Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, DOD reported having taken or planned actions that directly align with about half of the CWC recommendations applicable to it, and State and USAID each reported having taken or planned actions that directly align with about one-third of the recommendations applicable to each of them. Officials from the three agencies explained that for the remaining recommendations no actions were taken or planned that directly aligned with the specific recommendation. This was because, for example, the agencies had determined that existing policies or practices already meet the intent of the recommendations or had disagreed with the recommendations. The following are examples of actions that DOD, State, and USAID have taken or planned that directly align with specific CWC recommendations:"

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "We identified 1,340 potential, separate initiatives that DOD funded from fiscal year 2008 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2012 that, in DOD officials’ opinion, met the above definition for C-IED initiatives. We relied on our survey, in part, to determine this number because DOD has not determined, and does not have a ready means for determining, the universe of C-IED initiatives. Of the 1,340 initiatives, we received detailed survey responses confirming that 711 initiatives met our C-IED definition. Of the remaining 629 initiatives for which we did not receive survey responses, 481 were JIEDDO initiatives. JIEDDO officials attribute their low survey returns for reasons including that C-IED initiatives are currently not fully identified, catalogued, and retrievable; however, they expect updates to their information technology system will correct this deficiency. Our survey also identified 45 different organizations that DOD is funding to undertake these 1,340 identified initiatives. Some of these organizations receive JIEDDO funding while others receive other DOD funding. We documented $4.8 billion of DOD funds expended in fiscal year 2011 in support of C-IED initiatives, but this amount is understated because we did not receive …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "U.S.-funded global health programs have put regulatory and policy requirements in place to help prevent procurement of substandard drugs. USAID, for example, reviews quality assurance information for all drugs before they are procured. Specifically, USAID requires implementing partners to obtain written approval from the agency before purchasing drugs. Through its approval process, USAID determines whether there is sufficient information available to assure that the drug is of acceptable quality. Although USAID’s review process varies for some drugs, the type of information USAID reviews generally includes prior FDA approval of the drug or approval by a comparable stringent regulatory authority, as well as results of prior testing of the drug by an independent laboratory. As an additional quality assurance measure, USAID prequalifies selected wholesalers to procure drugs for U.S.-funded global health programs based on factors such as site visits to the wholesaler’s facility and a review of the wholesaler’s quality assurance practices and procedures. According to CDC officials, CDC requires its implementing partners to follow program-specific quality assurance requirements. For example, CDC’s implementing partners must follow the same requirements as the USAID/PMI program when procuring malaria drugs and as …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Under PPACA, states are responsible for making a number of changes to their Medicaid programs by January 1, 2014, including expanding eligibility levels and streamlining their enrollment processes. Specifically, states must expand Medicaid eligibility to non-elderly individuals with incomes at or below 133 percent of FPL. Under the newly eligible category, states will provide Medicaid coverage to eligible low-income parents and childless adults. States must also begin determining income eligibility for Medicaid beneficiaries, including newly eligible adults, using a uniform methodology—MAGI, which is a tax-based definition of income. To implement these requirements, eligibility categories have been consolidated into four groups—adults, children, parents, and pregnant women. States may choose to expand Medicaid coverage to the newly eligible prior to January 1, 2014 (referred to as the early expansion option), but must cover lower income individuals before higher income individuals. These more uniform eligibility requirements will replace the current system where Medicaid eligibility and income rules may vary from state to state. Further, states must adopt a methodology for identifying the newly eligible in order to obtain the increased federal match. States will receive the enhanced federal match …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In its November 2011 report, CMS presented three options for removing SSNs from Medicare cards. One option would truncate the SSN so that only the last four digits would appear on the card. However, the full SSN would continue to be used by both beneficiaries and providers for all Medicare business transactions. The other two options would replace the display of the SSN on the Medicare card with a newly developed identifier that CMS calls the Medicare Beneficiary Identifier (MBI). In one of these options, this new identifier would be used by the beneficiary in their interactions with CMS; however, the provider would continue to use the SSN to interact with CMS. In the other, both the beneficiary and provider would use the new identifier printed on the Medicare card and the SSN would be entirely excluded from the transaction. CMS, SSA, and RRB reported that all three options would generally require similar efforts, including coordinating with stakeholders; converting information-technology (IT) systems; conducting provider and beneficiary outreach and education; conducting training of business partners; and issuing new cards. While the level and type of modifications required to IT …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) 2011 report to Congress proposed three options for removing Social Security numbers (SSN) from Medicare cards. One option would truncate the SSN displayed on the card, but beneficiaries and providers would continue to rely on the SSN. The other two options would replace the SSN with a new identifier that would be displayed on the card and either be used only by beneficiaries, or by both beneficiaries and those who provide Medicare services. CMS, however, has not selected or committed to implementing any of these options. