A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In GAO's opinion, the Bureau of the Fiscal Service's (Fiscal Service) Schedules of Federal Debt for fiscal years 2013 and 2012 were fairly presented in all material respects, and although information systems controls could be improved, Fiscal Service maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2013. GAO's tests disclosed no instances of reportable noncompliance for fiscal year 2013 with selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements related to the Schedule of Federal Debt."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "According to the National Research Council (NRC) and others, infrastructure such as roads and bridges, wastewater systems, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) centers are vulnerable to changes in the climate. Changes in precipitation and sea levels, as well as increased intensity and frequency of extreme events, are projected by NRC and others to impact infrastructure in a variety of ways. When the climate changes, infrastructure-- typically designed to operate within past climate conditions--may not operate as well or for as long as planned, leading to economic, environmental, and social impacts. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimates that, within 15 years, segments of Louisiana State Highway 1-- providing the only road access to a port servicing 18 percent of the nation's oil supply--will be inundated by tides an average of 30 times annually due to relative sea level rise. Flooding of this road effectively closes the port."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In September 2012, GAO reported that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees identified having lower average morale than the average for the rest of the federal government, but morale varied across components. Specifically, GAO found that, according to the Office of Personnel Management's 2011 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), DHS employees had 4.5 percentage points lower job satisfaction and 7.0 percentage point lower engagement--the extent to which employees are immersed in their work and spending extra effort on job performance. Several components with lower morale, such as the Transportation Security Administration, made up a substantial share of FEVS respondents at DHS and accounted for a significant portion of the overall difference between the department and other agencies. In September 2012, GAO recommended that DHS take action to better determine the root cause of low employee morale, and where absent, add benchmarking against similar organizations, among other things. Since September 2012, DHS has taken a number of actions intended to improve employee morale, such as directing component human capital officials to reevaluate their action plans to ensure that metrics of success are clear and measurable. In December 2013, GAO …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, the total number of funded positions--both full-time support and part-time--at the Department of Defense's (DOD) 75 Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve (Reserves) component headquarters grew from about 30,200 to 31,900 positions (about 6 percent overall). Some organizations grew more markedly, among them the National Guard Bureau (17 percent); Army National Guard Directorate (44 percent); Air National Guard Readiness Center (21 percent); and the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (45 percent). DOD officials attribute growth to the conversion of contractor workload into civilian positions and increased missions assigned at certain headquarters. Over the same period, staff levels at the National Guard's 54 state Joint Force headquarters remained flat and the Air Force Reserve shrank by 4 percent."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, GAO found the following:"

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has made substantial progress in addressing more than half of the recommendations GAO made in a January 2010 report concerning the agency's efforts to protect children's health. Specifically, EPA has fully implemented five of the eight recommendations made by GAO. For example, for a recommendation that EPA ensure that its strategic plan expressly articulate children-specific goals, objectives, and targets, in September 2010, EPA issued an agency-wide strategic plan that identifies children's health as a top agency priority with goals, objectives, and targets. In addition, EPA took some steps to address the remaining three recommendations from GAO's January 2010 report but has not fully implemented them, including a recommendation that the agency strengthen the data system that identifies and tracks development of rulemakings and other actions to ensure they comply with the 1995 policy on evaluating health risks to children."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO found that the GEAR framework generally addresses previously identified key practices for effective performance management, such as aligning individual performance expectations with organizational goals, but refinements could improve future government-wide implementation. Five federal agencies are piloting GEAR--the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security/Coast Guard (DHS/Coast Guard), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Veterans Affairs/National Cemetery Administration (VA/NCA), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)--with the intention to expand GEAR government-wide. The Chief Human Capital Officers Council (CHCO Council) is developing a toolkit based, among other things, on the experience of the pilot agencies. The toolkit is intended to help additional agencies implement the GEAR framework; CHCO Council representatives expect the toolkit to be complete by the end of September 2013. However, beyond the toolkit, neither the CHCO Council nor OPM have identified next steps to implement GEAR government-wide, such as identifying roles and responsibilities. Further, neither OPM nor the CHCO Council has plans to regularly update the GEAR framework or toolkit to include additional lessons learned, or to make such information available more broadly to key stakeholders, such as human resource professionals who may be responsible …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Thirteen of the 16 state transportation agencies GAO contacted used Life-Cycle Cost Analysis (LCCA) to select the pavement type (e.g., asphalt or concrete) for certain road construction and rehabilitation projects. Officials in all 13 states indicated that LCCA helped ensure that the agency selected the pavement that was most cost-effective over the long term, but