Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Almost all ANS hardware and most software development were completed prior to its cancellation, according to the Army and GDRS. The software for the most advanced capabilities was not completed, which potentially presented the greatest complexities. GDRS had demonstrated many of ANS’s capabilities to some extent, including its capability to avoid obstacles and follow a leading vehicle through varying terrain. ANS had not yet progressed to the independent testing phase, however. In cancelling ANS and MM-UGV, the Army estimated that approximately $2.5 billion in planned funding for fiscal years 2013 to 2017 could be made available for other Army efforts. According to Army officials, the government owns the work completed on ANS to date."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The nation faces an evolving array of cyber-based threats arising from a variety of sources. These threats can be intentional or unintentional. Unintentional threats can be caused by software upgrades or defective equipment that inadvertently disrupt systems, and intentional threats can be both targeted and untargeted attacks from a variety of threat sources. Sources of threats include criminal groups, hackers, terrorists, organization insiders, and foreign nations engaged in crime, political activism, or espionage and information warfare. These threat sources vary in terms of the capabilities of the actors, their willingness to act, and their motives, which can include monetary gain or political advantage, among others. Moreover, potential threat actors have a variety of attack techniques at their disposal, which can adversely affect computers, software, a network, an organization’s operation, an industry, or the Internet itself. The nature of cyber attacks can vastly enhance their reach and impact due to the fact that attackers do not need to be physically close to their victims and can more easily remain anonymous, among other things. The magnitude of the threat is compounded by the ever-increasing sophistication of cyber attack techniques, such …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "We found that, compared to the initial test audits and the more recent collaborative audits, the majority of the MIG audits conducted under NMAP were less effective because they used Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) data. MSIS is an extract of states’ claims data and is missing key elements, such as provider names, that are necessary for identifying audit targets. Since fiscal year 2008, a small fraction (4 percent) of the 1,550 MSIS audits identified $7.4 million in potential overpayments, over two-thirds did not identify overpayments, and the remaining audits (27 percent) were ongoing. In contrast, 26 test audits and 6 collaborative audits—which used states’ more robust Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) claims data and allowed states to select the audit targets—together identified more than $12 million in potential overpayments. Furthermore, the typical amount of the potential overpayment for MSIS audits ($16,000) was smaller than the amounts identified through test and collaborative audits—$140,000 and $600,000—respectively."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) provided some useful information concerning air mobility systems—such as intratheater airlift, strategic airlift, and air refueling—but several weaknesses in the study raised questions about its ability to fully inform decision makers. In particular, the MCRS-16 did not provide decision makers with recommendations concerning shortfalls and excesses in air mobility systems. In evaluating capabilities, the MCRS-16 used three cases that it developed of potential conflicts or natural disasters and identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. Based on data in the MCRS-16, GAO was able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or an operational reserve, even though the MCRS-16 was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities exist. It also did not identify the risk associated with potential shortfalls or excesses. Identifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, there were nearly 70 different types of leasable minerals extracted from federal lands and waters in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, but their volume cannot be aggregated because they use different units of measure. For example, the volumes of the four most valuable of these minerals--oil, gas, natural gas liquids, and coal--are measured in barrels, million cubic feet (mcf), gallons, and tons, respectively. According to ONRR data, the total value of all leasable minerals extracted from federal and Indian land and sold in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 was $92.3 billion and $98.6 billion, respectively."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, we found that 68 of the 71 programs that responded to our survey reported that they experienced funding instability, faced workforce shortfalls, or that their planned capabilities changed after initiation. Most respondentsreported a combination of these challenges. We have previously reported that these challenges increase the likelihood acquisition programs will cost more and take longer to deliver capabilities than expected. Although DHS largely does not have reliable cost estimates and realistic schedules to accurately measure program performance, we used our survey results, cost information DHS provided to Congress, and an internal DHS review to identify 42 programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both. Further, using DHS's future-years funding plans - which aggregate funding levels to produce total project costs - we gained insight into the magnitude of the cost growth for 16 of the 42 programs. The total project costs for these 16 programs increased from $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011, an aggregate increase of 166 percent."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has experienced systemic challenges that have hindered its ability to manage and oversee contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan. Key challenges include gaps in planning for the use of contractors and assistance recipients and having visibility into their numbers. For example, GAO reported in April 2010 that, absent strategic planning for its use of contractors, individual offices within USAID often made case-by-case decisions on using contractors to support contract or grant administration and risks, such as possible conflicts of interest, were not always addressed. While having reliable data on contractors and assistance recipients is a starting point for informing agency decisions and ensuring proper management, GAO has also reported on limitations in USAID’s visibility into the number and value of contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan, as well as the number of personnel working under them. USAID, along with other agencies, has not implemented GAO’s recommendation to address such limitations. USAID, however, has taken other actions to