A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Fiscal year 2013 sequestration reduced or delayed some public services and disrupted some operations in the 23 federal agencies GAO reviewed, even though agencies took actions to minimize the effects. For example, agencies reported that sequestration reduced assistance for education, housing, and nutrition, as well as health and science research and development grants. Agencies also reported delaying investments such as information technology and facilities projects. Some federal services also experienced backlogs and delays as a result of personnel actions including limiting hiring and furloughing employees. However, many of the effects of sequestration could not be quantified or will not be known until future years, if at all, for a number of reasons including the timing of when funds are disbursed (such as grant cycles that start late in the fiscal year), challenges in isolating the effects from other factors, and the lack of currently available performance data for some programs. Moreover, congressional and agency actions mitigated some potential effects by shifting funds to higher priorities while deferring or reducing funding for lower priorities."

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A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Census Bureau (Bureau) has made progress in researching and testing information technology (IT) options for the 2020 Decennial Census, but several of the supporting projects lack schedules and plans, and it is uncertain whether they will be completed in time to inform the decision on the operational design for the 2020 census, planned for September 2015. Specifically, it has begun research on six IT-related projects, such as using the Internet for survey response and using employees' personal smartphones to collect census data. However, four of the projects lacked finalized schedules, and three lacked plans for gauging progress. Moreover, the two projects with completed schedules are not estimated to be completed until after the September 2015 design decision date (see figure)."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Although the October 2012 and the August 2013 versions of the U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan have similarities, the two versions differ in several aspects. These differences reflect, among other things, the U.S. government's heightened emphasis on the transition, through the end of 2014, of security responsibility for Afghanistan to Afghan security institutions and the Afghan National Security Forces as well as the transition in U.S. policy toward a more traditional diplomatic and development model. Both versions of the framework address four categories of U.S. efforts in support of U.S. national goals in Afghanistan, with security, the first category, as the foundation for the other three categories, or "pillars"--governance, rule of law, and socioeconomic development. Both versions also address the same crosscutting issues. Differences between the two versions include the following:"

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 2010, the United States pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its development aid directly through the Afghan government budget within 2 years. This direct assistance is intended to help develop the capacity of Afghan government ministries to manage programs and funds. Using bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds, the United States more than tripled its direct assistance awards to Afghanistan in the first year of the pledge, going from over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to over $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. The U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) most current reporting shows that for fiscal year 2012 the agency provided over $800 million in mission funds through direct assistance. In 2013, GAO reported that while USAID had established and generally complied with various financial and other controls in its direct assistance agreements, it had not always assessed the risks in providing direct assistance before awarding funds. USAID has taken steps in response to GAO's recommendations to help ensure the accountability of direct assistance funds provided to the Afghan government. Recently, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that USAID determined …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, amended the Clean Air Act to transfer regulatory authority for air emissions on the outer continental shelf (OCS) off Alaska's north coast, including the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the Department of the Interior. Since the act was passed on December 23, 2011, there has been limited activity subject to air emission regulations or permitting on the OCS off Alaska's north coast, according to officials at the EPA and Interior. EPA officials stated that, before the act was passed, EPA had issued to Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. and Shell Offshore, Inc., collectively, three air emission permits for drilling and other activities on the OCS off Alaska's north coast. Interior's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) is responsible for reviewing and approving plans for exploration, development, and production activities; this process includes projections of air emissions. According to a BOEM official, after the act passed, Shell conducted exploratory drilling on the OCS off Alaska's north coast in 2012, but it did so under its existing air emissions permits from EPA. Ancillary activities, such as surveys of the …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Air Force has managed its remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots using some strategic human-capital approaches, such as planning for the different levels of experience that it needs in these pilots. However, it continues to face challenges. High-performing organizations manage human capital to identify the right number of personnel and to target the right sources to fill personnel needs. In 2008, the Air Force determined the optimum number of RPA pilots—the crew ratio—for some units, but it did not account for all tasks these units complete. Air Force officials stated that, as a result, the crew ratio is too low, but the Air Force has not updated it. Air Force guidance states that low crew ratios diminish combat capability and cause flight safety to suffer, but the Air Force has operated below its optimum crew ratio and it has not established a minimum crew ratio. Further, high work demands on RPA pilots limit the time they have available for training and development and negatively affects their work-life balance. In addition, the Air Force faces challenges recruiting officers into the RPA pilot career and may face challenges …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "While the previous two-contract structure of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program met Department of Defense (DOD) needs for unprecedented mission success and an at-the-ready launch capability, the scope of its capability contract limited DOD’s ability to identify the cost of an individual launch, as direct launch costs were not separated from other costs. Minimal insight into contractor cost or pricing data meant DOD may have lacked sufficient knowledge to negotiate fair and reasonable launch prices."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "American Samoa employment and earnings have decreased since 2007, but employment increased slightly from 2011 to 2012. Since 2005, the American Samoa economy has had a flat or declining real gross domestic product (GDP)."