Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This report discusses the briefing presented to congressional staff on June 30, 2011 regarding the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 (Zadroga Act). The Zadroga Act requires GAO to report by July 1, 2011, on whether the Clinical Centers of Excellence (CCE) under contract with the World Trade Center Health Program (WTCHP) Administrator have financial systems that allow for the timely submission of health care claims data as envisioned by the act. Beginning on July 1, 2011, the WTCHP is to provide medical services to responders and survivors of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks through contracted medical facilities known as CCEs in the New York City/New Jersey metropolitan area and a nationwide network of providers. In addition to providing medical services, the WTCHP is required to collect, report, and analyze data, including health care claims data; perform research on World Trade Center-related health conditions; and establish an outreach program. The Secretary of Health and Human Services designated the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as the WTCHP Administrator. The Administrator is responsible, as specified by the Zadroga Act, for …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 became law on January 2, 2011, and established a World Trade Center Health Program (WTCHP) to assume the functions of the World Trade Center (WTC) responder health programs beginning on July 1, 2011. From September 11, 2001, through fiscal year 2010, approximately $475 million in federal funds was made available for screening, monitoring, and treating WTC responders for illnesses and conditions related to the WTC disaster. These include asthma, persistent coughing, and other respiratory conditions and mental health conditions such as depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The three federal programs that provided screening, monitoring, and treatment services to responders prior to July 1, 2011, which we refer to here as the WTC responder health programs, were the New York City Fire Department's (FDNY) WTC Medical Monitoring and Treatment Program, the New York/New Jersey (NY/NJ) WTC Consortium, and the WTC National Responder Health Program. The WTCHP is administered by HHS and provides screening, monitoring, and treatment services through contracted clinical centers in the NYC area for responders in that area and through a nationwide network of providers …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster site. As the towers collapsed, Lower Manhattan was blanketed with building debris and combustible materials. This complex mixture created a major concern: that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now be exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete. In May 2002, New York City formally requested federal assistance to address indoor contamination. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an indoor clean and test program from 2002 to 2003. Several years later, after obtaining the views of advisory groups, including its Inspector General and an expert panel, EPA announced a second test and clean program in December 2006. Program implementation is to begin later in 2007, more than 5 years after the disaster. GAO's testimony, based on preliminary work evaluating EPA's development of its second program, addresses (1) EPA's actions to implement recommendations from the expert panel and its Inspector General, (2) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its second plan, …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "President Bush has identified the success of global trade talks launched in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001 as one of the United States' top trade policy priorities. Known as the Doha Development Agenda, the talks are an important means of spurring global growth and development. Completing the talks in 2006 was considered essential for an agreement to qualify for streamlined congressional consideration under the U.S. Trade Promotion Authority. However, the talks collapsed in late July 2006 in the face of wide differences over the extent of agricultural reform and how best to promote economic development in poor countries. Efforts to break the deadlock continue. Given the tenuous state of this central plank of U.S. trade policy, GAO updated its series of prior reports. In this report, we assess (1) the overall status of the Doha Round negotiations now and the progress that had been made prior to and since the breakdown of the talks, (2) the substantive divisions among key World Trade Organization (WTO) members that led to an environment of deadlock and the eventual suspension of the negotiations, and (3) the possible economic and other …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The outcome of ongoing World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations is vital to the U.S. economy, because trade with WTO members accounts for about one-fifth of the U.S. gross domestic product. The current round of trade negotiations--called the Doha Round--was supposed to end by January 2005 with agreement on the key issues of agriculture, industrial market access, services, and to strengthen the trading system's contribution to economic development. Failure to reach any agreement at the last WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003, put the talks behind schedule and threatened the outcome; however, talks resumed in 2004, and a new ministerial conference will convene in Hong Kong in December 2005. In light of these events, and with the impending renewal decision on U.S. Trade Promotion Authority, which streamlines the process by which Congress approves trade agreements, GAO was asked to assess (1) the overall status of the Doha Round negotiations, (2) progress on key negotiating issues, and (3) factors affecting progress toward concluding the negotiations."