A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Deferral: Both deferral tax expenditures confer the benefit of effectively reducing taxes by delaying the taxation of certain income of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations until it is repatriated to the U.S. parent as dividends."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Estimated tax revenue that the federal government forgoes resulting from corporate tax expenditures increased over the past few decades as did the total number of corporate tax expenditures. In 2011, the Department of the Treasury estimated 80 tax expenditures resulted in the government forgoing corporate tax revenue totaling more than $181 billion. Many of these tax expenditures are broadly available to both corporate and individual taxpayers. More than twothirds or 56 of the 80 tax expenditures used by corporations in 2011 were also used by individual taxpayers, such as other types of businesses not organized as corporations. Modifying any of these 56 tax expenditures as part of broader corporate tax reform would likely affect both corporate and individual taxpayers to some degree."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) was directed by the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations to provide a report on the results of a review to streamline the processes for coordinating and sharing information with its critical infrastructure (CI) protection partners. GAO was unable to assess the extent to which NPPD's streamlining efforts were designed to ensure progress in four areas--mission clarity, useful and actionable work products, efficacy of planning and information sharing, and cost savings--because DHS's response does not discuss NPPD efforts to streamline those processes. Specifically, GAO's analysis of DHS's response showed that DHS provided information on NPPD efforts to coordinate and share information with its public and private partners (e.g., CI owners and operators) and the results of some of those efforts but did not provide information about any NPPD efforts to streamline the processes for coordination and information sharing. For example, DHS's response includes a section on coordinating and executing plans--one of the five topic areas that NPPD was required to include in its report--that describes who NPPD's partners are and ways that NPPD coordinates and executes …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed nine criteria that consider various factors--including the willingness of various stakeholders, such as asset owners and operators, to participate and concentrations of high-risk critical infrastructure--when identifying possible locations for Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) projects. According to DHS officials, final project selections are then made from a list of possible locations based on factors including geographic distribution and DHS priorities, among other considerations. However, it is unclear why some RRAP projects are recommended over others because DHS does not fully document why these decision are made. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to promptly record and clearly document transactions and significant events. Because DHS's selection process identifies a greater number of potential projects than DHS has the resources to perform, documenting why final selections are made would help ensure accountability, enabling DHS to provide evidence of its decision making."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 2007, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) has assigned about 3,500 high-risk chemical facilities to risk-based tiers under its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, but it has not fully assessed its approach for doing so. The approach ISCD used to assess risk and make decisions to place facilities in final tiers does not consider all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. For example, the risk assessment approach is based primarily on consequences arising from human casualties, but does not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation, nor does it consider vulnerability, consistent with the NIPP. ISCD has begun to take some actions to examine how its risk assessment approach can be enhanced, including commissioning a panel of experts to assess the current approach, identify strengths and weaknesses, and recommend improvements. ISCD will need to incorporate the various results of these efforts to help them ensure that the revised risk assessment approach includes all elements of risk. After ISCD has …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made several changes to its criteria for including assets on the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NCIPP) list of the nation's highest-priority infrastructure, but has not identified the impact of these changes or validated its approach. In 2009, DHS changed the criteria to make the list entirely consequence based--that is, based on the effect of an event on public health and safety, and economic, psychological, and government mission impacts. Subsequent changes introduced specialized criteria for some sectors and assets. For example, infrastructure that has received a specific, credible threat, but otherwise does not meet NCIPP criteria, may be included on the list. DHS's changes to the NCIPP criteria have changed the composition of the NCIPP list, which has had an impact on users of the list, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency. However, DHS has not reviewed the impact of changes on users nor validated its approach to developing the list. While the change to an entirely consequence-based list created a common approach to identify infrastructure and align the program with applicable laws and the National Infrastructure Protection …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In April 2013, GAO reported that, since 2007, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) assigned about 3,500 high-risk chemical facilities to risk-based tiers under its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, but it has not fully assessed its approach for doing so. The approach ISCD used to assess risk and make decisions to place facilities in final tiers does not consider all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. For example, the risk assessment approach is based primarily on consequences arising from human casualties, but does not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation, nor does it consider vulnerability, consistent with the NIPP. ISCD had taken some actions to examine how its risk assessment approach could be enhanced, including commissioning a panel of experts to assess the current approach and recommend improvements. In April 2013, GAO reported that ISCD needed to incorporate the results of these efforts to help ensure that the revised assessment approach includes all elements of risk. After ISCD has incorporated …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 2007, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) has assigned about 3,500 high-risk chemical facilities to risk-based tiers under its Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, but it has not fully assessed its approach for doing so. The approach ISCD used to assess risk and make decisions to place facilities in final tiers does not consider all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. For example, the risk assessment