenger buys the ticket because it is cheaper than a ticket to the intermediate city. Back-to-back ticketing occurs when a passenger buys two round-trip tickets that include a Saturday night stay but either uses only half the ticket coupons or uses all the coupons out of sequence. This practice results in a lower price than would be possible by purchasing round-trip tickets that did not include a Saturday night stay. Most airlines expressly forbid the use of hidden-city and back-to-back ticketing. This report reviews (1) the factors that airlines consider when setting fares; (2) the factors that create hidden-city ticketing and the pricing practices that foster back-to-back ticketing practices; (3) …

A chapter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issues regulations to strengthen aviation safety and security and to promote the efficient use of airspace. FAA's rulemaking is a complicated process intended to ensure that all aspects of any regulatory change are fully analyzed before any change goes into effect. During the last 40 years, many reports have documented problems in FAA's rulemaking efforts that have delayed the formulation and finalization of its rules. This report reviews FAA's rulemaking process. GAO reviewed 76 significant rules and found that FAA's rulemaking process varied widely. These rules constituted the majority of FAA's workload of significant rules from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2000. GAO found that FAA had begun about 60 percent of the rulemaking projects by Congress and about a third of the rulemaking projects recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board within six months. For one-fourth of the mandates and one-third of the recommendations however, at least five years passed before FAA began the process. Once the rule was formally initiated, FAA took a median time of two and a half years to proceed from formal initiation of the …

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the results of GAO's review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) rulemaking process and ways to improve its efficiency. GAO found that the time FAA took to formally initiate a rule in response to a congressional mandate or a National Transportation Safety Board recommendation varied widely. Between fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year 2000, FAA initiated most such rules within two years, but some rules were initiated many years later. During the entire six-year period GAO reviewed FAA's median time for the final rule phase--about 15 months--was comparable to that of four other federal regulatory agencies. Over a shorter, more recent period, FAA took longer to complete this phase. In 1998, FAA developed reforms to address problems the pace of rulemaking, including the timing of management's involvement, the administration of the process, and human capital management issues. However, the reforms have yet to shorten the rulemaking process because they have not been fully or effectively implemented. Shifting priorities, some brought about by external events and some by internal circumstances, have continued to delay the pace of rulemaking. In addition, difficult policy issues have sometimes remained …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Since 1781, the federal government has transferred or sold about 1.1 billion acres to nonfederal entities--such as state and local governments, businesses, nonprofit groups, and individual citizens--under various initiatives that promoted general economic development, developed transportation systems, supported public schools, and encouraged settlement of the western frontier. Today, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service administer about seventy percent of the 657 million acres that remain in federal ownership. These agencies continue to transfer and sell federal land, but under more limited circumstances. For example, a community might want to develop a public park, a nonprofit group might want land for a shooting range, or a homeowner might want to obtain clear property title after mistakenly building part of his house on federal land. During fiscal years 1991 through 2000, BLM alone was authorized by law to transfer land. BLM transferred about 79,000 acres during this period under four key statutes and received about $3 million. BLM and the Forest Service are both authorized by law to sell land and are directed by law to receive at least fair market value when they …

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the budget process established by the Budget Enforcement Act, which will expire in fiscal year 2002. Because the goal of achieving zero deficits has been achieved, the focus of the budget process has shifted to to the allocation of surpluses among debt reduction, spending increases, and tax cuts. The budget process should be designed to avoid what has been described as the year-end "train wreck." A year-end "train wreck" results from a failure to reach agreement--or at least a compromise acceptable to all parties--earlier in the year. Although it is possible that early agreement on some broad parameters could facilitate a smoother process, it is not clear that such an agreement will always prevent gridlock--it may just come earlier. Two ideas that have been proposed to avert the year-end disruption caused by an inability to reach agreement on funding the government include joint budget resolutions and biennial budgeting. In discussing alternatives for improving the budget process, there is a broad consensus among observers and budget analysts that the spending constraints established by the act are necessary even with the advent of actual and projected surpluses. …

