Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "IRS’s appropriations have declined to below fiscal year 2009 levels and FTEs have been reduced by about 8,000 since fiscal year 2009. Planned performance in enforcement and taxpayer service has decreased or fluctuated; for example, in the fiscal year 2014 congressional justification the audit coverage target for individual examinations was 1.0 percent for fiscal year 2014, however, the target was lowered to 0.8 percent in the fiscal year 2015 congressional justification. Amidst lower demand, IRS’s telephone level of service performance (the percentage of callers seeking live assistance and receiving it) was 73 percent from January 1 through March 15, 2014 compared to 69 percent during the same period last year. However, between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, IRS’s telephone level of service fluctuated between 61 percent and 74 percent. Average wait times have almost doubled since fiscal year 2009—from 8.8 minutes to 16.8 minutes as of mid-March 2014."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) class justifications included in GAO's sample were used primarily for the acquisition of weapon systems or related subsystems and components. About 77 percent covered specific weapon system development, production, sustainment, or modernization efforts; about 14 percent covered logistics support of multiple weapon systems or training systems; and the remaining 9 percent covered other requirements. Because weapon systems are typically used for many years, DOD officials told GAO class justifications provided an administrative efficiency by allowing one justification for multiple contracts that would essentially require the same justification. Most of the class justifications in GAO's sample had a total value of over $85.5 million and required approval at the highest level--the senior procurement executive of the DOD component. About 90 percent of the class justifications in GAO's sample cited only one responsible source to meet the requirements, generally because the contractor's ownership of proprietary technical data or expertise prevented the ability to compete the contract. The class justifications GAO reviewed generally cited the publication of notices of proposed contract actions on the Federal Business Opportunities website or market research to identify other qualified sources, …

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) total portfolio of major projects saw cost and schedule growth that remains low compared to GAO's first review of the portfolio. Some projects in this year's portfolio launched within their cost and schedule baselines; however, several others are undergoing replans, which could temper the portfolio's positive performance. For example, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN project launched on time and cost about $35 million less than its baseline estimate, but NASA officials are reporting that issues with the Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 project's primary instrument are driving costs to exceed the original baseline by at least 15 percent, and that the project will miss its committed launch date."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act), originally established inspectors general (IG) appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in 12 major departments and agencies of the government to conduct and supervise independent audits and investigations; recommend policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in their departments' and agencies' programs and operations. Based in part on GAO's findings that the internal audit offices of small federal agencies lacked independence and provided inadequate coverage of important programs, the Congress passed the IG Act Amendments of 1988 to establish IGs in designated federal entities (DFE), which are generally smaller agencies established in various statutes as commissions, boards, authorities, corporations, endowments, foundations, institutions, agencies, and administrations identified by the act. The DFE IGs are appointed by their respective entity heads with duties and responsibilities similar to those of IGs appointed by the President. The Congress used a budget threshold of $100 million to help determine which DFEs should have IGs. However, additional DFEs below this threshold were also included for specific reasons."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO found that the Navy continued to make progress in the past year toward (1) establishing a knowledge-based program that generally aligned with acquisition best practices and (2) meeting corresponding statutory certification requirements for entering the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process in the engineering and manufacturing development phase. The Navy has met or expects to meet requirements relating to assessment of technology readiness, making appropriate trade-offs to achieve affordability and getting approval of requirements, and development of an independent cost estimate. DOD has, however, waived a requirement for competitive prototyping and the Navy plans to defer a system level preliminary design review (PDR) until after the start of development. GAO reviewed DOD’s waiver of competitive prototyping for the VXX program last year and found that it addresses one of the two bases provided in Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 for such waivers; that is, that the cost to provide competitive prototypes exceeded the expected benefits. In addition, while the Navy’s plan to defer a system level PDR until after the start of system development deviates from acquisition best practices and is a waiver of a …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) effort has not yet reached Milestone A—the decision point in DOD’s acquisition process that generally authorizes assessment of potential technologies for an eventual acquisition program. At this point, Marine Corps officials are weighing the cost and technological feasibility of their required capabilities. In November 2011, the Marines Corps began an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)—a key first step in the acquisition process intended to assess alternative weapon system solutions for addressing a validated need—to identify an affordable alternative to the canceled Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. Following completion of that study in mid-2012, the Marine Corps Commandant directed the program to perform a second study to assess the feasibility and affordability of a variant capable of higher water speed. This second analysis has been completed, but no formal decisions have been made regarding whether to commence an acquisition program or what path it will take, if initiated. Program officials suggest that development of a high water speed technology may prove unaffordable at this time."