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "U.S. officials often call the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha Development Agenda or "Round" of global trade talks, launched in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, a "once in a generation opportunity" to expand trade. President Bush has identified their success as his administration's top trade priority. Due to various U.S. notification and consultation requirements, concluding the negotiations in 2006 is essential for a Doha agreement to qualify for congressional consideration under U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which expires July 1, 2007. A ministerial meeting among the WTO's 149 members was held on December 13-18, 2005, in Hong Kong, China, to make decisions needed to advance the talks. Given the importance of the WTO Doha Round to the United States, GAO was asked to provide an update on the status of the negotiations. In this report, the latest in a series on the negotiations, we (1) provide the status of the Doha negotiations on the eve of the Hong Kong ministerial, (2) review the outcome of the Hong Kong ministerial, and (3) discuss the prospects for concluding the Doha Round before TPA expires in July 2007."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Federal and Montana state agencies have long been entangled in controversy over bison leaving Yellowstone National Park. Some of these bison, as well as elk and other wildlife, have a contagious disease called brucellosis, which can cause pregnant animals to abort. Montana livestock owners and government officials fear that if bison are allowed to leave the park, the disease could spread to cattle, potentially threatening the economic health of the state's livestock industry. To help manage this issue, three federal and two state agencies have been implementing a bison management plan that they agreed to in 2000. This report discusses (1) the progress made in implementing the bison management plan and (2) the plan's soundness and the effectiveness of the agencies' implementation of it for managing bison-related issues in and near Yellowstone National Park. GAO reviewed documentation and research on bison and brucellosis and interviewed federal and state officials and key stakeholders."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Yellowstone National Park, in northwest Wyoming, is home to a herd of about 3,600 free-roaming bison. Some of these bison routinely attempt to migrate from the park in the winter. Livestock owners and public officials in states bordering the park have concerns about the bison leaving the park because many are infected with brucellosis--a contagious bacterial disease that some fear could be transmitted to cattle, thus potentially threatening the economic health of the states' livestock industry. Other interested groups believe that the bison should be allowed to roam freely both within and outside the park. In an effort to address these concerns, five federal and Montana state agencies agreed to an Interagency Bison Management Plan (IBMP) in December 2000 that includes three main steps to "maintain a wild, free-ranging population of bison and address the risk of brucellosis transmission to protect the economic interest and viability of the livestock industry in Montana." This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations on the progress that has been made in implementing the IBMP and the extent to which bison have access to lands and an easement acquired for $13 million in federal …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The transition to adulthood can be difficult for young adults who suffer from a serious mental illness, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. When these individuals are unsuccessful, the result can be economic hardship, social isolation, and in some cases suicide, all of which can pose substantial costs to society. Due to concerns about young adults with serious mental illness transitioning into adulthood, GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the number of these young adults and their demographic characteristics, (2) the challenges they face, (3) how selected states assist them, and (4) how the federal government supports states in serving these young adults and coordinates programs that can assist them. To do this work, GAO analyzed data based on national surveys, including the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R), and administrative data from the Social Security Administration (SSA). GAO also reviewed published research; interviewed federal, state, and local officials, as well as mental health providers, experts, and advocacy groups; and conducted site visits in Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Mississippi --four states that focus on this population. GAO did not make any recommendations. HHS made comments …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Youth Opportunity Grant program (YO) represented an innovative approach to improving education and employment opportunities for at-risk youth by targeting resources in high poverty areas and incorporating strategies that experts have identified as effective for serving this population. The Department of Labor (the Department) awarded 36 grants in 2000, and the program continued for 5 years. The Department had used a similar approach on a smaller scale in previous programs, but little information is available on the impact of these other programs. In order to understand what can be learned from the Youth Opportunity Grant program, GAO examined the grantees' implementation of the program, challenges they faced, and what is known about the program's outcomes and impact. To view selected results from GAO's Web-based survey of the Program Directors, go to GAO-06-56SP (http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-56SP)."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 1993, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has provided funding for Youthbuild, a competitive grant program that trains and educates disadvantaged youth and helps build low-income housing. In 2006, Youthbuild was transferred to the Department of Labor (Labor) to better align the Youthbuild program with existing youth workforce and training programs. In response to concerns about the overall quality of Youthbuild, a Senate report directed GAO to assess the program. GAO's objectives included (1) evaluating how HUD assessed and oversaw the program, (2) determining what results the program achieved, and (3) assessing how successful grantees were in obtaining outside funding. GAO analyzed Youthbuild performance data, visited Youthbuild sites, and interviewed agency officials."