This report focuses on current developments in Taiwan, analyzing how those developments are affecting choices the United States makes about its policy toward Taiwan, specifically, and toward the People's Republic of Chine (PRC) more broadly.

This report discusses the U.S. relations with Taiwan as especially troubled during the 109th Congress in 2005-2006. Two developments concerning Taiwan were particularly nettlesome to U.S. policymakers in 2005-2006.

This report provides background information from Mainland China to Taiwan. The report discusses the U.S. relations with China and Taiwan and policy implications for Congress.

Under the current Bush Administration, U.S.-China-Taiwan relations have undergone a number of changes. Initially, the new Administration seemed to abandon the longstanding U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan in favor of “strategic clarity” that placed more emphasis on Taiwan’s interests and less on PRC concerns. Among other things, President Bush publicly stated that the The United States would do “whatever it takes” to help Taiwan’s defense — an unprecedented a statement which no prior U.S. President has made. In April 2001, the President also approved a substantial sale of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, including Kidd-class destroyers, antisubmarine P-3 “Orion” aircraft, and diesel submarines. The White House also was more accommodating to visits from Taiwan officials than previous U.S. Administrations, and permitted visits from Taiwan’s president in 2001 and 2003, and from Taiwan’s VicePresident and Defense Minister in 2002.