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (Cost Guide) defines 12 leading practices that are associated with four characteristics—comprehensive, well documented, accurate , and credible —that are important to developing high-quality, reliable project-cost estimates. Using the Cost Guide , GAO determined that the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) cost-estimating guidance conforms to leading practices for developing estimates that are, in general, comprehensive and well-documented . However, AOC's guidance does not substantially conform to leading practices related to developing cost estimates that are accurate and credible . For example, pertaining to the credible characteristic, AOC's guidance does not require determining the confidence level of estimates or quantifying the extent to which a project's costs could vary due to changes in key assumptions. GAO found the strengths and weaknesses of AOC's guidance generally reflected in the cost estimates for AOC's Cannon House Office Building's (Cannon Building) renewal project ($753 million) and Capitol Dome's restoration project ($125 million)."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) reflect some, but not all, best practices. Scheduling best practices are summarized into four characteristics of reliable schedules—comprehensive, well constructed, credible, and controlled (i.e., schedules are periodically updated and progress is monitored). GAO assessed CBP's schedules as of March 2013 for the three highest-cost programs that represent 97 percent of the Plan's estimated cost. GAO found that schedules for two of the programs at least partially met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied about half of the criterion), and the schedule for the other program at least minimally met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied a small portion of the criterion), as shown in the table below. For example, the schedule for one of the Plan's programs partially met the characteristic of being credible in that CBP had performed a schedule risk analysis for the program, but the risk analysis was not based on any connection between risks and specific activities. For another program, the schedule minimally met the characteristic of being controlled in …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) reflect some, but not all, best practices. Scheduling best practices are summarized into four characteristics of reliable schedules—comprehensive, well constructed, credible, and controlled (i.e., schedules are periodically updated and progress is monitored). GAO assessed CBP's schedules as of March 2013 for the three highest-cost programs that represent 97 percent of the Plan's estimated cost. GAO found that schedules for two of the programs at least partially met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied about half of the criterion), and the schedule for the other program at least minimally met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied a small portion of the criterion), as shown in the table below. For example, the schedule for one of the Plan's programs partially met the characteristic of being credible in that CBP had performed a schedule risk analysis for the program, but the risk analysis was not based on any connection between risks and specific activities. For another program, the schedule minimally met the characteristic of being controlled in that it …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Army's annual report on its modular force either fully or partially addressed all of the requirements mandated by law. GAO's analysis showed that of the 14 legislative requirements, the report fully addressed 9 and partially addressed 5. The requirements that were fully addressed included an assessment of the modular force capabilities and the status of doctrine for the modular force, among others. Some of the requirements that were partially addressed included information related to risks and mitigation strategies associated with shortfalls; scheduling for repairing, recapitalizing, and replacing equipment; and itemizing information by active-duty and reserve components. The 2013 report provided more thorough information to congressional decision makers on the Army's progress in its modular force transformation than previous reports."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Army has not followed certain applicable statutory and regulatory requirements for implementing the Army Workload and Performance System (AWPS). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 requires the Secretary of the Army to submit annual progress reports to Congress on the implementation of the AWPS master plan until the Secretary certifies to Congress that AWPS is fully implemented. Although the Secretary has not yet made this certification, the Army has not been submitting progress reports. According to Army officials, the Army does not plan to submit progress reports until a revised master plan for AWPS is completed. However, for many years the Army has been unable to complete an update to the master plan due to a lack of oversight. Additionally, the Army has not validated AWPS as a manpower requirements determination tool. Army regulation states that the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency (USAMAA) is responsible for reviewing and validating manpower requirements models like AWPS and that major commands—such as the Army Materiel Command (AMC)—are responsible for submitting their models to USAMAA for validation. AMC directs the activities of Army industrial sites …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Aerospace medical experts GAO interviewed generally agreed that the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) medical standards are appropriate and supported FAA's recent data-driven efforts to improve its pilot medical-certification process. Each year, about 400,000 candidates apply for a pilot's medical certificate and complete a medical exam to determine whether they meet FAA's medical standards. From 2008 through 2012, on average, about 90 percent of applicants have been medically certified by an FAA-designated aviation medical examiner (AME) at the time of their medical exam or by a Regional Flight Surgeon. Of the remaining applicants, about 8.5 percent have received a special issuance medical certificate (special issuance) after providing additional medical information to FAA. Approximately 1.2 percent were not medically certified to fly. According to an industry association, the special issuance process adds time and costs to the application process, in part, because applicants might not understand what additional medical information they need to provide to FAA. Officials from FAA's medical certification division have said that technological problems with the aging computer systems that support the medical certification process have contributed to delays in the special issuance process. FAA's …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO found mixed evidence regarding the extent of a shortage of airline pilots, although regional airlines have reported difficulties finding sufficient numbers of qualified pilots over the past year. Specifically, looking at broad economic indicators, airline pilots have experienced a low unemployment rate—the most direct measure of a labor shortage; however, both employment and earnings have decreased since 2000, suggesting that demand for these occupations has not outstripped supply. Looking forward, industry forecasts and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' employment projections suggest the need for pilots to be between roughly 1,900 and 4,500 pilots per year, on average, over