This dissertation examines whether Percs, Preferred Equity Redemption Cumulative Stocks, are properly priced regarding to the relevant securities, such as the underlying common stock, the long-term call option of the stock, and so on. Test results indicate that Percs were overpriced with respect to the equivalent packages composed of the relevant securities. Further tests on arbitrage restrictions show that transaction costs would prevent arbitrage profits. This dissertation also examines the market reactions to Percs offerings. Test results reveal that the market reactions to the announcement of Percs offering and the actual issuance are both significantly negative. Compared to the market reaction on common stock offering announcement, the market reaction on Percs offering announcement is weaker. The overpricing of Percs and the weaker reaction of the market suggest that Percs may have advantages in transaction costs, taxes and some corporate finance issues.

An acquisition bid is like any other proposal for risky investment. The difference arises due to additional source of risk arising from two different sources of information asymmetry due to private knowledge held by the bidder and target. We hypothesize that the bidding process evolves in a manner to optimize bidder's investment in the target through a process of joint signalling. Medium of exchange and bid premium are used as the two signal elements simultaneously by the bidder. We develop a multiple signalling model of the bidding process which is fully revealing in equilibrium.