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense’s (DOD) processes for selecting in-kind projects in Asia vary by country and by whether the project is intended to support force structure initiatives or enduring installations, although these efforts are not mutually exclusive; domestically, DOD’s processes for selecting in-kind projects vary by military service and statutory authority. In Asia, the selection of in-kind projects to support initiatives for relocating U.S. troops within Japan and the Republic of Korea generally results from a schedule-driven process based on resources and infrastructure made available by the host nation to fulfill initiatives agreed to in prior years with target dates for completion, and input from affected military bases. The selection of in-kind projects to support enduring installations is characterized by priority-based processes with input from installations and unit commanders. All in-kind projects to support U.S. forces in Asia result from host nation support as agreed to bilaterally, with the exception of facilities provided through the Japan Facilities Improvement Program, which is a voluntary effort on the part of Japan. All DOD facility planning and project selection at enduring locations is based on military and operational requirements, independent of …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO found that there is substantial federal funding for health care workforce training programs but that obtaining comprehensive information about the scope of such programs is challenging. In GAO's August 2013 report on the federal role in health care workforce training, GAO found that four federal departments—the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Education (Education)—administered 91 programs that supported postsecondary training or education specifically for direct care health professionals in fiscal year 2012. All together, the four departments reported obligating about $14.2 billion for health care workforce training programs in fiscal year 2012, with HHS funding the most programs (69) and having the largest percentage of total reported funding (82 percent). The majority of funding for health care workforce training in fiscal year 2012—about $11.1 billion, or 78 percent—was invested in seven programs that supported postgraduate residency training for physicians, dentists, and certain other health professionals, called Graduate Medical Education. The remaining 84 programs administered by HHS, VA, DOD, and Education accounted for obligations of about $3.2 billion and provided varying levels …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Social Security Administration (SSA) reported in January 2014 that it is behind schedule in assessing the continued eligibility of recipients in its two disability programs, Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI),and has accumulated a backlog of 1.3 million continuing disability reviews (CDRs). From fiscal years 2000 to 2011, the numbers of adult and child CDRs conducted fell about 70 percent. Children make up about one fifth of all SSI recipients, and GAO reported in 2012 that many of their CDRs were overdue. For example, more than 24,000 CDRs for children with mental impairments were overdue by 6 or more years, including over 6,000 CDRs for children who were expected to medically improve within 6 to 18 months of their initial determination. GAO also identified several cases which exceeded their scheduled review date by 13 years or more. When CDRs are not conducted as scheduled, the potential for improper payments increases as some recipients receive benefits for which they are no longer eligible. In September 2011, SSA's Office of the Inspector General estimated that SSA had paid about $1.4 billion in SSI benefits to children who …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO's ongoing work examining VHA's management of outpatient specialty care consults identified examples of delays in veterans receiving outpatient specialty care, as well as limitations in the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA), Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) implementation of new consult business rules designed to standardize aspects of the clinical consult process. For example, for 4 of the 10 physical therapy consults GAO reviewed for one VAMC, between 108 and 152 days elapsed with no apparent actions taken to schedule an appointment for the veteran. For 1 of these consults, several months passed before the veteran was referred for care to a non-VA health care facility. VA medical center (VAMC) officials cited increased demand for services, and patient no-shows and cancelled appointments among the factors that lead to delays and hinder their ability to meet VHA's guideline of completing consults within 90 days of being requested. GAO's ongoing work also identified variation in how the five VAMCs reviewed have implemented key aspects of VHA's business rules, such as strategies for managing future care consults—requests for specialty care appointments that are not clinically needed for more than 90 days. Such …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO's 2014 annual report identifies 64 new actions that executive branch agencies and Congress could take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 26 areas of government. GAO identifies 11 new areas in which there is evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. For example, under current law, individuals are allowed to receive concurrent payments from the Disability Insurance and Unemployment programs. Eliminating the overlap in these payments could save the government about $1.2 billion over the next 10 years. GAO also identifies 15 new areas where opportunities exist either to reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections. For example, Congress could rescind all or part of the remaining $4.2 billion in credit subsidies for the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan program unless the Department of Energy demonstrates sufficient demand for this funding."