the next decade, which is consistent with airlines' reported expectations for hiring over this period. Yet studies GAO reviewed examining whether the future supply of pilots will be sufficient to meet this need had varying conclusions. Two studies point to the large number of qualified pilots that exists, but who may be working abroad, in the military, or in another occupation, as evidence that there is adequate supply. However, whether these pilots choose to seek employment with U.S. airlines depends on the extent to which pilot job …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO analysis found mixed evidence about a current or possible future shortage of aviation professionals. Aerospace engineers have experienced a low unemployment rate—the most direct measure of a labor shortage—and increases in employment suggesting a shortage may exist; however, earnings for the occupation have stayed about the same. Data provide less support for a shortage of aircraft mechanics; while the occupation has had a low unemployment rate, both employment and earnings have stayed about the same, suggesting that demand for this occupation has not outstripped supply. GAO was unable to analyze information on avionics technicians because of insufficient data. In addition, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' employment projections indicate slower than average or no growth for these three occupations over the next 10 years. Data also suggest the number of people who have received training related to these aviation professions is increasing; however, several other industries compete for these individuals and not all will pursue aviation careers."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) met the presidentially announced time frame to deploy initial ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) but did not fully identify and plan to resolve implementation issues before deployment. As a result, DOD experienced implementation issues, such as incomplete construction of housing facilities for soldiers arriving at the EPAA radar site in Turkey and incomplete implementing arrangements defining how to operate with allies when certain BMD elements arrived in the host country. U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with other combatant commands, developed criteria to assess whether a BMD capability is ready for operational use to ensure that BMD capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered. However, the assessment criteria used during this process focused on effectiveness, suitability, and interoperability areas—such as whether BMD elements can work together to track ballistic missile threats—and did not explicitly require DOD to comprehensively identify and plan to resolve implementation issues prior to deploying these capabilities. DOD plans to continue to use its existing process to accept BMD capabilities planned for Europe in the future. Without …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The schedule and cost for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) border enforcement system modernization program known as TECS Mod that is managed by Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) continue to change; while the part managed in parallel by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is undergoing major revisions to its scope, schedule, and cost after discovering that its initial solution is not technically viable. CBP's $724 million program intends to modernize the functionality, data, and aging infrastructure of legacy TECS and move it to DHS's data centers by 2016. To date, CBP has deployed functionality to improve its secondary inspection processes to air and sea ports of entry and, more recently, to land ports of entry in 2013. However, CBP is in the process of revising its schedule baseline for the second time in under a year. Further, CBP has not developed its master schedule sufficiently to reliably manage work activities or monitor program progress. These factors raise questions about the certainty of CBP's remaining schedule commitments. Regarding ICE's $818 million TECS Mod program, it is redesigning and replanning its program, having determined in June 2013 that its …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Cancellation of a major Department of Defense (DOD) weapon program can have broad effects. Cancellation of one program can affect the schedules or budgets for related programs as well as the industrial base and local economies. For example, the cancellation of one program has impacted the schedule for the Army's network modernization efforts. DOD stakeholders can provide input to program officials on the potential effects of a cancellation."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Officials at four selected agencies—the General Services Administration (GSA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of the Interior (Interior)—experienced challenges receiving full upfront funding for federal real property projects through the annual appropriations process. For example, due to budget constraints, GSA acquired one property between 2008 and 2012. In addition, GSA has been unable to access funding to complete renovations in Interior's headquarters building due to obligation limitations in the GSA-administered Federal Buildings Fund (FBF). The FBF, which is the primary funding source for operating and capital costs associated with federal space, held an unobligated carryover balance of $4.7 billion at the end of fiscal year 2013 as a result of congressional limits on obligations. Officials noted that authority to retain proceeds provides a key incentive to initiate disposals, as agencies without this authority must request upfront funding for disposal costs while resulting proceeds are paid to the Department of the Treasury. Nonetheless, officials at selected agencies with the authority to retain disposal proceeds cited barriers to disposals, such as poor market demand, historical status or necessary remediation."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "To help prevent the sexual abuse of students in public K-12 schools, 46 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia surveyed by GAO required background checks of applicants--such as teachers or bus drivers--seeking public school employment; however, the methods and sources varied widely. Forty-two states established professional standards or codes of conduct for school personnel, and 22 of those included information on appropriate boundaries between personnel and students. Although experts view awareness and prevention training on sexual abuse and misconduct as another key prevention tool, only 18 states reported in the survey that they require school districts to provide this training. However, two of six districts GAO visited provided training to school personnel, volunteers, and students in response to prior allegations of sexual misconduct by school personnel. These trainings covered a variety of topics, including recognizing the signs of abuse and misconduct."

A statement of record issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury—use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the records GAO reviewed. GAO also found that the civilian IC elements either under- or over-reported the amount of contract obligations by more than 10 percent …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements--the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury--use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel and data shortcomings limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the 287 records GAO reviewed. Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information …