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA), and private insurers have already removed or taken steps to remove SSNs from display on their identification or health insurance cards."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) program remains vulnerable to fraud and abuse. VA has made inconsistent statements about its progress verifying firms listed in VetBiz using the more-thorough process the agency implemented in response to the Veterans Small Business Verification Act (2010 Act). In one communication, VA stated that as of February 2011, all new verifications would use the 2010 Act process going forward. However, as of April 1, 2012, 3,717 of the 6,178 SDVOSB firms (60 percent) listed as eligible in VetBiz had not been verified under the 2010 Act process. Of these 3,717 firms, 134 received $90 million in new VA SDVOSB set-aside or sole-source contract obligations from November 30, 2011, to April 1, 2012. While the 2010 Act did not include a deadline for verification using the more-thorough process, the presence of firms that have only been subjected to the less-stringent process that VA previously used represents a continuing vulnerability. VA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that the less-stringent process was in many cases insufficient to establish control and ownership and in effect allowed businesses to …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Almost all ANS hardware and most software development were completed prior to its cancellation, according to the Army and GDRS. The software for the most advanced capabilities was not completed, which potentially presented the greatest complexities. GDRS had demonstrated many of ANS’s capabilities to some extent, including its capability to avoid obstacles and follow a leading vehicle through varying terrain. ANS had not yet progressed to the independent testing phase, however. In cancelling ANS and MM-UGV, the Army estimated that approximately $2.5 billion in planned funding for fiscal years 2013 to 2017 could be made available for other Army efforts. According to Army officials, the government owns the work completed on ANS to date."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since fiscal year 2005, the number of federal non-postal civilian and non-tactical military vehicles has increased about 7 percent, from about 420,000 to 449,000 vehicles. However, from fiscal year 2005 to 2011, some agencies decreased their fleets, and the change in fleet size from agency to agency varied considerably. For example, one-third of the agencies (8 of 24) with the largest number of vehicles decreased their fleets by at least 2 percent during this period. Of the 4 agencies GAO selected for review, the Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Veterans Affairs (VA) increased their fleets 5 and 49 percent, respectively since fiscal year 2005; the U.S. Air Force and Department of the Interior (Interior) decreased their fleets 7 and 9 percent, respectively. Overall, federal agencies increased the portion of their fleets made up of alternative fuel vehicles (e.g., vehicles that operate using ethanol or batteries) from about 14 percent to 33 percent from fiscal years 2005 to 2011. In addition, GAO found that 8 agencies accounted for almost 80 percent of total federal vehicles in fiscal year 2011, while 35 other agencies held the remaining vehicles."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "To help the Department of State (State) meet its requirements for critical goods and services in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) supported State on 22 acquisitions. On State's behalf, DOD awarded and manages 20 acquisitions, known as assisted interagency acquisitions, under the authority of the Economy Act with an estimated value of almost $1 billion for basic support goods and services and security services. DOD also supported two of State's acquisitions for medical services and unmanned aerial vehicles. Across the 22 acquisitions, DOD has been involved in one or more aspects of the acquisition cycle, including planning, award, management, and oversight. GAO identified at least 128 DOD personnel with contracting and subject matter expertise who provided support for these acquisitions."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Minority- or female-owned, minority-owned, and female-owned firms represented 15 percent, 6 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of firms in the U.S. pipeline industry in 2007. In terms of market share, minority- or female-owned firms are estimated to have accounted for a total of 13 percent of industry receipts, with minority-owned firms having accounted for 3 percent and female-owned firms having accounted for 11 percent of receipts."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, VA’s SDVOSB program remains vulnerable to fraud and abuse. VA has made inconsistent statements about its progress in verifying firms listed in VetBiz using the new, more-thorough process the agency implemented in response to the 2010 Act. In one communication, VA stated that as of February 2011, all new verifications would use the 2010 Act process going forward. According to the most-recent information provided by VA, there are 6,079 SDVOSBs and veteran-owned small businesses (VOSB) listed in VetBiz. Of these, 3,724 were verified under the more-through process implemented under the 2010 Act, and 2,355—over 38 percent—were verified under the less-rigorous 2006 Act process. The presence of firms that have only been subjected to the less-stringent process that VA previously used represents a continuing vulnerability. In 2011, VA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report finding that VA’s document review process under the 2006 Act “ in many cases was insufficient to establish control and ownership [and] in effect allowed businesses to self-certify as a veteran-owned or service-disabled veteran-owned small business with little supporting documentation.”"