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) authority to regulate the practice of representatives before IRS is limited to certain preparers, such as attorneys and certified public accountants. Unenrolled preparers—those generally not subject to IRS regulation—accounted for 55 percent of all preparers as of March 2014. In 2010, IRS initiated steps to regulate unenrolled preparers through testing and education requirements; however, the courts ruled that IRS lacked the authority."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) spent (obligated) less than half of the $1.1 billion in tobacco user fees it collected from manufacturers and others from fiscal year 2009 through the end of fiscal year 2012; however, FDA's spending increased substantially in fiscal year 2013. Through December 31, 2013, FDA spent nearly 81 percent of the approximately $1.75 billion in fees collected by that time. According to officials in FDA's Center for Tobacco Products (CTP), the center established by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco Control Act) to implement the act's provisions, the time it took to award contracts contributed to the center spending less than it had planned to spend. In fiscal year 2013, FDA was able to carry out a number of activities that were originally planned for fiscal years 2011 and 2012, such as efforts to educate youth on the dangers of tobacco use. About 79 percent ($1.12 billion) of user fees spent as of December 31, 2013, was spent by three CTP offices: Office of Health Communication and Education, Office of Science, and Office of Compliance and Enforcement."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The number of reported information security incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) has more than doubled over the last several years (see figure)."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense's (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made progress in its goals to improve acquisition management, and accountability and transparency. The agency gained important knowledge for its Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) by successfully conducting several important tests, including the first missile defense system-level operational flight test. Additionally, key programs successfully conducted developmental flight tests that demonstrated key capabilities and modifications made to resolve prior issues. MDA also made some improvements to transparency and accountability. For example, MDA improved the management of its acquisition-related efforts to deploy a missile defense system in Europe and MDA continued to improve the clarity of its resource and schedule baselines, which are reported to Congress for oversight."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Data from the Veteran's Health Administration (VHA), within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), do not show evidence of VHA receiving contaminated tissue products, although, it is difficult to link adverse events in recipients to such products. VA's National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS), which began operation in 1999, has not issued any patient safety alerts—mandates for action to address actual or potential threats to life or health—or advisories—guidance to address issues such as equipment design and product failure—related to tissue products potentially received by VA medical centers (VAMC) in the last 10 years. NCPS issues patient safety alerts and advisories for recalls that require specific clinical actions to ensure patient safety. Since NCPS began issuing and recording data on recalls in November 2008, NCPS has notified VAMCs of 13 recalls for tissue products from vendors from which VHA could have received affected products—none of these recalls have resulted in patient safety alerts or advisories. For 6 of the recalls, 27 VAMCs reported to NCPS that they had identified and removed the recalled products from their inventories. For the other 7 recalls, none of the VAMCs had the …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Although the October 2012 and the August 2013 versions of the U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan have similarities, the two versions differ in several aspects. These differences reflect, among other things, the U.S. government's heightened emphasis on the transition, through the end of 2014, of security responsibility for Afghanistan to Afghan security institutions and the Afghan National Security Forces as well as the transition in U.S. policy toward a more traditional diplomatic and development model. Both versions of the framework address four categories of U.S. efforts in support of U.S. national goals in Afghanistan, with security, the first category, as the foundation for the other three categories, or "pillars"--governance, rule of law, and socioeconomic development. Both versions also address the same crosscutting issues. Differences between the two versions include the following:"

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "CDC has administered and provided oversight of the CPPW program, which includes the monitoring of award recipients. CDC required recipients to use their CPPW funds to support efforts to improve nutrition, increase physical activity, or reduce tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke. In addition, CDC suggested possible strategies for achieving these results, such as working to establish smoke-free zones or to implement zoning changes that promote physical activity. CDC policy prohibited CPPW award recipients from using funds for specific types of activities, including lobbying, which generally meant certain activities designed to influence action in regard to a particular piece of pending legislation."

