The management of risks from radioactive and chemical materials has been a major environmental concern in the United states for the past two or three decades. Risk management of these materials encompasses the remediation of past disposal practices as well as development of appropriate strategies and controls for current and future operations. This symposium is concerned primarily with low-level radioactive wastes and mixed wastes. Individual reports were processed separately for the Department of Energy databases.

The Natural Gas Monthly (NGM) highlights activities, events, and analyses of interest to public and private sector organizations associated with the natural gas industry. Volume and price data are presented each month for natural gas production, distribution, consumption, and interstate pipeline activities. Producer-related activities and underground storage data are also reported. From time to time, the NGM features articles designed to assist readers in using and interpreting natural gas information. This month feature is on the value of underground storage in today`s natural gas industry.

A series of materials has been prepared that have authentic properties of explosives but are non-hazardous. These NESTT materials are prepared by coating a few micron thick layer of an explosive on a non-reactive substrate. This produces a formulation with an authentic vapor and molecular signature. Authentic x-ray and oxygen/nitrogen density signatures are obtained through the appropriate choice of a substrate. The signatures of NESTT TNT and NESTT Comp. C-4 have been verified by instrument and K-9 detection in a Beta Test Program.

During a six-week period in the fall of 1994 a team of 31 US government and Y-12 personnel packaged and removed several thousand kilograms of material containing highly enriched uranium from the (former Soviet Union) Republic of Kazakhstan for interim storage at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This classified mission, known as PROJECT SAPPHIRE, had been initiated at the request of the Kazakhstan government in order to rid itself of possible security problems. Planning for the mission included assurance of the health and safety of the team members, as well as compliance with all local, IAEA, and US government regulations regarding the handling, packaging, transportation, and storage of radioactive and fissile material. The mission classification restrictions were relaxed following the return of the team and material to the United States. The material to be removed, in the form of small billets and rods of uranium metal and uranium-beryllium alloy and oxide powder, was sealed by team members on site into two-liter steel cans. Two or three cans each were loaded into more than 400 IAEA certified fissile material shipping container, and each container was packed into a large steel drum for transport by US Air Force cargo planes …

Tests have been carried out on a string prototype superconducting magnets, consisting of one double-quadrupole and two double-dipoles forming the major part of a half-cell of the LHC machine. The magnets are protected individually by ``cold diodes`` and quench heaters. The electrical aspects of these tests are described here. The performance during quench of the protection diodes and the associated interconnections was studied. Tests determined the magnet quench performance in training and at different ramp-rates, and investigated the inter-magnet propagation of quenches. Current lead and inter-magnet contact resistances were controlled and the performance of the power converter and the dump switches assessed.

This Stabilization Blend Plan documents the material to be processed and the processing order for the FY95 Ash Stabilization Campaign. The primary mission of this process is to reduce the inventory of unstable plutonium bearing ash. The source of the ash is from Rocky Flats and the 232-Z incinerator at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The ash is currently being stored in Room 235B and Vault 174 in building 234-5Z. The sludge is to be thermally stabilized in a glovebox in room 230A of the 234-5Z building and material handling for the process will be done in room 230B of the same building. The campaign is scheduled for approximately 12--16 weeks. A total of roughly 4 kg of Pu will be processed.