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Nuclear power reactors generate highly radioactive waste. To permanently store this waste, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been working to submit a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain about 100 miles from Las Vegas, Nevada. Although the project has been beset with delays, in part because of persistent problems with its quality assurance program, DOE stated in July 2006 that it will submit a license application with NRC by June 30, 2008. NRC states that a high-quality application needs to be complete, technically adequate, transparent by clearly justifying underlying assumptions, and traceable back to original source materials. GAO examined (1) DOE's development of its schedule for submitting a license application and the stakeholders with whom it consulted, (2) NRC's assessment of DOE's readiness to submit a high-quality application, and (3) DOE's progress in addressing quality assurance recommendations and challenges identified in GAO's March 2006 report. GAO reviewed DOE's management plan for creating the license application, reviewed correspondence and attended prelicensing meetings between DOE and NRC, and interviewed DOE managers and NRC on-site representatives for the …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Energy (DOE) is working to obtain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The project, which began in the 1980s, has been beset by delays. In 2004, GAO raised concerns that persistent quality assurance problems could further delay the project. Then, in 2005, DOE announced discovery of employee e-mails suggesting quality assurance problems. Quality assurance, which establishes requirements for work to be performed under controlled conditions that ensure quality, is critical to making sure the project meets standards for protecting public health and the environment. This testimony, which summarizes GAO's March 2006 report (GAO-06-313), provides information on (1) the history of the project's quality assurance problems, (2) DOE's tracking of these problems and efforts to address them since GAO's 2004 report, and (3) challenges facing DOE as it continues to address quality assurance issues within the project."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The future of the Yucca Mountain project in Nevada--originally designated for permanent storage of nuclear waste--is uncertain. Since 1983, the Department of Energy (DOE) has spent billions of dollars to evaluate the Yucca Mountain site for potential use as a nuclear waste repository. In February 2010, the President proposed eliminating funding for the project, and in March 2010, DOE filed a motion to withdraw its license application. Stakeholders--federal officials, state and local government officials, private companies, and others--have expressed interest in whether the site's characteristics are suitable for alternative uses. GAO was asked to examine alternative uses for the Yucca Mountain site. This report examines: (1) the characteristics of the Yucca Mountain site; (2) stakeholders' proposed alternative uses, and experts' evaluations of them; and (3) challenges, if any, in pursuing alternative uses. We selected a nonprobability sample of experts that included experts affiliated with nationally recognized research organizations, universities, and national laboratories, and that did not represent or benefit from any of the stakeholders' proposed alternative uses of the site. Using a data collection instrument, we elicited comments from these experts on stakeholders' proposed uses. The …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In March 2005, the Department of Energy (DOE) reported the discovery of a series of e-mail messages written in the late 1990s by U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) employees working under a contract with DOE on the Yucca Mountain Project. These e-mails alerted DOE that USGS workers may have falsified records for scientific work on the project and may have been disdainful of the project's quality assurance program and its requirements. In March 2006, we reported that DOE was engaged in a detailed review of these and other project e-mails and was reworking technical documents to ensure the credibility of the USGS's scientific analyses, particularly its conclusions on water infiltration. At Congress' request, we undertook follow-on work to determine the estimated costs incurred in DOE's response, which also included additional management and quality assurance training for project personnel. We briefed Congressional staff on October 23, 2006, on the results of this work. As Congress requested, we also briefed Congressional staff on the estimated cost of completing the Yucca Mountain Project, based on DOE's new schedule for receiving a license and opening the nuclear waste repository by 2017."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Energy (DOE) is working to obtain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The project, which began in the 1980s, has been beset by delays. In a 2004 report, GAO raised concerns that persistent quality assurance problems could further delay the project. Then, in 2005, DOE announced the discovery of employee e-mails suggesting quality assurance problems, including possible falsification of records. Quality assurance, which establishes requirements for work to be performed under controlled conditions that ensure quality, is critical to making sure the project meets standards for protecting public health and the environment. GAO was asked to examine (1) the history of the project's quality assurance problems, (2) DOE's tracking of these problems and efforts to address them since GAO's 2004 report, and (3) challenges facing DOE as it continues to address quality assurance issues within the project."

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