states' specific LCCA practices varied. In general, these states used LCCA for larger projects, but each state had unique criteria to determine which projects should be subject to an LCCA. Likewise, the broad categories of LCCA inputs--such as agency costs, timing of future road work, and discount rate--are similar, but state transportation agencies handled each of these inputs in different ways. For example, estimates of when future roadwork would occur for a particular pavement type were based on state-specific factors, such as past experience with pavements and climate. Furthermore, state agencies used different criteria to decide if LCCA results clearly indicated a pavement type with the lowest life-cycle cost. In 9 of the 13 states that used LCCA, the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) LCCA guidance was an important influence on state …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Of the 590 information technology (IT) investments reviewed, GAO identified 12 potentially duplicative investments at three key federal agencies--namely, the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Health and Human Services (HHS). These investments accounted for about $321 million in reported IT spending for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. Of the 12 investments, GAO identified:"

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "While each agency's suspension and debarment program that GAO reviewed in 2011 was unique, agencies with the most suspension and debarment activity shared certain characteristics. These included a dedicated suspension and debarment program and staff, detailed policies and procedures, and practices that encouraged an active referral process."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As of August 2013, the Chief Information Officers (CIO) at the eight selected agencies rated 198 of their 244 major information technology (IT) investments listed on the Federal IT Dashboard (Dashboard) as low risk or moderately low risk, 41 as medium risk, and 5 as high risk or moderately high risk. However, the total number of investments reported by these agencies has varied over time, which impacts the number of investments receiving CIO ratings. For example, Energy reclassified several of its supercomputer investments from IT to facilities and Commerce decided to reclassify its satellite ground system investments. Both decisions resulted in the removal of the investments from the Dashboard, even though the investments were clearly IT. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not update the public version of the Dashboard as the President's budget request is being created. As a result, the public version of the Dashboard was not updated for 15 of the past 24 months, and so was not available as a tool for investment oversight and decision making."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) generally focus on many of the same broad topics and rely on agency safeguards, as well as on the scientific community's professional norms, to prevent inadvertent duplication of research projects within and between the agencies. Shortcomings with certain agency safeguards, however, may increase the potential risk of project duplication within or between the two agencies. ARS and NIFA built in their own safeguards to help prevent project duplication, such as (1) panels of independent external scientists who review proposed projects and (2) agency requirements for staff to ensure that proposed work is relevant, including checking the Current Research Information System (CRIS)--USDA's primary system containing project-level information on its ongoing and completed research projects--for potentially duplicative research projects in both agencies. The agencies also rely on professional norms to safeguard against duplication, such as the peer review process used by scientific journals to limit the publication of unnecessarily duplicative research. Indeed, agency officials and stakeholders could not provide recent examples of duplication within or between the two agencies, and …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has taken initial steps toward applying key project management practices in the areas of project planning, requirements management, and acquisition planning for its Federal Housing Administration Transformation (FHA Transformation) Initiative to address performance gaps in housing insurance programs and its Next Generation Management System (NGMS) to improve management of its affordable housing programs. However, HUD has not yet fully implemented any of these practices in executing and managing the information technology (IT) projects associated with these efforts. Specifically, while the department had developed project management artifacts such as charters and requirements management plans, none of these documents included all of the key details that could facilitate effective management of its projects such as full descriptions of the work necessary to complete the projects, cost and schedule baselines, or prioritized requirements, among other things. Department officials attributed these deficiencies to a lack of project management expertise."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In its review of guidance and practices related to contract termination liability estimates, the Department of Defense (DOD) found that weapons programs generally received estimates of contract termination liability from contractors;, although there is no comprehensive guidance on how or when programs should require or consider these estimates. DOD plans to include additional language to help ensure that program managers are aware of the need to consider termination liability before contract award and during the life of a contract in its next update of its acquisition management guidance."