Summary: "Criticality was considered impossible in any contingency encountered in practice under either of the following conditions which include no safety factor: (a) In any isolated cylinder not more than 5 in. in disruptor, if the total amount of U235 present does not exceed 7.5 Eg. (b) In an isolated vessel of any shape and size, if the total amount of U235 present does not exceed 880 g. An "isolated" vessel is one which does not "see" more than 0.1 [...] other vessels containing fissionable material."

Report discussing a method of rear face monitoring by television as a form of visual contact and communication between Hanford Works crews. A conclusion and recommendation of the method is given as well as an explanation of necessary materials.

At the request of 234-5 Development, studies of a system for controlling plutonium powder transfer were undertaken by Process Equipment Development. This report presents details of equipment designed to fulfill requirements and proposes equipment for installation on additional Hot Button Line prototypes.