mitigate risks associated with awarding contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan. In June 2011, GAO reported on USAID’s vendor vetting program, then in its …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, we reported that ICE does not have a process to identify and assess risks posed by schools in SEVP. Specifically, SEVP (1) does not evaluate program data on prior and suspected instances of school fraud and noncompliance, and (2) does not obtain and assess information from CTCEU and ICE field office school investigations and outreach events. Moreover, weaknesses in ICE’s monitoring and oversight of SEVP-certified schools contribute to security and fraud vulnerabilities. For example, ICE has not consistently implemented internal control procedures for SEVP in the initial verification of evidence submitted in lieu of accreditation. In addition, ICE has not consistently followed the standard operating procedures that govern the communication and coordination process among SEVP, CTCEU, and ICE field offices. We recommended that ICE, among other things, identify and assess risks posed by schools in SEVP. Specifically, SEVP (1) does not evaluate program data on prior and suspected instances of school fraud and noncompliance, and (2) does not obtain and assess information from CTCEU and ICE field office school investigations and outreach events. Moreover, weaknesses in ICE’s monitoring and oversight of SEVP-certified schools contribute to security …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The November 2011 memorandum that discussed the management of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program was prepared based primarily on the observations of the former Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), a division of the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). The memorandum was intended to highlight various challenges that have hindered ISCD efforts to implement the CFATS program. According to the former Director, the challenges facing ISCD included not having a fully developed direction and plan for implementing the program, hiring staff without establishing need, and inconsistent ISCD leadership—factors that the Director believed place the CFATS program at risk. These challenges centered on three main areas: (1) human capital issues, including problems hiring, training, and managing ISCD staff; (2) mission issues, including problems reviewing facility plans to mitigate security vulnerabilities; and (3) administrative issues, including concerns about NPPD and IP not supporting ISCD’s management and administrative functions."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "For the Medicaid program, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the states have taken some actions related to GAO’s four key strategies but more needs to be done."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency that administers Medicare—has made progress in implementing several key strategies GAO identified in prior work as helpful in protecting Medicare from fraud; however, some actions that could help combat fraud remain incomplete."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Data GAO obtained from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises) and five of the largest mortgage lenders indicate that appraisals—which provide an estimate of market value at a point in time—are the most commonly used valuation method for first-lien residential mortgage originations. Other methods, such as broker price opinions and automated valuation models, are quicker and less costly but are viewed as less reliable. As a result, they generally are not used for most purchase and refinance mortgage originations. Although the enterprises and lenders GAO spoke with did not capture data on the prevalence of approaches used to perform appraisals, the sales comparison approach—in which the value is based on recent sales of similar properties—is required by the enterprises and the Federal Housing Administration. This approach is reportedly used in nearly all appraisals."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "TSA and aircraft operators have taken several important actions to enhance general aviation security, and TSA is working with aviation industry stakeholders to develop new security guidelines and regulations. Among other measures, TSA worked with members of the General Aviation Working Group of its Aviation Security Advisory Committee in 2003 and 2004 to develop recommended guidelines for general aviation airport security, and TSA expects the group to issue updated guidelines later this year. In addition, pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA established and oversees implementation of a security program in which aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds in scheduled or charter service that carry passengers or cargo or both, and that do not fall under another security program, must implement a “Twelve-Five” standard security program. Aircraft operators implementing a Twelve-Five security program must include, among other elements, procedures regarding bomb or air piracy threats. TSA obtains information directly from aircraft operators that fall under Twelve-Five through its review and approval of the security programs developed by these operators and through periodic inspections to determine the extent to which operators comply with their security programs. TSA …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, based on our work to date, we have found that"

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "State has an extensive process designed to make the country reports on human rights as comprehensive, objective, and uniform as possible. This process includes annually issuing detailed instructions, consulting and assessing information from multiple sources, and collaboratively and iteratively drafting and reviewing the reports. State issues instructions for preparing the country reports each year, outlining a consistent structure and describing, for example, the topics that should be included in each subsection. The instructions also, among other things, indicate that the country reports should build on the previous year’s reports and specify guidelines for new and updated content. In addition, the instructions state that staff preparing the country reports are to use and assess multiple sources, including host governments, local and international human NGOs, labor unions, and host country media as well as classified information. State officials told us that they also obtain information from business leaders and industry groups, although there is no legal requirement to do so. In general, according to State officials, Foreign Service officers—often on their first or second tour of duty—prepare first drafts of the country reports with the assistance of other embassy personnel, …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken actions to validate the science underlying its behavior-based passenger screening program, the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT, program, but more work remains. GAO reported