A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DODIG has taken multiple steps, in collaboration with the service IGs in some instances, to improve DOD’s ability to process military whistleblower reprisal cases in a timely manner. Timeliness is important to ensure the reliability of evidence and appropriate resolution of reprisal allegations. However, DODIG has generally not met statutory requirements to report on investigations within 180 days, or to provide alternative notification. DODIG has undertaken efforts to improve timeliness by, for example, eliminating a time-consuming phase of its investigative process. However, DOD’s efforts are hampered by unreliable and incomplete data. For instance, GAO found that DODIG has not consistently or accurately recorded key dates to track how long investigations take to complete. Without key timeliness data, DODIG may have difficulty in identifying process areas requiring improvement and evaluating the impact of reforms. Further, the absence of this information limits congressional decision makers’ ability to provide oversight of DOD’s whistleblower reprisal investigative program."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As the responsible DOD agency for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was directed to develop DOD’s counter-IED strategic plan in February 2006 under DOD Directive 2000.19E. As previously recommended by GAO, JIEDDO has made several attempts to develop such a plan, but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading strategic-management practices or have since been discontinued. For example, JIEDDO’s 2007 strategic plan did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomes—a leading strategic-management practice. In addition, JIEDDO’s 2009–2010 strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO discontinued using these measures because it later determined that the measures were not relevant to the organization’s goals. Although DOD tasked JIEDDO to develop its counter-IED strategic plan, DOD has not translated DOD’s counter-IED general mission objective of eliminating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence into actionable goals and objectives. JIEDDO issued a new counter-IED strategic plan in January 2012; however, the new plan does not apply to all other counter-IED efforts departmentwide, only to those managed by JIEDDO. Consequently, JIEDDO’s new strategic plan alone …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The SNS contains supportive care items for thermal burns, such as bandages, pain medications, intravenous fluids, and topical antimicrobial cream needed for the immediate treatment of burn injuries to reduce the risk of infection and stabilize injured individuals. HHS officials told us that the goal of the SNS is to supplement state and local supplies used for immediate care in the initial response—identified as within 72 hours of sustaining injury. CDC compiled supplies needed for the immediate treatment of burn injuries into kits in 2002 and 2003, based on information provided at that time by burn experts about needed items. Because most medical countermeasures for thermal burns can be found in local hospitals, countermeasures in the SNS would be used to supplement local supplies and inventories, with kits deployed within 24 to 48 hours of notification. The SNS does not contain other countermeasures that may be available for both the immediate care and the longer-term treatment of burn injuries. However, HHS is currently considering whether to acquire some additional countermeasures, including those for longer-term treatment of burn injuries."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""