Correspondence issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on short- and long-form questionnaire response rates, focusing on the: (1) 2000 Census; (2) 1998 Census Dress Rehearsal; (3) 1990 Census; and (4) 1988 Census Dress Rehearsal."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Commerce's (Commerce) U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) seeks updated information on the addresses and maps of housing units and group quarters from state, local, and tribal governments through the Local Update of Census Addresses (LUCA) Program. Prepared under the Comptroller General's authority, this report assesses (1) the status of the LUCA Program, (2) the Bureau's response to prior recommendations by GAO and others and new challenges related to the program, and (3) the Bureau's plans for conducting the program in areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO reviewed LUCA program documents, met with and surveyed participants in the LUCA Dress Rehearsal, and interviewed Bureau officials and local officials in the Gulf Coast region."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Commerce's U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) seeks updated information on the addresses and maps of housing units from state, local, and tribal governments through the Local Update of Census Addresses (LUCA) program. This testimony discusses (1) the status of the LUCA program, and (2) the Bureau's response to prior issues raised by GAO as well as new challenges related to the program. The testimony is based on a GAO report issued on June 14, 2007. GAO reviewed LUCA program documents, met with and surveyed participants in the LUCA Dress Rehearsal, and interviewed Bureau officials and local officials."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "To conduct a successful census, it is important that the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) produce the most complete and accurate address file and maps for 2010. For this review, GAO's specific objectives were to determine the extent to which (1) the Bureau's efforts to modernize the address file and maps are addressing problems experienced during the 2000 Census, (2) the Bureau is managing emerging address file and map issues, (3) the Bureau is able to collect and transmit address and mapping data using mobile computing devices (MCD) equipped with global positioning system (GPS) technology, and (4) the Bureau has a plan to update the address file and maps in areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO reviewed the Bureau's progress in modernizing both the address file and maps."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The 2010 Census will be the most expensive census in our nation's history, even after adjusting for inflation. The Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates that the life cycle cost of the 2010 Census will be from $13.7 billion to $14.5 billion. GAO was asked to (1) assess the extent to which the Bureau's 2010 Census life cycle cost estimate adheres to characteristics defined for high-quality cost estimation, (2) report on the relationship between the estimate and the Bureau's budget, and (3) assess whether the Bureau's existing policies and resources are sufficient to conduct cost estimation. To assess the reliability of the Bureau's cost estimate, GAO analyzed the Bureau's methods and approaches to determine if the estimate is well-documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The decennial census is a constitutionally mandated activity, with immutable deadlines. It produces data used to allocate about $200 billion yearly in federal financial assistance, reapportion the seats of the House of Representatives, and provide a profile of the nation's people to help guide policy decisions. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates the 2010 Census will cost $11.3 billion, making it the most expensive census in the nation's history, even after adjusting for inflation. Based primarily on GAO's issued reports, this testimony addresses the extent to which the Bureau has (1) developed detailed and timely cost data for effective oversight and cost control, (2) reduced nonresponse mail follow up costs, and (3) produced risk mitigation plans to address identified challenges."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "On April 3, 2008, the Secretary of Commerce announced significant changes to how the Census Bureau (Bureau) would conduct nonresponse follow-up, its largest field operation, in which census workers interview households that do not return initial census forms for the 2010 decennial census, and to its Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) contract. The Bureau has since issued a redesigned plan to conduct a paper-based follow-up operation, an integrated 2010 Census project schedule, and is working on revising the FDCA contract. These are major changes late in the decennial census cycle. This testimony discusses (1) the Bureau's plans for conducting a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation, (2) management of the FDCA contract and its latest cost estimates, and (3) the status of the Bureau's integrated 2010 project schedule. This testimony is based on past work, recent interviews with Bureau officials, and a review of redesign documents."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As part of its work to improve the management and performance of the federal government, GAO monitors progress and continuing challenges in performance budgeting and the Administration's related initiatives, such as the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). In light of the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance and other emerging 21st century challenges, we have also reported that performance budgeting can help facilitate a needed reexamination of what the federal government does, how it does it, who does it, and how it is financed in the future. GAO remains committed to working with Congress and the Administration to help address these important and complex issues."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) was established in 1970 to advocate for low-income families. Allegations of voter registration fraud and videotapes of questionable behavior by ACORN employees raised concerns about ACORN, and Congress passed fiscal year 2010 laws prohibiting federal funds from being awarded to ACORN and ACORN related organizations. GAO was asked to report on these organizations, including (1) how much federal funding was awarded to them for fiscal years 2005 through 2009 and the purpose of the funding, (2) the extent to which federal agencies' monitoring of these awards detected issues identified by audits, (3) the nature and results of any federal investigations or prosecutions conducted of these organizations from fiscal years 2005 through 2009, and (4) how federal agencies implemented provisions prohibiting the award of funds. Among other things, GAO identified awards to ACORN or potentially related organizations by 31 federal agencies and audits of such awards; documentation of related investigations and cases; and actions to implement funding restrictions by the 27 agencies in our review subject to them."

