This study explores Franco-Papal relations, and their effect on the French Church and State, from Henri IV's conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1593 until his death in 1610. Because Henri IV's primary concern, even in matters involving the Papacy or the Gallican Church, was to protect his kingdom from Habsburg encroachment, he was willing either to abandon his Protestant allies abroad, or to adopt reform measures, such as the decrees of the Council of Trent, that might weaken his own authority or disturb the peace of his kingdom. This caused repeated conflicts with the Counter-Reformation Popes Clement VIII and Paul V, to whom the primary enemy was always the infidel and the heretic. Nevertheless both sides realized that they needed each other to maintain their independence of Spain.

This thesis examines the struggle between King Louis XI and the great feudal houses of the fifteenth century such as Burgundy, Brittany, Anjou, Armagnac, Bourbon, and Foix. It attempts to provide a detailed narrative based on the primary sources and the excellent studies on individual feudal princes produced by a number of French historians, supplemented by a critical analysis of the traditional view of Louis XI as the "vainquer de la grande féodalité."

The focus of this thesis is the relationship between immigration historiography and the history of Basque migration to the United States. The depictions of immigration presented by historians Oscar Handlin, Marcus Lee Hansen, and John Higham have been influential in immigration historiography and are presented in the first chapter. The second chapter contains a description of Old World Basque culture and the third chapter presents a brief history of Basque migration to the United States. The fourth chapter discusses to what extent the immigration theories presented in chapter one match the Basque experience in the New World. The concluding chapter contains some observations on the nature of immigration historiography, on the Basques, and on new directions for research.

Jeanne Bécu, an illegitimate child from the Vaucouleurs area in France, ascended the ranks of the Ancien régime to become the Countess du Barry and take her place as Royal Mistress of Louis XV. During her tenure as Royal Mistress, Jeanne amassed a jewel collection that rivaled all private collections. During the course of the French Revolution, more specifically the Reign of Terror, Jeanne was forced to hatch a plot to secure the remainder of her wealth as she lost a significant portion of her revenue on the night of 4 August 1789. To protect her wealth, Jeanne enlisted Nathaniel Parker Forth, a British spy, to help her plan a fake jewel theft at Louveciennes so that she could remove her economic capital from France while also reducing her total wealth and capital with the intent of reducing her tax payments. As a result of the theft, her jewelry was transported to London, where she would travel four times during the French Revolution on the pretext of recovering her jewelry. This thesis examines her actions while abroad during the Revolution and her culpability in the plot. While traveling to and from London, Jeanne was able to move information, money, and …

After conquering Belgium and the Rhineland in 1794, the French Army of the Sambre and Meuse faced severe logistical, disciplinary, and morale problems that signaled the erosion of its capabilities. The army’s degeneration resulted from a revolution in French foreign policy designed to conquer the natural frontiers, a policy often falsely portrayed as a diplomatic tradition of the French monarchy. In fact, the natural frontiers policy – expansion to the Rhine, the Pyrenees, and the Alps – emerged only after the start of the War of the First Coalition in 1792. Moreover, the pursuit of natural frontiers caused more controversy than previously understood. No less a figure than Lazare Carnot – the Organizer of Victory – viewed French expansion to the Rhine as impractical and likely to perpetuate war. While the war of conquest provided the French state with the resources to survive, it entailed numerous unforeseen consequences. Most notably, the Revolutionary armies became isolated from the nation and displayed more loyalty to their commanders than to the civilian authorities. In 1797, the Sambre and Meuse Army became a political tool of General Lazare Hoche, who sought control over the Rhineland by supporting the creation of a Cisrhenan Republic. Ultimately, …

This thesis presents a diplomatic history of the United States and France for the period 1776-1898. This study, due to the enormous amount of foreign diplomacy, is by no means exhaustive. The author has tried to limit the diplomacy of the United States with the other nations to a minimum and omitted all relations except in instances which are closely related to the diplomacy of France and the United States.

In 1793, Great Britain embarked on a war against Revolutionary France to reestablish a balance of power in Europe. Traditional assessments among historians consider British war planning at the ministerial level during the First Coalition to be incompetent and haphazard. This work reassesses decision making of the leading strategists in the British Cabinet in the development of a theater in the Mediterranean by examining political, diplomatic, and military influences. William Pitt the Younger and his controlling ministers pursued a conservative strategy in the Mediterranean, reliant on Allies in the region to contain French armies and ideas inside the Alps and the Pyrenees. Dependent on British naval power, the Cabinet sought to weaken the French war effort by targeting trade in the region. Throughout the first half of 1793, the British government remained fixed on this conservative, traditional approach to France. However, with the fall of Toulon in August of 1793, decisions made by Admiral Samuel Hood in command of forces in the Mediterranean radicalized British policy towards the Revolution while undermining the construct of the Coalition. The inconsistencies in strategic thought political decisions created stagnation, wasting the opportunities gained by the Counter-revolutionary movements in southern France. As a result, reinvigorated …

Immediately after the outbreak of the World War, Great Britain, France and Japan cut the German submarine cables which were situated in the different oceans of the world. The study of the submarine cables during the World War and its aftermath is a complex problem. To understand the post-war negotiations, previous international agreements, treaties and the ownership, operation and financing of the cables must be understood.