approach is based primarily on consequences arising from human casualties, but does not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation, nor does it include vulnerability, consistent with the NIPP. ISCD has begun to take some actions to examine how its risk assessment approach can be enhanced. Specifically, ISCD has, among other things, engaged Sandia National Laboratories to examine how economic consequences can be incorporated into ISCD's risk assessment approach and commissioned a panel of experts to assess the current approach, identify strengths and weaknesses, and recommend improvements. Given the critical nature of ISCD's risk assessment …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The cruise industry and federal agencies have implemented 11 of 15 Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) provisions, but implementation of 4 provisions requires the development of regulations and policy, and is underway. Officials from all five cruise lines GAO met with said most required measures were in place when the CVSSA was enacted. According to U.S. Coast Guard officials, a notice of proposed rulemaking is in development to address 3 of the 4 remaining provisions. The 3 provisions relate to technologies to (1) detect a person going overboard, (2) maintain a video surveillance system to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel, and (3) transmit communications and warnings from the ship to anyone in surrounding waters. A policy linked to the fourth provision on the certification of trainers who provide the CVSSA course on crime scene preservation to cruise line personnel, is, as of December 2013, undergoing review at the Department of Transportation. With respect to CVSSA crime-reporting requirements, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Coast Guard have implemented these provisions as required. Accordingly, the agencies publish on a website information on …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) provide democracy assistance for Cuba aimed at developing civil society and promoting freedom of information. Typical program beneficiaries include Cuban community leaders, independent journalists, women, youths, and marginalized groups. USAID receives the majority of funding allocated for this assistance, although State has received 32 percent of funding since 2004. In recent years, both USAID and State have provided more funding for program implementation to for-profit and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) with a worldwide or regional focus than to universities and to NGOs that focus only on Cuba. All types of implementing partners, but worldwide or regional organizations in particular, used subpartners to implement program activities under 21 of the 29 awards and contracts that GAO reviewed."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal operations are evolving and growing. Federal agencies have reported increasing numbers of cybersecurity incidents that have placed sensitive information at risk, with potentially serious impacts on federal and military operations; critical infrastructure; and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive government, private sector, and personal information. The increasing risks are demonstrated by the dramatic increase in reports of security incidents, the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, and steady advances in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology. The number of incidents reported by federal agencies to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team has increased 782 percent from 2006 to 2012."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The 24 agencies participating in the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative made progress towards the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) goal to close 40 percent, or 1,253 of the 3,133 total federal data centers, by the end of 2015, but OMB has not measured agencies’ progress against its other goal of $3 billion in cost savings by the end of 2015. Agencies closed 420 data centers by the end of December 2012, and have plans to close an additional 548 to reach 968 by December 2015—285 closures short of OMB’s goal. OMB has not determined agencies’ progress against its cost savings goal because, according to OMB staff, the agency has not determined a consistent and repeatable method for tracking cost savings. This lack of information makes it uncertain whether the $3 billion in savings is achievable by the end of 2015. Until OMB tracks and reports on performance measures such as cost savings, it will be limited in its ability to oversee agencies’ progress against key goals."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The 24 agencies participating in the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) made progress towards the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) goal to close 40 percent, or 1,253 of the 3,133 total federal data centers, by the end of 2015, but OMB has not measured agencies' progress against its other goal of $3 billion in cost savings by the end of 2015. Agencies closed 420 data centers by the end of December 2012, and have plans to close an additional 548 to reach 968 by December 2015--285 closures short of OMB's goal. OMB has not determined agencies' progress against its cost savings goal because, according to OMB staff, the agency has not determined a consistent and repeatable method for tracking cost savings. This lack of information makes it uncertain whether the $3 billion in savings is achievable by the end of 2015. Until OMB begins tracking and reporting on performance measures such as cost savings, it will be limited in its ability to oversee agencies' progress against key initiative goals. Additionally, extending the horizon for realizing planned cost savings could provide OMB and data center …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Air Force did not evaluate its pilot program that moved funding for Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) acquisition civilian personnel from its 1-year Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation to its 2-year Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation. In addition, the Air Force is considering using this pilot program to inform funding changes for other sections of its civilian workforce. GAO's prior work has identified the following practices for implementing and evaluating pilot programs: (1) develop objectives that link to the goals of the pilot; (2) develop processes for monitoring the pilot; (3) develop and implement a data collection and analysis plan for evaluating the pilot; and (4) communicate evaluation results to stakeholders. When implementing the pilot program, the Air Force did not follow these practices, and primarily focused on ensuring that administrative changes were made accurately such as ensuring employees received pay on time. For example, while a variety of potential goals were identified for the pilot program by the Air Force in various documents; they were not clear or consistent. As a result, anecdotal opinions on the advantages or disadvantages of the …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) 2012 portfolio of 86 major defense acquisition programs is estimated to cost a total of $1.6 trillion, reflecting decreases in both size and cost from the 2011 portfolio. Those decreases are largely the result of more programs exiting than entering the portfolio, as well as reductions in procurement quantities due to program cancelations and restructurings. Notably a majority of programs in the portfolio gained buying power in the last year as their acquisition unit costs decreased. DOD's 10 costliest programs, excluding the Missile Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), drive most of the portfolio's cost performance and funding needs. The majority (65 percent) of the funding that DOD estimates it will need to complete its current programs is associated with those 10 programs, and almost all of that funding is for procurement."