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DOD incorporated results-oriented management practices into the planning and development of the four ongoing DSO improvement efforts. Additionally, it appears that DOD is incorporating those practices into its planning for the fifth effort—strategic network optimization—which is still under development. On the basis of our assessment of DOD’s key planning documents and other information for the process improvement, surface optimization, air optimization, and supply alignment efforts, we found that DOD addressed the six characteristics found in the framework. For example, DOD identified the main purpose of the improvement efforts, their scope, and the resources needed to execute individual efforts. Preliminary observations of DOD's planning for strategic network optimization indicate that agency officials are also incorporating results-oriented management practices for this effort. For example, DOD has developed a mission statement and established mechanisms to coordinate with stakeholders. However, because planning is still underway for strategic network optimization, we were unable to fully assess the extent to which DOD has used result-oriented management practices to develop and implement this improvement effort. For example, DOD has not yet decided how to implement the effort nor developed specific performance measures to assess progress."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "We found that the Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) has not followed sound data collection practices in designing and maintaining the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) database, raising concerns that the database is not a useful tool for describing the nature, use, and extent of excess and underutilized federal real property. The FRPC has not ensured that key data elements—including buildings’ utilization, condition, annual operating costs, mission dependency, and value—are defined and reported consistently and accurately. For example, we documented buildings reported to the FRPP as underutilized even though they were fully occupied and we also documented others that were vacant but reported as utilized. We also saw severely dilapidated buildings that were reported as being in excellent condition. In fact, at 23 of the 26 locations visited, we identified inconsistencies and inaccuracies related to these data elements. As a result, FRPC cannot ensure that FRPP data are sufficiently reliable to support sound management and decision making about excess and underutilized property. In addition to problems with data consistency, we found problems with collaboration and reporting issues, among others."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) assesses regulatory fees among industry sectors and fee categories based on obsolete data, with limited transparency. The Communications Act requires FCC to base its regulatory fees on the number of full-time equivalents (FTE) that perform regulatory tasks in certain bureaus, among other things. FCC based its fiscal year 2011 regulatory fee assessments on its fiscal year 1998 division of FTEs among fee categories. It has not updated the FTE analysis on which it bases its regulatory fees, in part to avoid fluctuations in fees from year to year. FCC officials stated that the agency has complied with its statutory authority by dividing fees among fee categories based on FTE data—although the data is from fiscal year 1998—since the statute does not prescribe a specific time for FCC to update its FTE analysis. As a result, after 13 years in a rapidly changing industry, FCC has not validated the extent to which its fees correlate to its workload. Major changes in the telecommunications industry include the increasing use of wireless and broadband services and a convergence of telecommunications industries. Moreover, FCC’s practice …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) is not assessing risks at federal facilities in a manner consistent with standards such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s (NIPP) risk management framework, as FPS originally planned. Instead of conducting risk assessments, since September 2011, FPS’s inspectors have collected information, such as the location, purpose, agency contacts, and current countermeasures (e.g., perimeter security, access controls, and closed-circuit television systems). This information notwithstanding, FPS has a backlog of federal facilities that have not been assessed for several years. According to FPS’s data, more than 5,000 facilities were to be assessed in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. However, GAO was unable to determine the extent of FPS’s facility security assessment (FSA) backlog because the data were unreliable. Multiple agencies have expended resources to conduct risk assessments, even though the agencies also already pay FPS for this service. FPS received $236 million in basic security fees from agencies to conduct FSAs and other security services in fiscal year 2011. Beyond not having a reliable tool for conducting assessments, FPS continues to lack reliable data, which has hampered the …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has not been effective as the lead agency for the government facilities sector, which includes facilities at the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial level. Under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the 2010 sector-specific plan, FPS is responsible for establishing a risk management approach and developing effective partnerships for the sector. However, FPS has not implemented a risk management approach. According to FPS, it has not identified or obtained data on facilities at the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial level, which are fundamental for employing a risk management approach. In addition, despite providing information on the principles of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, FPS has not coordinated or assessed risk across government facilities, another key element of risk management. FPS also lacks effective metrics and performance data to track progress toward implementing a risk management approach and for the overall resilience or protection of government facilities. Consequently, FPS does not have a risk management approach for prioritizing and safeguarding critical government facilities. Furthermore, FPS has not built effective partnerships across different levels of government. While FPS chairs the Government …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The amount of spent fuel stored on-site at commercial nuclear reactors will continue to accumulate—increasing by about 2,000 metric tons per year and likely more than doubling to about 140,000 metric tons—before it can be moved off-site, because storage or disposal facilities may take decades to develop. In examining centralized storage or permanent disposal options, GAO found that new facilities may take from 15 to 40 years before they are ready to begin accepting spent fuel. Once an off-site facility is available, it will take several more decades to ship spent fuel to that facility. This situation will be challenging because by about 2040 most currently operating reactors will have ceased operations, and options for managing spent fuel, if needed to meet transportation, storage, or disposal requirements, may be limited."