Nuclear criticality parameters were developed as a basis for evaluating criticality safety for waste stored in the high-level waste tank farms on the Hanford Site in Washington State. The plutonium critical concentration and critical mass were calculated using a conservative waste model (CWM). The primary requirement of a CWM is that it have a lower neutron absorption than any actual waste. Graphs are provided of the critical mass as a function of plutonium concentration for spheres and for uniform slab layers in a 22.9-m-diameter tank. Minimum subcritical absorber-to-plutonium mass rates were calculated for waste components selected for their relative abundance and neutron absorption capacity. Comparison of measured absorber-to-plutonium mass ratios in their corresponding subcritical limit mass ratios provides a means of assessing whether criticality is possible for waste of the measured composition. A comparison is made between the plutonium critical concentrations in CWM solids and in a postulated real waste. This comparison shows that the actual critical parameters are likely to be significantly larger than those obtained using the CWM, thus providing confidence that the margin of safety obtained to the criticality safety evaluation is conservative.

The purpose of this document is to investigate the effects of a spray leak inside the 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility. This analysis will provide information to be used in the revision of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The scope of work is to assess the impacts of the radiological and toxicological consequences if the 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility door remains open during a spray leak accident. The dimensions of the roll-up door on the Unloading room are 3.7 m by 5.5 m (12 feet x 18 feet). The 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility is a reinforced concrete structure approximately 20 m (64 ft) long by 12 m (40 ft) wide by 7.77 m (25.5 ft) high. Aging waste liquids are considered in this analysis.

This paper is an overview of the low-level radioactive waste management practices and treatment systems at Argonne National Laboratory - East (ANL-E). It addresses the systems, processes, types of waste treated, and the status and performance of the systems. ANL-E is a Department of Energy laboratory that is engaged in a variety of research projects, some of which generate radioactive waste, in addition a significant amount of radioactive waste remains from previous projects and decontamination and decommissioning of facilities where this work was performed.

There are three tanks in the 241-SY tank farm. Tank 241-SY101 and 241-SY-103 are flammable gas watch list tanks. Tank 241-SY-102 is included in the ventilation improvement process in an effort to further control air flow in the tank farm. This tank farm has only one outlet ventilation port for all three tanks. Flammable gas is released (may be steady and/or periodic) from the waste in the primary tank vapor space. The gas is removed from the tank by an active ventilation system. However, maintaining consistent measurable flow through the tank can be problematic due to the poor control capabilities of existing equipment. Low flow through the tank could allow flammable gas to build up in the tank and possibly exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL), prevent the most rapid removal of flammable gas from the tank after a sudden gas release, and/or cause high vacuum alarms to sound. Using the inlet and outlet down stream butterfly valves performs the current method of controlling flow in tank farm 241-SY. A filter station is installed on the inlet of each tank, but controlling air flow with its 12 inch butterfly valve is difficult. There is also in-leakage through pump and valve …

The objective of this project is to investigate styles of reservoir heterogeneity found in low permeability pelleted wackestone/packstone facies and mixed carbonate/clastic facies found in Permian Basin reservoirs by studying similar facies exposed in the Guadalupe Mountains. Specific objectives for the outcrop study include construction of a stratigraphic framework, petrophysical quantification of the framework, and testing the outcrop reservoir model for effects of reservoir heterogeneity on production performance. Specific objectives for the subsurface study parallel objectives for the outcrop study. Subsurface Activities - We continue to prepare two final reports that summarize research results of the South Cowden Field study. One report summarizes results of the petrophysical characterization research, and one summarizes results of the fluid-flow modeling research. Outcrop Activities - We also continue to prepare the final report, which summarizes the research results of the Grayburg outcrop reservoir study.

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization (NCSO) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of highly qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document defines the Qualification Program to address the NCSO technical and managerial qualification as required by the Y-12 Training Implementation Matrix (TIM). It is implemented through a combination of LMES plant-wide training courses and professional nuclear criticality safety training provided within the organization. This Qualification Program is applicable to technical and managerial NCSO personnel, including temporary personnel, sub-contractors and/or LMES employees on loan to the NCSO, who perform the NCS tasks or serve NCS-related positions as defined in sections 5 and 6 of this program.

Some code improvements have been made during the course of this study. One immediately obvious need was for more flexibility in the constitutive representation for materials in shell elements. To remedy this situation, a model with a tabular representation of stress versus strain and rate dependent effects was implemented. This was required in order to obtain reasonable results in the IED cylinder simulation. Another deficiency was in the ability to extract and plot variables associated with shell elements. The pipe whip analysis required the development of a scheme to tally and plot time dependent shell quantities such as stresses and strains. This capability had previously existed only for solid elements. Work was initiated to provide the same range of plotting capability for structural elements that exist with the DYNA3D/TAURUS tools. One of the characteristics of these problems is the disparity in zoning required in the vicinity of the charge and bubble compared to that needed in the far field. This disparity can cause the equipotential relaxation logic to provide a less than optimal solution. Various approaches were utilized to bias the relaxation to obtain more optimal meshing during relaxation. Extensions of these techniques have been developed to provide more powerful …

Interim and long-term storage of carefully prepared plutonium material within hermetically sealed containers may generate dangerous gas pressures and compositions. The authors have been investigating the application of acoustic resonance spectroscopy to non-intrusively monitor changes in these parameters within sealed containers. In this approach a drum-like gas cavity is formed within the storage container which is excited using a piezoelectric transducer mounted on the outside of the container. The frequency response spectrum contains a series of peaks whose positions and widths are determined by the composition of the gas and the geometry of the cylindrical resonator; the intensities are related to the gas pressure. Comparing observed gas frequencies with theory gives excellent agreement. Small changes in gas composition, better than 1:1000, are readily measurable.

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization (NCSO) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSO personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This Training Implementation document is applicable to all technical and managerial NCSO personnel, including temporary personnel, sub-contractors and/or LMES employees on loan to the NCSO, who are in a qualification program.