Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Our evaluation of the reports MSHA used to support its proposal and the key scientific studies on which the reports were based shows that they support the conclusion that lowering the PEL from 2.0 mg/m3 to 1.0 mg/m3 would reduce miners’ risk of disease. The reports and key studies concluded that miners’ cumulative exposure to coal mine dust at the current PEL over their working lives places them at an increased risk of developing CWP, progressive massive fibrosis, and decreased lung function, among other adverse health outcomes. To mitigate the limitations and biases in the data, the researchers took reasonable steps, such as using multiple x-ray specialists to reduce the risk of misclassifying disease and making adjustments to coal mine dust samples where bias was suspected. In addition to addressing the limitations and biases in the data, researchers used appropriate analytical methods to conclude that lowering the existing PEL would decrease miners’ risk of developing black lung disease. For example, in addition to taking steps to precisely estimate a miner’s cumulative exposure, the researchers accounted for several factors in their analyses—such as the age of the miners, the …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Minority- or female-owned, minority-owned, and female-owned firms represented 15 percent, 6 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of firms in the U.S. pipeline industry in 2007. In terms of market share, minority- or female-owned firms are estimated to have accounted for a total of 13 percent of industry receipts, with minority-owned firms having accounted for 3 percent and female-owned firms having accounted for 11 percent of receipts."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The cost effectiveness of the alternative training approach depends on several cost elements that are currently unknown, such as the up-front costs to develop the new controller training curriculum for CTI schools and the duration of the new orientation session at the Academy. However, some direct cost savings to FAA are possible and may be realized under the alternative training approach. These savings include avoiding the cost of pay (salary and per diem) for Academy trainees and not incurring the cost of providing Academy courses for each assigned air traffic control specialization. However, any cost savings could be offset by a number of additional costs that FAA could incur related to the alternative training approach; because some of these costs are unknown at this time, it is unclear whether the alternative approach would be more cost effective. These additional costs would depend primarily on how FAA implements the new training. Also unknown are recurring costs for any additional evaluations FAA would have to undertake to check the accreditation status of CTI schools and to assess graduates' proficiency in the initial specialization coursework. The cost of the mandate's proposed …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, VA’s SDVOSB program remains vulnerable to fraud and abuse. VA has made inconsistent statements about its progress in verifying firms listed in VetBiz using the new, more-thorough process the agency implemented in response to the 2010 Act. In one communication, VA stated that as of February 2011, all new verifications would use the 2010 Act process going forward. According to the most-recent information provided by VA, there are 6,079 SDVOSBs and veteran-owned small businesses (VOSB) listed in VetBiz. Of these, 3,724 were verified under the more-through process implemented under the 2010 Act, and 2,355—over 38 percent—were verified under the less-rigorous 2006 Act process. The presence of firms that have only been subjected to the less-stringent process that VA previously used represents a continuing vulnerability. In 2011, VA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report finding that VA’s document review process under the 2006 Act “ in many cases was insufficient to establish control and ownership [and] in effect allowed businesses to self-certify as a veteran-owned or service-disabled veteran-owned small business with little supporting documentation.”"

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) program remains vulnerable to fraud and abuse. VA has made inconsistent statements about its progress verifying firms listed in VetBiz using the more-thorough process the agency implemented in response to the Veterans Small Business Verification Act (2010 Act). In one communication, VA stated that as of February 2011, all new verifications would use the 2010 Act process going forward. However, as of April 1, 2012, 3,717 of the 6,178 SDVOSB firms (60 percent) listed as eligible in VetBiz had not been verified under the 2010 Act process. Of these 3,717 firms, 134 received $90 million in new VA SDVOSB set-aside or sole-source contract obligations from November 30, 2011, to April 1, 2012. While the 2010 Act did not include a deadline for verification using the more-thorough process, the presence of firms that have only been subjected to the less-stringent process that VA previously used represents a continuing vulnerability. VA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that the less-stringent process was in many cases insufficient to establish control and ownership and in effect allowed businesses to …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Sixty-five solar-related initiatives with a variety of key characteristics were supported by six federal agencies. Over half of these 65 initiatives supported solar projects exclusively; the remaining initiatives supported solar and other renewable energy technologies. The 65 initiatives exhibited a variety of key characteristics, including multiple technology advancement activities ranging from basic research to commercialization by providing funding to various types of recipients including universities, industry, and federal laboratories and researchers, primarily through grants and contracts. Agency officials reported that they obligated about $2.6 billion for the solar projects in these initiatives in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, an amount higher than in previous years, in part, because of additional funding from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The amount of spent fuel stored on-site at commercial nuclear reactors will continue to accumulate—increasing by about 2,000 metric tons per year and likely more than doubling to about 140,000 metric tons—before it can be moved off-site, because storage or disposal facilities may take decades to develop. In examining centralized storage or permanent disposal options, GAO found that new facilities may take from 15 to 40 years before they are ready to begin accepting spent fuel. Once an off-site facility is available, it will take several more decades to ship spent fuel to that facility. This situation will be challenging because by about 2040 most currently operating reactors will have ceased operations, and options for managing spent fuel, if needed to meet transportation, storage, or disposal requirements, may be limited."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, as of August 2012, USDA had fully addressed three of our recommendations, made significant progress toward addressing two, and made some progress toward addressing one."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Through its policy and guidance, VHA has outlined processes that enable VAMCs to respond to reported adverse events that occur. VHA generally grants individual VAMCs discretion on choosing which process to use. Specifically, VAMCs conduct an initial review to determine how best to respond to an adverse event. According to VHA officials, if the circumstances that led to an adverse event are clear, based on a VAMC's initial review, VAMCs can take immediate corrective action. If the circumstances that led to an adverse event need to be examined further, VAMCs are given discretion to use one or more of the following four processes: (1) root cause analysis, (2) peer review, (3) clinical care review, and (4) administrative investigation board. Because VAMCs generally have discretion in which of these processes they use, different VAMCs that experience similar adverse events may not use the same processes to respond to them. Nonetheless, each process has certain purposes and limitations. For example, some of these processes may be used to examine a clinician's actions as they relate to an adverse event, while others may be used to examine whether a systems or …