Despite their many successes, Roman leaders continually struggled with indiscipline in their own ranks as they battled Rome's opponents. Desertion and defection were steps that soldiers often undertook to avoid their obligated service. Previous scholarship has largely overlooked this aspect of Roman warfare. This dissertation analyzes why Roman soldiers began turning to desertion and defection throughout the Republican period. Such cases were generally rare in early Rome, but the expanding responsibilities and hardships of warfare in the Middle Republic caused them to rise, as did the sizeable growth of the Roman community. The civil wars of the Late Republic saw especially high cases of such acts, as generals incentivized defections in their opponents ranks. Roman desertion was not unique, but a common occurrence in ancient warfare. This dissertation also addresses how Romans capitalized on desertion and defection in warfare. The Second Punic War offers an example of how Rome achieved victory by encouraging defection in its enemy's alliances. Romans also relied heavily on defectors as a source of intelligence and as a tool in siege warfare. The moral forces of commitment, discipline, dissatisfaction, and desertion were often as important as the tactics and technologies of the participants in Rome's wars.

Carl A. Helmecke, like many German Americans marginalized by the anti-Germanism of the First World War and interwar period, believed that democracy had failed him. A professor with a doctoral degree in social philosophy, he regularly wrote newsletter columns declaring that the emphasis on individualism in the United States had allowed antidemocratic forces to corrupt the government, oppress citizens, and politicize schools and institutions for propaganda purposes. Moreover, widespread hunger and unemployment during the Great Depression added to the long list of failures attributable to democracy. What the United States needed, Helmecke thought, was political change, and he believed that the Nazi regime in his homeland, albeit flawed, had much to offer. In 1937, he went on a teaching sabbatical to Nazi Germany to study the Third Reich's education and social programs. When he returned to the United States, he began promoting Nazi ideals about education and labor camps. Although Hitler's 1939 invasion of Poland, followed by the United States entry into World War II, brought his fascist illusions for political change in the United States to an abrupt end, his belief in the correctness of an autocratic system of governance for Germany rather than that of the western democracies …

The role of Odierno's III Corps as MNC-I has failed to receive sufficient attention from studies of the 2007-2008 surge of U.S. forces in Iraq. However, was Odierno's employment of military force in time, space, and purpose based on the logic of conventional military operations that laid the groundwork for the successes gained in 2007 and 2008. III Corps's achievements as an operational headquarters were rooted in the successful application of operational art. Operational art is a way to conceptualize how to fight wars using campaigns of multiple, simultaneous, and successive operations across a theater of operations to achieve a unifying goal. While neither downplaying nor minimizing the importance of Army COIN principles, a study of MNC-I's December 2006-February 2008 campaign in Iraq through the neglected prism of operational art suggests that the campaign's success was due to the successful application of already established operational principles rather than from a revolution in the profession of arms.

On the one hand, using a traditional narrative approach, this dissertation examines disco's historical trajectory from an underground movement to a mainstream phenomenon, and analyzes its relationships to American cultural and racial tensions during the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, this dissertation also departs from traditional historical approaches by emphasizing an archive of personal experiences, memories, and reflections produced over the last four decades by individuals, living and dead, whose creative expressions help give disco its definition. Each chapter is organized around the story of an individual DJ whose work and play reflected the broader disco landscape. Together, the anecdotal experiences of these DJs help to conjure a collective biography of disco, emphasizing the significance of disco not only as a "genre" of pop music, but as a larger reference point for shared, and sometimes contested, cultural experiences.

This thesis examines the changes Spain was forced to make toward their colonial patterns due to Nahua resistance. Each chapter assesses different periods during the colonial era, tracing how the Virgin of Guadalupe's meaning changed according to Spanish colonial needs.

The expansionist agenda of the Polk administration culminated in the War with Mexico. The capture of Mexico City in September 1847 left the United States Army with the unprecedented task of occupying an enemy capital for an extended period. After the initial theaters of operation proved unable to secure a peace, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott commenced a campaign to take central Mexico including the capital city. In March 1847, an army of 11,000 soldiers under Scott landed at Vera Cruz. In six months, Scott's army marched over 250 miles and won five major battles. In mid-September, Scott took Mexico City. Throughout the campaign, Scott attempted to implement a pacification plan in an effort to prompt Mexico to open peace negotiations. Concern for his army weighed heavily on him as he faced unprecedented challenges in occupying Mexico City after its capture. The United States simply had almost no experience in the ramifications of fighting a foreign war, other than a few brief small-scale incursions onto foreign soil at Tripoli in 1805 and in British Canada. The difficulties that arose for Scott from the situation in Mexico were frustrating. Scott pacification plan used conciliation, coercion, and force on Mexico's army and people …

The Luftwaffe Field Divisions have remained on the periphery of World War II historiography for over seventy years, overshadowed by the myth of German military excellence during the conflict. The Heer is still known for lightning-quick attacks, brutal firepower, ably trained soldiers, and formidable success on the battlefield; an army of almost faceless, remorseless pain that grimly and efficiently faced down the Allies until the very end. Only recently, flaws have begun opening in this pristine picture as historians have examined how quickly the quality of the German army deteriorated from 1942-onward. Despite the vast landscape of scholarship on the war and the recent historical analysis of the weaknesses the Germans suffered, serious study on the creation and management of the Luftwaffe Field Divisions has been sparse. What has been written about them since 1945 has done little to offer a full picture of the units, their creation, or their significance to the German war effort. The purpose of this study was to fulfill this need by answering the necessary questions about the divisions, provide a complete history of the units, and place the LwFDs properly within the historiography of the Second World War.