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony reviews the Department of Defense's (DOD) handling of appropriated funds from expired appropriation accounts. In 1990, Congress changed the law governing the use of appropriation accounts because it concluded that controls over them were not working. Without adequate controls, Congress was concerned that agencies could disburse money in amounts and for purposes that it had not approved. GAO found that DOD improperly charged appropriation accounts after they were closed. GAO also found that DOD did not establish the requisite systems, controls, and managerial attention required to properly account for its disbursements consistent with the 1990 account closing law, and as a result, DOD made at least $615 million of illegal or otherwise improper adjustments during fiscal year 2000 alone. DOD was aware of the limitations the account closing law placed on the availability of canceled appropriations and that the law was enacted because of previous abuses by DOD's use of old appropriations. DOD also knew that a major system used to control its use of appropriations allowed for disbursements to be charged in a way that was inconsistent with the law. However, DOD did nothing to …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report reviews the Department of Defense's (DOD) handling of appropriated funds from expired appropriation accounts. In 1990, Congress changed the law governing the use of appropriation accounts because it concluded that controls over them were not working. Without adequate controls, Congress was concerned that agencies could disburse money in amounts and for purposes that it had not approved. GAO found that DOD improperly charged appropriation accounts after they were closed. GAO also found that DOD did not establish the requisite systems, controls, and managerial attention required to properly account for its disbursements consistent with the 1990 account closing law. As a result, DOD made at least $615 million of illegal or otherwise improper adjustments during fiscal year 2000 alone. DOD was aware of the limitations the account closing law placed on the availability of canceled appropriations and that the law was enacted because of previous abuses by DOD. DOD also knew that a major system used to control its use of appropriations allowed for disbursements to be charged in a way that was inconsistent with the law. However, DOD did nothing to fix the system, …

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) generally comes from two select committees of Congress and the CIA's Inspector General. GAO has broad authority to evaluate CIA programs. In reality, however, GAO faces both legal and practical limitations on its ability to review these programs. For example, it has no access to some CIA "unvouchered" accounts and cannot compel its access to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information. In addition, as a practical matter, GAO is limited by the CIA's level of cooperation, which has varied through the years. GAO has not actively audited the CIA since the early 1960s, when it discontinued such work because CIA was not providing it with enough access to information to allow GAO to do its job. The issue has arisen since then from time to time as GAO's work has required some level of access to CIA programs and information. However, given a lack of requests from Congress for GAO to do specific work at the CIA and its limited resources, GAO made a decision not to pursue the issue further. Today, GAO's dealings with the CIA are mostly limited to information …

Correspondence issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in 1997 to reduce the number of uninsured poor children whose families incomes are too high to qualify for Medicaid. Congress appropriated $40 billion over 10 years (fiscal years 1998 through 2007) for SCHIP. Each state's SCHIP allotment is available as a federal match based on state expenditures. Although the SCHIP statute generally targets children in families with incomes up to 200 percent of the federal poverty level, 13 states' programs cover children in families above 200 percent of the federal poverty level. This report provides information on (1) enrollment and federal expenditures for SCHIP and estimates of the number of and costs to enroll eligible unenrolled children and income-eligible pregnant women and (2) factors that may influence states' future expenditures for SCHIP and the availability of funding for any program expansion."

Other written product issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report provides information on the legal requirements for recognizing and recording obligations under the Defense Health Program (DHP), specifically focusing on (1) the legal basis for obligations incurred by TRICARE Management Activity for, among other services, medical services provided directly by the Department of Defense (DOD) to beneficiaries as well as medical services provided by civilian contractors who subsequently bill DHP for those services, (2) the legal basis for obligations for costs of change orders or other negotiated settlements, and (3) whether the Antideficiency Act applies to DHP obligations and expenditures. GAO held that (1) DOD 's practices in obligating funds are consistent with federal regulations, (2) DOD should record obligations for change orders against the appropriation current at the time the services are rendered, and (3) DOD may enter into obligations in excess of available resources, but it must obtain appropriations sufficient to liquidate those obligations."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Consumer complaints against household good carriers have soared in the last five years, yet the Department of Transportation (DOT) has done little to oversee the industry. Although DOT does not collect nationwide information on consumer complaints against household good movers, it estimates that it receives about 4,000 complaints each year. Consumer protection in the interstate household goods moving industry is a relatively low priority for DOT compared with its primary mission of promoting motor carrier safety. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has fallen behind in its recent efforts to improve industry oversight and consumer protection. FMCSA has failed to meet the milestones for completing many of its efforts and has extended its deadlines by as much as a year. In addition, DOT has not completed a study on the effectiveness of arbitration as a way to settle household goods disputes, even though the law mandated that the study be completed by 1997. DOT now plans to conduct the study between 2003 and 2005. This testimony summarizes a March report (GAO-01-318)."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Congress authorized the Pilot Mentor Protege Program to boost the participation of small disadvantaged businesses as subcontractors and suppliers under Department of Defense (DOD) contracts. The program provides incentives for major defense contractors (mentors) to assist small disadvantaged businesses (proteges) in strengthening their ability to compete for work. However, DOD has been criticized for not establishing compelling evidence about the program's overall effectiveness. This report reviews (1) the relationship between the results of the Mentor-Protege Program and the statutory goal of awarding five percent of the total dollar amount contracted by DOD and subcontracted by DOD prime contractors to small disadvantaged businesses; (2) whether the Mentor-Protege Program enhanced the business competitiveness, financial independence, and business development of protege firms; and (3) whether program funds had been used as an effective incentive for mentor firms to participate in the program. GAO found that DOD lacks data integral to assessing the success of the Mentor-Protege Program. DOD lacks enough information to determine the relationship between the program and the goal of awarding five percent of the total dollar amount contracted to small disadvantaged businesses. Although DOD has consistently …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "In negotiating profit on contracts, the Department of Defense (DOD) requires contracting officers to set negotiating objectives by relying on guidelines in defense regulations. Congress mandated that DOD review its profit guidelines and consider whether modifying them would provide more incentive for contractors to develop and produce complex and innovative new technologies for weapon systems. After completing its review, DOD issued a final rule in December 2000 that added a technology incentive to its guidelines for setting profit objectives on negotiated defense contracts. This report reviews whether the new policy is (1) likely to achieve its intended objective of stimulating increased innovation and (2) consistent with the revised policies for acquiring weapons systems. GAO found that the new profit policy may have limited effect on incentivizing additional innovation because the policy has limited reach during research and development and it does not provide adequate guidance on when to apply the incentive. The policy may not reinforce DOD's emphasis on technology maturity in its guidance on the system acquisition process."