Guidance issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This publication supersedes GAO-04-218G, Acquisition/Financial Systems Interface Requirements: Checklist for Reviewing Systems under the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (Exposure Draft), December 2003. The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) requires that agencies implement and maintain financial management systems that substantially comply with federal financial management system requirements. These requirements are described in detail in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidance and in the Federal Financial Management System Requirements series issued by the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP). JFMIP intends for its requirements series to promote understanding of key financial management systems concepts and requirements, to provide a framework for establishing integrated financial management systems that support program and financial managers, and to describe specific requirements of financial management systems."

Correspondence issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report reviews the data, assumptions, and conclusions reached by the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) on the acquisition of about two million square feet of leased space for the consolidation of PTO activities. This build-to-suit lease, valued at approximately $1.2 billion over its 20-year term, was signed in June 2000. this report responds to allegations and questions from two public interest groups about the PTO lease acquisition. One public interest group alleged that during the procurement process for the lease (1) GSA improperly awarded the lease to an offeror who had not complied with the solicitation's stated requirements, (2) GSA failed to compete the construction of the interior finishes phase of the project as required by law, and (3) GSA used an illegal cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract. The second public interest group asked (1) whether the requirements in GSA's Solicitation for Offers for the PTO lease transformed the lease from an operating lease to a capital lease under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11; (2) whether the new facility will be able to house all PTO employees and contractors throughout the …

Correspondence issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO followed up on its previous report on the scope and limits of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program's 1998 sanction data, focusing on: (1) whether the number of full-family sanctions in an average month in 1998 can be annualized and used to determine the impact full-family sanctions had that year on caseload size; and (2) what constitutes the combined number of full-family and partial sanctions in an average month during 1998."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The federal government spends billions of dollars annually for programs that help low-income families and other individuals. A significant portion of these funds cover administrative costs rather than direct benefits and services. To provide information on how these administrative costs compare across programs and the federal government's role in funding these programs' administrative costs, we examined (1) total funding and the amounts and types of administrative expenditures for selected programs and (2) the federal matching rates for these administrative expenditures."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "In October 2001, in response to the Taliban regime's protection of al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States, coalition forces forcibly removed the regime from Afghanistan. In December 2002, Congress passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizing assistance funds to help Afghanistan rebuild a stable, democratic society. The act directed GAO to monitor the implementation of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance. This report analyzes, for fiscal years 2002-2003, (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures in Afghanistan, (2) results of assistance projects, (3) the assistance coordination mechanisms and strategy, and (4) major obstacles that affected the achievement of U.S. goals."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan had no army or functioning police and, before September 11, 2001, was a haven for international terrorists. In April 2002, the United States and several other nations agreed to reform the five pillars of Afghanistan's security sector--creating an Afghan army, reconstituting the police force, establishing a working judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the Afghan militias. As the leader for the army pillar, the United States has provided about $3.3 billion. For the German-led effort to reconstitute the Afghan police, the United States has provided over $800 million. We examined the progress made, and limitations faced, in developing the army and police forces. We also identified challenges that must be addressed to complete and sustain these forces."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 2002, the United States has worked to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), directs U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and, in conjunction with the Department of State (State), the Afghan National Police (ANP). To follow up on recommendations from GAO's 2005 report on the ANSF, GAO analyzed the extent to which U.S. plans for the ANSF contain criteria we recommended. GAO also examined progress made and challenges faced in developing the ANA and ANP. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Defense, State, and contractor documents and met with cognizant officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 2005, the Department of Defense (Defense), with support from the Department of State (State), has directed U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Police (ANP) into a force capable of enforcing the rule of law and supporting actions to defeat insurgency, among other activities. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop a capable ANP; (2) challenges that affect the development of a capable ANP; and (3) GAO analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which comprise the ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA). This statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report titled Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008)."