This study examines the differential effect of each of the ten largest bank failures on shareholders' wealth of non-failed banks over the period from 1973 through 1984. It examines how contagion and information effects of major bank failures have changed over time. FDIC policy for settling failures has important implications for system stability, and has changed over time. This study's purpose is to provide empirical evidence on the effects of FDIC policy. The FDIC's handling of the Penn Square failure signaled a policy shift and offers a unique opportunity to examine changes in market reactions to large bank failures. The literature on the capital market effects of major bank failures provides limited evidence on the impact of bank failures and related FDIC policy. Most fail to discriminate between contagion and information effects, and conduct analysis on one (or a few) bank failure(s) in the mid-1970s using traditional event study methodology. This study considers multivariate regression (MVRM) an appropriate methodology for bank failures which are likely to have simultaneous impact on non-failed banks. MVRM, which accounts for contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence of residuals, has three advantages over standard residual analysis: no "event clustering" problem, multiple hypotheses tests, and computational efficiency. This study …

An acquisition bid is like any other proposal for risky investment. The difference arises due to additional source of risk arising from two different sources of information asymmetry due to private knowledge held by the bidder and target. We hypothesize that the bidding process evolves in a manner to optimize bidder's investment in the target through a process of joint signalling. Medium of exchange and bid premium are used as the two signal elements simultaneously by the bidder. We develop a multiple signalling model of the bidding process which is fully revealing in equilibrium.

The purpose of this study is to examine the wealth effect of the Risk-Based Capital (RBC) regulation on the U.S. commercial banking industry. The RBC plan was first proposed in January 1986, and its final form was announced on July 11, 1988. This plan resulted from dissatisfaction with the old capital regulation, which did not account for asset risk and off-balance sheet activities. The present study hypothesizes that the new regulation restricted bank optimal behavior and, therefore, adversely affected stock prices. The second and third hypotheses suggest that investors used company specific information, Net Tier 1 and Total risk-based capital ratios respectively, in valuing stocks of the affected bank holding companies. Hypotheses four and five suggest that abnormal returns are proportionally related to the levels of Net Tier 1 or Total RBC ratio. Both the traditional event study and the portfolio time-series regression, with RBC ratios (Net Tier 1 or Total) as the weight factors, are used in this study.