Questions concerning the ethics of terraforming Mars have received some attention from both philosophers and scientists during recent decades. A variety of theoretical approaches have been supplied by a number of authors, however research pursuant to this thesis has indicated at least two major blindspots in the published literature on the topic. First, a broad category of human considerations involving risks, dangers, and social, political, and economic inequalities that would likely be associated with efforts to terraform Mars have been woefully overlooked in the published literature to date. I attempt to rectify that oversight by employing the interpretive lens of environmental justice to address questions of environmental colonialism, equality in terms of political participation and inclusion in decision making structures, risks associated with technological progressivism, and responses to anthropogenic climate change. Only by including the historically marginalized and politically disenfranchised "voices," of both humans and nonhumans, can any future plan to terraform Mars be deemed ethical, moral or just according to the framework provided by environmental justice. Furthermore, broader political inclusion of this sort conforms to what ecofeminist author Val Plumwood calls the "intentional recognition stance" and provides an avenue through which globally societies can include nonanthropocentric considerations in decision …

This thesis argues that there is a philosophical attempt directed at combating the fragmentation of the sciences that starts with Heidegger and continues today through Trish Glazebrook's interpretations of the former's concept of "reflection," and Carl Mitcham and Robert Frodeman's concept of "critical interdisciplinarity" (CID). This is important as the sciences are both more implicated in our lives and more fragmented than ever. While scientific knowledge is pursued for its own sake, the pertinent facts, meaning, and application of the science is ignored. By linking Heidegger's views on the fragmentation of the sciences to Glazebrook's interpretations of reflection and Mitcham and Frodeman's CID, I show that CID is a concrete realization of Heidegger's reflection.