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Over the past year and a half, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to implement its plan to collect contractor manpower data directly from contractors and to develop and implement a department-wide system, based on the Army's existing system, to collect and store these and other inventory data. DOD officials estimate that the data system will be available in fiscal year 2014, with DOD components reporting on most of their service contracts by fiscal year 2016. DOD, however, is still working on key decisions related to security, funding, and other technological issues and has not developed a plan of action with anticipated time frames and necessary resources to help ensure DOD remains on track to meet its goals. Making timely decisions and developing a plan of action with anticipated timeframes and necessary resources, as GAO has previously recommended, would facilitate DOD's stated intent of implementing a DOD-wide system to collect required inventory information. For the fiscal year 2011 inventory, DOD components generally used the same compilation processes used in the previous year. As such, with the exception of the Army, which already has an …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "An open systems approach, which includes a modular design and standard interfaces, allows components of a product (like a computer) to be replaced easily. This allows the product to be refreshed with new, improved components made by a variety of suppliers. Designing weapons as open systems offers significant repair, upgrade, and competition benefits that could translate to millions of dollars in savings as the weapons age."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Over the last decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken several actions to address legislative requirements to improve the acquisition and management of services. In 2001, as amended in 2006, Congress required DOD to implement a management structure for the acquisition of services. In response, DOD implemented such a structure and service acquisition review and approval process. Recently, DOD also established new positions within its management structure, including senior managers within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the military departments, to oversee and coordinate service acquisition. With a management structure and review process in place, USD(AT&L) is focusing on efforts to improve the process for how requirements for individual service acquisitions are developed and enhancing training to respond to several legislative directives. USD(AT&L) also created its Acquisition of Services Functional Integrated Product Team, in part, to determine how to address legislative requirements to provide training for personnel acquiring services. USD(AT&L) did not develop a plan to implement the Defense Science Board recommendations to improve service acquisition but identified 23 different actions, including its Better Buying Power …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) must get better outcomes from its weapon system investments, which in recent years have totaled around $1.5 trillion or more. Recently, there have been some improvements, owing in part to reforms. For example, cost growth declined between 2011 and 2012 and a number of programs also improved their buying power by finding efficiencies in development or production and requirements changes. Still, cost and schedule growth remain significant; 39 percent of fiscal 2012 programs have had unit cost growth of 25 percent or more."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) has improved its Strategic Management Plan (SMP) by including additional strategic planning elements that were lacking from previous plans; however, the fiscal year 2012-2013 SMP still needs to incorporate some key information that would make it more useful for DOD decision makers as a guide for implementing business transformation efforts and for measuring progress. Improvements in the SMP include links between its business goals and DOD-wide goals, as well as milestone or target data that would enable DOD to better measure performance and assess progress in achieving SMP goals. However, the SMP does not fully describe the specific challenges the goals are intended to address and what the root causes of those challenges are. For example, the SMP states that the goal on strengthening DOD's acquisition processes is aimed at obtaining greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending, but the accompanying narrative does not describe what is causing acquisition-related cost growth and how the goal's initiatives may address those causes. The SMP also lacks sufficient context for why business goals and strategies were chosen or changed from prior plans, such as …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DOD has taken some steps to gain efficiencies in its approach to contracting for certain types of foreign language support services and products, but its contracting approach for other types remains fragmented across multiple components, and DOD has not explored whether additional opportunities exist to gain efficiencies across this broader range of contracting activity. In 2005, DOD sought to centralize and standardize contracting efforts for foreign language support by designating the Army as an executive agent to manage contracting in this area. In performing its responsibilities, the executive agent has focused its efforts solely on arranging for contracts to acquire translation and interpretation services for contingency operations because of the rapidly increasing requirements for these services. Specifically, from fiscal year 2008 through 2012, the Army, as executive agent, obligated about $5.2 billion for contracts to provide DOD components with translation and interpretation services for contingency operations. During the same time period, we found that multiple DOD components contracted independently for foreign language support outside of the executive agent's management. Specifically, to support the needs of contingency operations, predeployment training, and day-to-day military activities, we identified 159 contracting organizations …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense’s (DOD) competition rate for all contract obligations declined over the past five fiscal years, from 62.6 percent in fiscal year 2008 to 57.1 percent in fiscal year 2012. GAO also found that the competition rate in fiscal year 2012 varied by specific DOD component with the Air Force having the lowest at 37.1 percent and the Defense Logistics Agency the highest at 83.3 percent. The majority of the noncompetitive awards cited the availability of only one responsible source to meet the government’s needs as the reason for using noncompetitive procedures."