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) has improved its Strategic Management Plan (SMP) by including additional strategic planning elements that were lacking from previous plans; however, the fiscal year 2012-2013 SMP still needs to incorporate some key information that would make it more useful for DOD decision makers as a guide for implementing business transformation efforts and for measuring progress. Improvements in the SMP include links between its business goals and DOD-wide goals, as well as milestone or target data that would enable DOD to better measure performance and assess progress in achieving SMP goals. However, the SMP does not fully describe the specific challenges the goals are intended to address and what the root causes of those challenges are. For example, the SMP states that the goal on strengthening DOD's acquisition processes is aimed at obtaining greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending, but the accompanying narrative does not describe what is causing acquisition-related cost growth and how the goal's initiatives may address those causes. The SMP also lacks sufficient context for why business goals and strategies were chosen or changed from prior plans, such as …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Several federal entities, including the Government Accountability and Transparency Board (GAT Board), the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (Recovery Board), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), have initiatives under way to improve the accuracy and availability of federal spending data. The GAT Board, through its working groups, developed approaches to standardize key data elements to improve data integrity; link financial management systems with award systems to reconcile spending data with obligations; and leverage existing data to help improve oversight. With no dedicated funding, GAT Board plans are incremental and leverage ongoing agency initiatives designed to improve existing business processes as well as improve data transparency. These initiatives are in an early stage, and some progress has been made to bring greater consistency to award identifiers. The GAT Board's mandate is to provide strategic direction, not to implement changes. Further, while these early plans are being developed with input from a range of federal stakeholders, the GAT Board and OMB have not developed mechanisms for obtaining input from non-federal fund recipients."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "During its audit of the American Battle Monuments Commission’s (the Commission) fiscal year 2012 financial statements, GAO identified two material weaknesses that resulted in ineffective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2012. Specifically, the material weaknesses concern the Commission’s financial reporting process and its monitoring process. Because of these control weaknesses, GAO found significant errors in the Commission’s financial reporting that were not detected by the Commission. The Commission made the necessary adjustments and was able to prepare financial statements that were fairly stated in all material respects by fiscal year-end. However, these material weaknesses increase the risk that a material misstatement of the Commission’s financial statements will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis. GAO also found that a previously reported significant deficiency concerning foreign payroll processing continued to exist during fiscal year 2012. These material weaknesses and the significant deficiency in internal control warrant the attention of those charged with governance of the Commission."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "On the basis of GAO's analysis of a representative sample of 131 alien sex offenders under U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) supervision, GAO estimates that as of September 2012, 72 percent of alien sex offenders were registered, 22 percent were not required to register, and 5 percent did not register but should have. According to officials, offenders were not required to register for various reasons, such as the offense not requiring registration in some states. Of the 6 offenders in GAO's sample that should have registered, officials from ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations (ICE-ERO) field offices informed 4 of their registration requirements. However, officials at some of these field offices identified several reasons why they did not ensure that these offenders actually registered. For example, the offender may have moved and no longer resided in the area of responsibility for that particular field office. ICE had not informed the remaining 2 offenders of their registration requirements."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In GAO’s opinion, the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) fiscal years 2013 and 2012 financial statements are fairly presented in all material respects. However, in GAO’s opinion, IRS did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2013, because of a continuing material weakness in internal control over unpaid tax assessments. GAO’s tests of IRS’s compliance with selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements detected no reportable instances of noncompliance in fiscal year 2013."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Patriot Express loans valued at about $703 million have defaulted at a higher rate than loans under the Small Business Administration's (SBA) other related loan guarantee programs, and losses for Patriot Express have exceeded its income. With the exception of loans approved in 2007, Patriot Express loans have defaulted at a higher rate than loans made under SBA's main 7(a) program or loans made under SBA's streamlined loan guarantee program (SBA Express). The Patriot Express program's overall default rate was significantly higher for smaller loans, especially for loans below $25,000 (20 percent). Additionally, one lender accounted for more than 64 percent of these smaller loans and experienced higher default rates than the remaining lenders. From 2007 through 2012, losses in the Patriot Express program exceeded income by $31.1 million (not accounting for future fee revenues or funds recovered from loans in default)."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of State's (State) Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) has reported on President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) treatment program results primarily in terms of (1) numbers of people on treatment directly supported by PEPFAR, (2) percentages of eligible people receiving treatment, and (3) percentages of people alive and on treatment 12 months after starting treatment. However, these indicators do not reflect some key PEPFAR results. First, although the number of people on treatment directly supported by PEPFAR grew from about 1.7 million to 5.1 million in fiscal years 2008 through 2012, this indicator alone does not provide complete information needed for assessing PEPFAR's contributions to partner countries' treatment programs. Second, although 10 PEPFAR country teams reported that percentages of people alive and on treatment after 12 months exceeded 80 percent, data for this indicator are not always complete and have other limitations. To improve these data, according to OGAC officials, OGAC clarified its guidance and conducted data quality assessments. However, OGAC has not yet established a common set of indicators to monitor the results of PEPFAR's efforts to improve the …