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have collectively obligated billions of dollars for contracts and assistance to support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. There are concerns that U.S. funds are being diverted to fund insurgent and criminal activity in Afghanistan. In light of these concerns, under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States, we initiated a review to identify DOD, State, and USAID efforts to vet non-U.S. contractors and assistance recipients in Afghanistan. GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD has established a process to vet non-U.S. vendors to ensure that resources are not used to support insurgents; (2) the extent to which State and USAID have established processes to vet vendors and assistance recipients; and (3) the extent to which vetting information is shared among DOD, State, and USAID. GAO reviewed documents and met with a variety of agency officials to address the report's objectives."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has experienced systemic challenges that have hindered its ability to manage and oversee contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan. Key challenges include gaps in planning for the use of contractors and assistance recipients and having visibility into their numbers. For example, GAO reported in April 2010 that, absent strategic planning for its use of contractors, individual offices within USAID often made case-by-case decisions on using contractors to support contract or grant administration and risks, such as possible conflicts of interest, were not always addressed. While having reliable data on contractors and assistance recipients is a starting point for informing agency decisions and ensuring proper management, GAO has also reported on limitations in USAID’s visibility into the number and value of contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan, as well as the number of personnel working under them. USAID, along with other agencies, has not implemented GAO’s recommendation to address such limitations. USAID, however, has taken other actions to mitigate risks associated with awarding contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan. In June 2011, GAO reported on USAID’s vendor vetting program, then in its …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "We performed the agreed-upon procedures requested by the Secretary of the Senate related to receipt and disbursement processing and related procedures applicable to the Office of Public Records Revolving Fund's (the Fund's) fiscal years 2003-2005. In summary, the procedures we agreed to perform involved inspecting supporting documentation for Fund-related receipt and disbursement activities processed through the Office of Public Records (OPR) and Senate Disbursing Office (SDO) and reconciliation procedures performed by OPR."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Air Force depot maintenance activity group in-house operations generate about $5 billion in annual revenue principally by repairing aircraft, missiles, engines, and other assets. In doing so, the group operates under the working capital fund concept, where customers are to be charged the anticipated costs of providing goods and services to them. The group's average price for in-house work almost doubled between fiscal years 2000 and 2004 from $119.99 per hour to $237.84 per hour. GAO was asked to determine (1) what factors were primarily responsible for the price increase, (2) if the prices charged recovered the reported actual costs of performing the work, and (3) if the Air Force has taken effective steps to improve efficiency and control the activity group's costs."

A chapter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the progress of the Air Force's depot maintenance reform initiatives to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of its industrial operations."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 requires GAO to review various aspects of the Department of Defense (DOD) policy that allows Defense Working Capital Fund activities to carry over a 3-month level of work from one fiscal year to the next. The DOD 3-month carryover standard applies to all DOD activity groups except for the contract portion of the Air Force depot maintenance activity group, for which DOD established a 4.5-month carryover standard because of the additional administrative functions associated with awarding contracts. Reported carryover balances for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 were inaccurate and, therefore, the balances were not reliable for decision-making or budget review purposes. The reported carryover balances were not accurate due to (1) faulty assumptions used in calculating work-in-process and (2) records not accurately reflecting work that was actually completed by year-end. As a result, the amount of carryover reported by the Air Force was understated by tens of millions of dollars and customers' funds were idle that could have been used for other purposes during the fiscal year. Even though the carryover was understated, Air …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Spare parts shortages on the three Air Force systems GAO reviewed have undermined the performance of assigned missions and the economy and efficiency of maintenance activities. Specifically, the Air Force did not meet its mission-capable goals for the E-3 or C-5 aircrafts during fiscal years 1996-2000, nor did it have enough F-100-220 engines to meet peacetime and wartime goals during that period. These shortages may also affect personnel retention. GAO recently reported that the lack of parts and materials to successfully complete daily job requirements was one of six major factors causing job dissatisfaction among military personnel. Item managers at the maintenance facilities often indicated that spare parts shortages were caused by the inventory management system underestimating the need for spare parts and by delays in the Air Force's repair process as a result of the consolidation of repair facilities. Other reasons included difficulties with producing or repairing parts, reliability of spare parts, and contracting issues. The Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have planned or begun many initiatives to alleviate shortages of the spare parts for the three systems GAO reviewed."