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The Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) equipment sent earlier to the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) at Novouralsk, Russia, was installed and implemented successfully on February 2, 1999. The BDMS installation supports the highly enriched uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program for material subject to monitoring under the HEU purchase agreement between the United States of America (USA) and the Russian Federation (RF). The BDMS consists of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Fissile (uranium-235) Mass Flow Monitor (FMFM) and the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Enrichment Monitor (EM). Two BDMS�s for monitoring the Main and Reserve HEU blending process lines were installed at UEIP. Independent operation of the FMFM Main and FMFM Reserve was successfully demonstrated for monitoring the fissile mass flow as well as the traceability of HEU to the product low enriched uranium. The FMFM systems failed when both systems were activated during the calibration phase due to a synchronization problem between the systems. This operational failure was caused by the presence of strong electromagnetic interference (EMI) in the blend point. The source-modulator shutter motion of the two FMFM systems was not being properly synchronized because of EMI producing a spurious signal on the synchronization cable connecting the …

Agreements between the governments of the US and the Russian Federation for the US purchase of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons calls for the establishment of transparency measures to provide confidence that nuclear nonproliferation goals are being met. To meet these transparency goals, the agreements call for the installation of nonintrusive US instruments to monitor the down blending of HEU to LEU. The Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) has been jointly developed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to continuously monitor {sup 235}U enrichments and mass flow rates at Russian blending facilities. Prior to its installation in Russian facilities, the BDMS was installed and operated in a UF{sub 6} flow loop in the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant simulating flow and enrichment conditions expected in a typical down-blending facility. A Russian delegation to the US witnessed the equipment demonstration in June, 1998. To conduct the demonstration in the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP), the BDMS was required to meet stringent Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing, safety and operational requirements. The Paducah demonstration was an important milestone in achieving the operational certification for the BDMS …

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Fissile Mass Flow Monitor (FMFM) was deployed at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) highly enriched uranium (HEU) blending facility in January and February 1999 at Novouralsk in Russia for the DOE HEU Transparency Program. The FMFM provides unattended monitoring of the fissile mass flow of the uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) gas in the process lines of HEU, the low enriched uranium (LEU) blend stock, and the product LEU (P-LEU) of the blending tee non-intrusively. To do this, uranium-235 (U-235) fissions are induced in the UF{sub 6} by a thermalized and modulated californium-252 (Cf-252) neutron source placed on each process line. A set of detectors, located downstream of source, measure delayed gamma rays emitted by the resulting fission fragments. The observed delay in the time correlated measurement between the source and the detector signal provides the velocity of UF{sub 6} and its amplitude is related to the U- 235 content in UF{sub 6}. An on-line computer controls the source modulator, processes the collected detector data, and displays the results. The UEIP Main and the Reserved process lines were implemented with minor modifications. The FMFM monitors the HEU blending operation by measuring UF{sub 6} flows …

The development of neutron detectors makes extensive use of the predictions of detector response through the use of Monte Carlo techniques in conjunction with the point reactor model. Unfortunately, the point reactor model fails to accurately predict detector response in common applications. For this reason, the general Monte Carlo N-Particle code (MCNP) was modified to simulate the pulse streams that would be generated by a neutron detector and normally analyzed by a shift register. This modified code, MCNP - Random Exponentially Distributed Neutron Source (MCNP-REN), along with the Time Analysis Program (TAP) predict neutron detector response without using the point reactor model, making it unnecessary for the user to decide whether or not the assumptions of the point model are met for their application. MCNP-REN is capable of simulating standard neutron coincidence counting as well as neutron multiplicity counting. Measurements of MOX fresh fuel made using the Underwater Coincidence Counter (UWCC) as well as measurements of HEU reactor fuel using the active neutron Research Reactor Fuel Counter (RRFC) are compared with calculations. The method used in MCNP-REN is demonstrated to be fundamentally sound and shown to eliminate the need to use the point model for detector performance predictions.

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This paper documents the development of a dedicated information barrier system for warhead and sensitive item verification. The system the authors describe includes software and hardware information barriers used in conjunction with suitable procedures (or protocols) to achieve a high quality verification while minimizing intrusiveness and preventing transfer of sensitive data to inspectors. The system they describe has been referred to as CIVET--Controlled Intrusiveness Verification Technology and has been implemented to verify warheads and warhead components during various exercises and demonstrations under the auspices of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on its member states to assist with recruiting qualified individuals for positions within the IAEA's secretariat. It is important that persons within and outside the US nuclear and safeguards industries become aware of career opportunities available at the IAEA, and informed about important vacancies. The IAEA has established an impressive web page to advertise opportunities for employment. However, additional effort is necessary to ensure that there is sufficient awareness in the US of these opportunities, and assistance for persons interested in taking positions at the IAEA. In 1998, the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) approved a special task under the US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) for improving US efforts to identify qualified candidates for vacancies in IAEA's Department of Safeguards. The International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) developed a plan that includes increased advertising, development of a web page to support US recruitment efforts, feedback from the US Mission in Vienna, and interaction with other recruitment services provided by US professional organizations. The main purpose of this effort is to educate US citizens about opportunities at the IAEA so that qualified candidates can be identified for the IAEA's consideration.

While substantial work has been performed in the Russian MPC&A Program, much more needs to be done at Russian nuclear facilities to complete four necessary steps. These are (1) periodically measuring the physical inventory of nuclear material, (2) continuously measuring the flows of nuclear material, (3) using the results to close the material balance, particularly at bulk processing facilities, and (4) statistically evaluating any apparent loss of nuclear material. The periodic closing of material balances provides an objective test of the facility's system of nuclear material protection, control and accounting. The statistical evaluation using the uncertainties associated with individual measurement systems involved in the calculation of the material balance provides a fair standard for concluding whether the apparent loss of nuclear material means a diversion or whether the facility's accounting system needs improvement. In particular, if unattractive flow material at a facility is not measured well, the accounting system cannot readily detect the loss of attractive material if the latter substantially derives from the former.

The objective of this work was to analyze instrumentation and methodologies used at Russian nuclear facilities for measurement of item nuclear materials, materials in bulk form, and waste streams; specify possibilities for the application of accounting measurements; and develop recommendations for improvement. The major steps and results: Representative conversion, enrichment (gas centrifuge), fuel fabrication, spent fuel reprocessing, and chemical-metallurgical production facilities in Russia were selected; Full lists of nuclear materials were prepared; Information about measurement methods and instrumentation for each type of nuclear material were gathered; and Recommendations on methodological and instrumentation support of accounting measurements for all types of materials were formulated. The analysis showed that the existing measurement methods and instrumentation serve mostly to support the technological process control and nuclear and radiation safety control. Requirements for these applications are lower than requirements for MC and A applications. To improve the state of MC and A at Russian nuclear facilities, significant changes in instrumentation support will be required, specifically in weighing equipment, volume measurements, and destructive and non-destructive analysis equipment, along with certified reference materials.