A chapter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The collection of outstanding criminal debt has been a long-standing problem for the federal government. Since October 1985, as reported in the U.S. Attorney's statistical reports, the balance of outstanding criminal debt has grown from $260 million to more than $13 billion. Currently, the receipting of collections and recordkeeping for criminal debt is primarily the responsibility of the U.S. Courts, while the Department of Justice is responsible for collecting criminal debt. This report reviews (1) the key reasons for the growth in reported uncollected criminal debt; (2) whether adequate processes exist to collect criminal debt; and (3) what role, if any, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury play in monitoring the government's collection of criminal debt. GAO found that four key factors have contributed to the significant growth of uncollected criminal debt. These factors are (1) the nature of the debt, in that it involves criminals who may be incarcerated or deported or who have minimal earning capacity; (2) the assessment of mandatory restitution regardless of the criminal's ability to pay, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act …

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) is an important element of the U.S.' strategy to protect the nation's infrastructures from hostile attacks, especially computer-based attacks. This testimony discusses the key findings of a GAO report on NIPC's progress in developing national capabilities for analyzing cyber threats and vulnerability data and issuing warnings, enhancing its capabilities for responding to cyber attacks, and establishing information-sharing relationships with governments and private-sector entities. GAO found that progress in developing the analysis, warning, and information-sharing capabilities has been mixed. NIPC began various critical infrastructure protection efforts that have laid the foundation for future governmentwide efforts. NIPC has also provided valuable support and coordination related to investigating and otherwise responding to attacks on computers. However, the analytical and information-sharing capabilities that are needed to protect the nation's critical infrastructures have not yet been achieved, and NIPC has developed only limited warning capabilities. An underlying contributor to the slow progress is that the NIPC's roles and responsibilities have not been fully defined and are not consistently interpreted by other entities involved in the government's broader critical infrastructure protection strategy. This report summarized an April report …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Since the end of the Persian Gulf War in February 1991, the Department of Defense (DOD) has reported over $25 billion in incremental costs for its overseas contingency operations. These operations include the enforcement of no-fly zones, humanitarian assistance, and peace enforcement operations. The majority of these costs ($22 billion) have been incurred in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo) and Southwest Asia. In fiscal year 2001, U.S. military forces are continuing to participate in a number of contingency operations, primarily in the Balkans and Southwest Asia. In this report, GAO reviews (1) the adequacy of DOD's incremental contingency operations funding for all ongoing contingency operations in fiscal year 2001, (2) DOD's estimated contingency operations costs for fiscal year 2002, and (3) the ramifications of DOD's plan to change the method for funding its operations in Southwest Asia. GAO found that (1) existing funds are sufficient to cover DOD's estimated costs for ongoing contingency operations for fiscal year 2001, (2) in June 2001, the administration submitted a revised fiscal year 2002 budget for DOD, which included $4 billion for ongoing operations in the Balkans and Southwest Asia, …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Congress has expressed concern about the extent to which the Department of Defense has moved funds that directly affect military readiness, such as those that finance training, to pay for other subactivities within its operation and maintenance (O&M) account, such as real property maintenance and base operations. This report reviews the (1) Army's obligation of O&M division training funds and (2) readiness of the Army's divisions. GAO found that the Army continued to use division training funds for purposes other than training during fiscal year 2000. However, the reduced funding did not interfere with the Army's planned training events or exercises. The Army's tank units also reported that, despite the reduced funding and their failure to meet their tank mileage performance goal, their readiness remained high. Specifically, many tank units reported that they could be fully trained for their wartime mission within a short time period. Units that reported that they would need more time to become fully trained generally cited personnel issues rather than the lack of training funds as the reason. Even so, starting in fiscal year 2001, the Army has taken action to …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report examines selected logistics, funding, and readiness issues pertaining to the AH-64 Apache helicopter program. GAO found that the Apache's identified sustainment systems technical support requirements have not been fully met in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. In