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Fiscal sustainability presents a national challenge shared by all levels of government. Since 2007, GAO has published long-term fiscal simulations for the state and local government sector. These simulations have consistently shown that, like the federal government, the state and local sector faces persistent and long-term fiscal pressures and, absent any policy changes, would face an increasing gap between receipts and expenditures in future years."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 2011, GAO has identified 11 areas across the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) where fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication exists and 13 areas of opportunity for cost savings or enhanced revenue collections. In these reports, GAO has suggested 53 total actions to the department and Congress to help strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of DHS operations. In GAO’s 2013 annual report on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives that have duplicative goals or activities, GAO identified 6 new areas where DHS could take actions to address fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication or achieve significant cost savings. For example, GAO found that DHS does not have a department-wide policy defining research and development (R&D) or guidance directing components how to report R&D activities. Thus, DHS does not know its total annual investment in R&D, which limits its ability to oversee components’ R&D efforts. In particular, GAO identified at least 6 components with R&D activities and an additional $255 million in R&D obligations in fiscal year 2011 by DHS components that was not centrally tracked. GAO suggested that DHS develop and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Social Security Administration (SSA) will experience management challenges in four key areas over the next decade."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The federal government faces long-standing problems in managing real property, including excess and underutilized property. In focusing on this issue, GAO found that data problems continue to hamper federal efforts. GAO examined Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) data, which is managed by the General Services Administration (GSA) and is to describe the real property under the custody and control of executive branch agencies. GAO identified inconsistencies and inaccuracies at 23 of the 26 locations visited in 2011 and 2012 in key data elements related to the management of excess and underutilized property, including utilization, condition, annual operating costs, and value of the buildings. For example, several buildings that received high scores for condition were in poor condition, with problems including, asbestos, mold, health concerns, radioactivity, and flooding. These findings raised concern that the FRPP is not a useful tool for describing the nature, use, and extent of excess and underutilized federal real property."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Most of the Department of Defense's (DOD) major satellite programs are in mature phases of development, that is, the initial satellites have been designed, fabricated, and launched into orbit while additional satellites of the same design are being produced. For the portfolio of major satellite programs, new cost and schedule growth is not as widespread as it was in prior years, but DOD is still experiencing problems. For example, total program costs have increased approximately $180 million from a baseline of $4.1 billion for one of two satellite programs that are in the earlier phases of acquisition. Though satellite programs are not experiencing problems as widespread as in years past, ground control systems and user terminals in most of DOD's major space system acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter. For example, the development and fielding of user terminals for a Navy communications satellite program lag behind the launch of new satellites by more than a year. Additionally, the development of ground software needed to extract capabilities of new missile warning satellites is not expected to be complete until …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Actual costs to relocate federal users from the 1710-1755 megahertz (MHz) band have exceeded the original $1 billion estimate by about $474 million as of March 2013, although auction revenues appear to exceed relocation costs by over $5 billion. Actual relocation costs exceed estimated costs for various reasons, including unforeseen challenges and some agencies not following the National Telecommunications and Information Administration's (NTIA) guidance for preparing the cost estimate. In contrast, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to complete relocation for about $275 million or approximately $80 million less than its $355 million estimate. According to DOD officials, the relocation of systems from this band has been less expensive than originally estimated because many systems were simply re-tuned to operate in the adjacent 1755-1850 MHz band. The auction of the 1710-1755 MHz band raised almost $6.9 billion in gross winning bids. NTIA expects agencies to complete the relocation effort between 2013 and 2017; therefore, final net auction revenue (auction revenue less relocation costs) may change."