This paper investigates the determinants of mutual fund portfolio manager ownership and its association with fund performance. Using hand-collected data of 1,420 U.S. equity funds from 32 fund families, we find that variations in fund manager holdings are broadly consistent with optimal contracting theory instead of the result of managers' personal investment consideration. Portfolio manager ownership is positively and significantly correlated with variables that proxy for intensity of agency conflicts. Specifically, portfolio managers hold more mutual fund shares when the size of concurrently managed hedge fund increases and when the advisor is affiliated to the bank. In addition, fund managers invest more in funds with primary investment in growth stock, non-index funds, and solo-managed funds. Regarding to the alternative governance mechanism, higher threat of dismissal for outsourced funds, stronger monitoring from institutional investors, and long-term performance based bonus work as substitutes of fund manager ownership while director ownership works as a compliment. Finally, we find little evidence supporting the notion that funds with higher portfolio manager ownership perform better.

The dissertation analyzes three issues related to corporate environmental performance. In the first essay, I analyze the stock price reactions of the defendant firms and their peer firms to environmental lawsuits. Empirical evidence finds that the defendant and their peer firms experience negative and significant cumulative abnormal returns to the announcement of environmental lawsuits. Additionally, cross-sectional analyses find certain firm characteristics, such as profitability, growth opportunities and leverage can influence the market reaction. Furthermore, if the plaintiffs are government agencies or corporations instead of individual citizens, the defendant and peer firms experience higher negative market reactions. The second essay examines if a firm's environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance can moderate the negative market response to environmental lawsuits. The results are mixed. The overall sample of the defendant and their peer firms show that ESG performance is not a significant factor in mitigating the negative market response. However, an interesting finding shows, for defendant and peer firms in the environmentally sensitive industries, better ESG ratings help reduce the adverse market reactions. The final essay investigates whether the defendant and peer firms improve their ESG performance in the next two years following the lawsuits. The results indicates that firms generally experience …