fiscal year 2000, funding fell short of the $28.6 million needed for Apache sustainment support. The military projects that it will be able to meet only 56 percent of the Apache's sustainment support requirements for fiscal years 2001-2003. Furthermore, because the Apache sustainment support projects must compete with other weapon systems for limited funding, some Apache projects have been delayed or limited in scope. GAO also found that the procurement of parts for the Apache is hampered by an outdated inventory system. The technical manuals used by field and depot personnel lack critical technical drawings and specifications, and the Army must resort to other methods, such as reverse engineering, to compensate for the lack of data. Finally, the Army has several unfunded requirements for Apache component upgrades for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. GAO found, however, that these issues have not prevented the Apache fleet from meeting …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Current plans for identifying spectrum to support third generation mobile wireless systems by July 30, 2001, and to auction licenses by September 30, 2002, are premature. GAO agrees with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department of Commerce that delaying the identification of spectrum and the auction of licenses for third generation wireless systems could serve the public interest. Adequate information is not currently available to fully identify and address the uncertainties and risks of reallocation. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the federal government could make decisions affecting national security without knowing the full extent of risks they face or steps available to reduce those risks. Extending the current schedule for the identification and auction of licenses for this portion of the spectrum would allow DOD to complete technical and operational assessments and to consider the nation's future spectrum requirements. In addition, a delay would allow time to further consider the adequacy of existing national spectrum strategies affecting international agreements and for DOD overseas military operations to modify these strategies as necessary and to incorporate them into the nation's long-range spectrum plan."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report reviews the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan to assess the agency's progress in achieving selected key outcomes important to the agency's mission. GAO found that although HUD did not attain all of the goals pertaining to the selected key outcomes in its fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan, the performance report shows that HUD made some progress toward achieving the outcomes. However, HUD's progress varied for each outcome, and the information presented in the performance report does not always provide enough information for the reader to evaluate HUD's contribution to achieving the outcome. In general, HUD's strategies for achieving these outcomes appear to be clear and reasonable."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report reviews the Department of Justice's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and assesses Justice's progress in achieving selected key outcomes that were identified as important mission areas. Justice's overall progress toward achieving the key outcomes was difficult to ascertain because generally the performance report lacked fiscal year 2000 performance targets to measure success and lacked clear linkage between performance measures and outcomes. Justice did not set fiscal year 2000 performance targets for some measures because the measures were new, and for some measures Justice believes that setting performance targets could cause the public to perceive law enforcement as engaging in "bounty hunting" or pursuing arbitrary targets merely for the sake of meeting particular goals. Justice's strategies varied in the extent to which they included sufficient information to inform decisionmakers about initiatives to achieve these outcomes. GAO notes opportunities for Justice to improve the usefulness of its reports and plans."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report reviews the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to contract for goods and services by acquiring and implementing a standard procurement system (SPS). DOD's management of SPS is a lesson in how not to justify, make, and monitor the implementation of information technology investment decisions. Specifically, DOD has not (1) ensured that accountability and responsibility for measuring progress against commitments are clearly understood, performed, and reported; (2) demonstrated, on the basis of reliable data and credible analysis, that the proposed system solution will produce economic benefits commensurate with costs; (3) used data on progress against project cost, schedule, and performance commitments throughout a project's life cycle to make investment decisions; and (4) divided this large project into a series of incremental investment decisions to spread the risks over smaller, more manageable components. Because it has yet to effectively apply any of these basic tenets of effective investment management to SPS, DOD lacks the basic information needed to make informed decisions on how to proceed with the project. Nevertheless, DOD continues to push forward in acquiring and deploying additional versions of SPS. Continuing this approach involves …