These criteria delineate objective, bases, and functional requirements governing preparation of design of the bauxite-sulfuric acid feed facilities installed in the 183-KE and KW Buildings. These facilities produces the chemical coagulant used in the treatment of Columbia River water in the K Area water plants and thus replaces the existing liquid alum feed systems used for this purpose.

An accidental ball 3X trip occurred at DR Reactor on July 11, 1961. Startup was attempted on July 21, 1961, subsequent to the ball recovery operations, at which time a large reactivity loss was apparent. The loss was assigned to inaccessible poison balls remaining within the graphite structure. Enriched uranium (0.947% U{sup 235}) columns were charged during successive outages to immediately recover the minimum excess reactivity required for operational transients and effective control. The large increase in enrichment inventory in the reactor complicated evaluation of total control and speed-of-control requirements necessary to comply with the control criteria. An additional effect of the remaining ball poison was observed as a skewed front-to-rear klux distribution with downstream peaking, indicating a much larger concentration of the balls in the upstream regions of the reactor. Summaries of various physics analyses performed as a result of the ball drop and some of the analytical techniques used in evaluating and resolving the flux distribution and reactivity and control problems are outlined in the report. The ball boron burnout rate and total estimated costs incurred due to the decreased conversion ratio, reduced operating level, and increased rupture potential are also provided.

The completion of Phase III construction in B Plant will provide facilities to meet certain common needs of departmental Waste Management and Fission Product programs. This is an estimate of the total and unit costs of operation in these facilities on a `goin concern` basis, recognizing full well the highly tentative nature of information available with respect to staffing, process rates, equipment, etc., approximately 3 to 4 years in advance of operations. It is planned that this document serve as an operating cost guideline during the interim period, subject to periodic revision as more firm data of significant cost impact becomes available. This review covers those functions performed within B Plant proper plus a PAW feed material preparation function tentatively planned for Purex head end for convenience purposes. Feed material streams from supernatant and sludge removal functions are considered F.O.B. B Plant. No staffing or costs have been included for tank farm activities or the 200 North storage function. Cesium and strontium costs include processing to a solid and packaging in a high integrity container compatible with final confinement requirements. Staffing is provided to perform a peroxyacetate strike or similar function for the cerium-rare earth fraction, but additional study would …

From considerations of the results of experimental simulations of non-axial placement of fuel elements in process tubes and in-reactor experience, it is concluded that the ultimate outcome of a charging error which results in operation with one or more unsupported fuel elements in a K Zircaloy-2 process tube would be multiple fuel failure and failure of the process tube. The outcome of the accident is determined by the speed with which the fuel failure is detected and the reactor is shut down. The release of fission products would be expected to be no greater than that which has occurred following severe fuel failure incidents. The highest probability for fission product release occurs during the discharge of failed fuel elements, when a small fraction of the exposed uranium of the fuel element may be oxidized when exposed to air before the element falls into the water-filled discharge chute. The confinement and fog spray facilities were installed to reduce the amount of fission products which might escape from the reactor building after such an event.

The objectives of this production test are to confirm the KVNS fuel element design, determine the effect of support height on annulus coolant temperature distribution (R Value), evaluate the effect of eccentricity on KVNS fuel element irradiation behavior.

The objective of production test detailed in this report was to characterize the effects of NH{sub 4}OH as a pH control agent in a recirculating, high temperature and pressure water system having NPR characteristics. Of particular interest is the crud forming and decomposition characteristics of NH{sub 4}OH at potential NPR conditions.

Distortion of the graphite stacks of the Hanford IPD reactors due to neutron irradiation effects has grown to where major corrective or compensatory action must be taken to preserve the operability of the safety control systems and life of the reactors. For the past few years, the line has been satisfactorily held by an aggressive maintenance program and short-range solutions. However, longer range, more permanent solutions are needed and high priority is being given to studies toward these ends. Important from a reactor life standpoint (and of more immediate concern and the subject of this discussion) is the jeopardy the reactors face from the use of the Ball-3X system. Permanent loss of balls in cracks in the graphite stacks following a ball drop is a real possibility in most of the reactors today. Recent, detailed investigations of the internal stack conditions in the K Reactors have revealed gaps opening into the vertical ball channels which are as wide as three inches. Any means to measurably reduce the probability of an inadvertent ball drop without compromising reactor safety could be a much cheaper alternative to any presently contemplated solutions which are directed towards physically preventing loss of balls to the graphite …

The construction and operation of a trigger system designed to fire a 30-kV 5000 A spark gap with a minimum delay following the arrival of a small signal pulse is described. In this particular experiment a 150-MeV/c muon is detected with scintillators on three 6199 phototubes, and the output pulse of the attached tunnel-diode triple-coincidence circuit is amplified and used to trigger the gap. Approximately 32 nanoseconds are needed from passage of the muon to the coincidence output, and approximately 25 nanoseconds are required from the coincidence output to the time of complete breakdown of the gap. These delays represent the shortest times that we could achieve with the particular boundary conditions under which the circuit had to operate. Sufficient detail is given to show how additional savings of nanoseconds could be made under different operating conditions.

The DR Reactor was shut down on July 10, 1963, for a scheduled charge-discharge outage. During the charge-discharge operation on July 11, 1963, the front work platform was being lowered to a new location for charging when the far side charging machine mounting rail came in contact with the 2 1/2 inch drain valve stem on front crossheader No. 25. Before the platform travel could be stopped, the drain valve and the related 2 1/2 inch piping was twisted down transmitting sufficient force to the crossheader to form a dimple in the header adjacent to the drain line-header weld junction.