Napoleon’s defeat in 1813 generates a number of explanations from historians regarding why he lost this epic campaign which ultimately resulted in France losing control over the German states. Scholars discussing the French marshalate of the Napoleonic era frequently assert that these generals could not win battles without the emperor present. Accustomed to assuming a subordinate role under Bonaparte’s direct supervision, these commanders faltered when deprived of the strong hand of the master. This thesis contributes to this historiographical argument by positing that the pre-professional nature of Napoleon’s marshalate precluded them from adapting to the evolving nature of warfare during the First French Empire. Emerging from non-military backgrounds and deriving their capabilities solely from practical experience, the marshals failed to succeed at endeavors outside of their capacity. An examination of the military administration of the Old Regime, the effects of the French Revolution on the French generalate, and the circumstances under which Bonaparte labored when creating the imperial marshalate demonstrates that issues systemic to the French high command contributed to French defeat in 1813. This thesis also provides evidence that Napoleon understood this problem and attempted to better prepare his marshals for independent command by instructing them in his way …

My purpose is to sketch briefly the diplomatic background of the existing relations between France and Germany from 1871 to 1939. I have told the story chronologically, because I believe that we must follow events as they unfold themselves if we are to understand why statesmen made their decisions. I have attempted to mass all the important facts that I could find on Franco-German Diplomatic Relations from 1871 to 1939 without self-interests or prejudices to either of the two nations. My intentions were to seek a general knowledge of the drift of Franco-German Diplomatic affairs during this period of seventy years.

Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, comte de Guibert (1743-1790) dedicated his life and career to creating a new doctrine for the French army. Little about this doctrine was revolutionary. Indeed, Guibert openly decried the anarchy of popular participation in government and looked askance at the early days of the Revolution. Rather, Guibert’s doctrine marked the culmination of an evolutionary process that commenced decades before his time and reached fruition in the Réglement of 1791, which remained in force until the 1830s. Not content with military reform, Guibert demanded a political and social constitution to match. His reforms required these changes, demanding a disciplined, service-oriented society and a functional, rational government to assist his reformed military. He delved deeply, like no other contemporary writer, into the linkages between society, politics, and the military throughout his career and his writings. Guibert exerted an overwhelming influence on military thought across Europe for the next fifty years. His military theories provided the foundation for military reform during the twilight of the Old Regime. The Revolution, which adopted most of Guibert’s doctrine in 1791, continued his work. A new army and way of war based on Guibert’s reforms emerged to defeat France’s major enemies. In Napoleon’s hands, Guibert’s army …

This thesis studies France"s relations with the Little Entente during the term of Foreign Minister Delbos. It relies primarily on published diplomatic papers and memoirs. It discusses Delbos's background, the histories of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania from 1919-1936, and the formation of the Little Entente. The thesis focuses on France's efforts after the Rhineland crisis to strengthen her Eastern European alliances. Delbos chose the Little Entente over the Soviet Union as France's primary Eastern European alliance. Delbos's proposed Mutual Assistance Pact between France and the Little Entente and his Eastern European trip in December, 1937, failed owing to Yugoslavian and Rumanian opposition. German economic domination and intimidation of, and British disinterest in, Eastern Europe contributed to Yugoslavian and Rumanian rejection of France's overtures.

The French nation has been prolific of consummate diplomatists all through history, but her annals record no more brilliant achievement than that of Theophile Delcassé and Paul Cambon when they brought Great Britain into a French alliance. Even those who disapprove the consequences of their act must admit the skill and the pertinacity with which the two statesmen pursued their purpose. Their difficulties were stupendous; British governments had for years stood aloof from Continental agreements, but precedent was forced to give way before the perspicacity and perseverance of these two French statesmen. Delcassé had contributed the Entente Cordiale to the French cause in 1904. This understanding pledged British diplomatic support to France in her imperialistic venture in Morocco-nothing more; but it also provided a foundation upon which Cambon could exercise his talents in leading Great Britain into a trap. The result of these activities was the equivalent of an Anglo-French alliance. The French, to accomplish their purpose, led the British into a series of military and naval conversations as a means of working out plans of joint operations whereby the latter could assist the former in case of a Franco-German war. The conversations had their official beginning in 1906 and …

The entry of the United States into the Great War was enthusiastically endorsed by Congress on April 3, 1917. Even after the declaration of war, however, the exact nature of American participation was unclear. This thesis examines the role of American involvement in the war, as it responded to requests for support from Great Britain and France.