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Housing assistance is fragmented across 160 programs and activities. Overlap exists for some products offered, service delivery, and geographic areas served by selected programs—particularly in the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Rural Housing Service (RHS) and Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA). For instance, RHS, FHA, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) all guarantee mortgage loans for homeowners. According to fiscal year 2009 data (the most recent available), FHA served a larger number of households than RHS in all areas, including a larger number of low- and moderate-income households in rural areas. Although selected HUD, USDA, and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) multifamily programs had overlapping purposes, the products, areas served, and delivery methods differed. For example, HUD, RHS, and Treasury provide financing for development and rehabilitation of multifamily housing for low- and moderate-income households, but RHS-financed properties were more concentrated in rural areas and HUD’s and Treasury’s tax credit properties were more concentrated in urban and suburban areas."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Because of delays and cost increases, the General Services Administration (GSA) canceled the authorized 41-courtroom Los Angeles (L.A.), California, courthouse project in 2006. Since then, GSA and the judiciary have been slow to agree upon how to proceed with the project, for which about $366 million in appropriated funds remains available. In 2012, with the judiciary’s support, GSA issued a request for proposal for contractors to design and build a 24-courtoom, 32-chamber courthouse, which would be used in conjunction with 25 existing courtrooms in the Roybal Courthouse. However, this new plan will not address one of the principal justifications for the original project—that the L.A. Court be centralized at one site. Instead, it would increase the distance between the Roybal Courthouse and the planned second court location and the distance to the federal detention center from which prisoners must be transported."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, we identified four groups of states that differed in their use of Medicaid managed care on the basis of the 12 indicators we included in our analysis. A handful of these indicators—namely Medicaid enrollment in MCOs and PCCM programs, HMO penetration rates, and the concentration of low-income individuals that lived in urban areas—had significant influence on how states grouped. In contrast, within the four groups, considerable variation existed among the other indicators we examined, such as states’ primary care capacity and commercial HMO market index. For labeling purposes, we typically describe the four groups on the basis of states’ enrollment of Medicaid beneficiaries in MCOs and PCCM programs—generally the predominant similarity among the states within each group:"

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Our evaluation of the reports MSHA used to support its proposal and the key scientific studies on which the reports were based shows that they support the conclusion that lowering the PEL from 2.0 mg/m3 to 1.0 mg/m3 would reduce miners’ risk of disease. The reports and key studies concluded that miners’ cumulative exposure to coal mine dust at the current PEL over their working lives places them at an increased risk of developing CWP, progressive massive fibrosis, and decreased lung function, among other adverse health outcomes. To mitigate the limitations and biases in the data, the researchers took reasonable steps, such as using multiple x-ray specialists to reduce the risk of misclassifying disease and making adjustments to coal mine dust samples where bias was suspected. In addition to addressing the limitations and biases in the data, researchers used appropriate analytical methods to conclude that lowering the existing PEL would decrease miners’ risk of developing black lung disease. For example, in addition to taking steps to precisely estimate a miner’s cumulative exposure, the researchers accounted for several factors in their analyses—such as the age of the miners, the …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DOD's rationale for waiving WSARA's competitive prototyping requirement for CAPS covered both bases provided in the statute; however, DOD did not provide complete information about the potential benefits of competitive prototyping or support for its conclusion that prototyping would result in schedule delays. In the waiver, DOD found reasonable the Air Force's conclusion that the additional $49 million cost of producing competing prototypes exceeded the negligible expected life-cycle benefits because minimal opportunities exist to increase CAPS technological and design maturity through competitive prototyping. The Air Force's conclusions about CAPS technical and design risk are supported by its market research, but its cost-benefit analysis was incomplete because neither the waiver nor the business case analysis supporting it provided an estimated dollar value for the expected benefits. Further, the Air Force's cost estimate of competitively prototyping CAPS was based on a program office estimate, which has not been independently reviewed by DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Performance Evaluation. DOD also did not provide support in the waiver for its conclusion that implementing competitive prototyping will delay EPS's initial operational capability and result in DOD being unable to meet critical …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Federal efforts to support entrepreneurs are fragmented--including among 52 programs at the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Small Business Administration (SBA). All overlap with at least one other program in terms of the type of assistance they are authorized to offer, such as financial (grants and loans) and technical (training and counseling), and the type of entrepreneur they are authorized to serve. Some entrepreneurs struggle to navigate the fragmented programs that provide technical assistance. For example, some entrepreneurs and technical assistance providers GAO spoke with said the system can be confusing and that some entrepreneurs do not know where to go for assistance. Collaboration could reduce some negative effects of overlap and fragmentation, but field staff GAO spoke with did not consistently collaborate to provide training and counseling services to entrepreneurs. The agencies have taken initial steps to improve how they collaborate by entering into formal agreements, but they have not pursued a number of other good collaborative practices GAO has previously identified. For example, USDA and SBA entered into a formal agreement in 2010 to coordinate their …