in May 2010 that (1) TSA deployed SPOT before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators to reliably identify passengers who may pose a risk; and (2) it is unknown if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist related activity, although there is other evidence that terrorists have transited through SPOT airports. GAO recommended in May 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the ongoing validation study on the SPOT program to determine whether it is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the program. DHS concurred and subsequently revised its validation study to include an independent expert review. DHS's study, completed in April 2011, found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees; however, DHS noted limitations …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "A federal dig once policy would likely have several advantages, including potentially decreasing the frequency of construction on major highways and the cost of installation, while accelerating access to and reliability of broadband networks. However, disadvantages—which could be exacerbated by a requirement to install conduit as part of certain federally funded highway construction—include the potential to install conduit that telecommunications companies might not use and to divert highway funding away from highway construction. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and state DOT officials we spoke with supported the concept of a dig once policy, but suggested alternative approaches to a federal requirement to install conduit in all covered projects. For example, FCC officials expressed support for a federal requirement for evaluation of the feasibility and need for conduit during federal highway construction, and state and U.S. DOT officials expressed support for a federal role in facilitating discussion and best practice sharing among states implementing broadband deployment policies."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DISH is cooperating with the Special Master’s examination, which consists of examining DISH’s compliance with the royalty payment and household eligibility requirements of the license under Section 119. Since beginning his examination, the Special Master has been holding regular meetings with representatives of DISH and NAB, which represents the four major networks and their affiliates. The Special Master requested, and DISH provided, information on DISH’s royalty calculations and payments to the Copyright Office. The Special Master told us that he is satisfied with the information provided by DISH to date and is currently in the process of reviewing the methodology DISH used for its royalty payments. To determine whether any problems exist with DISH’s services to eligible subscribers, and whether a more detailed examination of DISH’s records may be needed, DISH and NAB are collaborating on a survey of all major network-affiliated television broadcast stations nationwide. According to the parties, the survey is to be distributed twice: once in February 2012 and again in May 2012, to ensure that affiliated stations are not having issues with DISH’s services. The Special Master has been kept apprised of the development …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "NASA plans to use international partner and new domestic commercial launch vehicles to access, utilize, and sustain the International Space Station from 2012 through 2020. However, the agency faces challenges in transporting cargo and crew to the ISS as well as ensuring the station is fully utilized. NASA’s decision to rely on the new commercial vehicles to transport cargo starting in 2012 and to transport crew starting in 2017 is inherently risky because the vehicles are not yet proven and are experiencing delays in development. Further, NASA does not have agreements in place for international partners to provide cargo services to the ISS beyond 2016. The agency will also face a decision regarding the need to purchase additional seats on the Russian Soyuz vehicle beyond 2016, likely before commercial vehicles have made significant progress in development, given the three-year lead time necessary for acquiring a seat. This decision is further complicated because restrictions prohibit NASA from making certain payments to Russia in connection with the ISS unless the President makes a determination. Further, NASA currently expects to transport all cargo needed by the ISS in 51 flights through …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "NNSA has successfully ensured that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable in the absence of underground nuclear testing, accomplishing this complicated task by using state-of-the-art facilities as well as the skills of top scientists. Nevertheless, NNSA does not have reliable enterprise-wide management information on program budgets and costs, which potentially increases risk to NNSA’s programs. For example, in June 2010, GAO reported that NNSA could not identify the total costs to operate and maintain essential weapons activities facilities and infrastructure. In addition, in February 2011, GAO reported that NNSA lacks complete data on, among other things, the condition and value of its existing infrastructure, cost estimates and completion dates for planned capital improvement projects, and critical human capital skills in its contractor workforce that are needed for its programs. As a result, NNSA does not have a sound basis for making decisions on how to most effectively manage its portfolio of projects and other programs and lacks information that could help justify future budget requests or target cost savings opportunities. NNSA recognizes that its ability to make informed decisions is hampered and is taking steps to …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In a series of reviews, GAO found that OPM’s retirement modernization efforts were hindered by weaknesses in key management practices that are essential to successful IT modernization projects. For example, in 2005, GAO made recommendations to address weaknesses in the following areas:"

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As part of its efforts to identify high-risk cargo for inspection, CBP uses various sources of information to screen containers in advance of their arrival in the United States. For example, in 2009, CBP implemented the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements to collect additional information for targeting. The additional cargo information required, such as country of origin, is to be provided to CBP in advance of arrival of the cargo containers at U.S. ports. In September 2010, GAO recommended that CBP establish milestones and time frames for updating its targeting criteria to include additional information. In response, CBP updated its targeting criteria in January 2011."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The distribution of grant funding per person in poverty in cities was not consistently aligned with overall poverty rates. Most cities, with the exception of those cities with the highest poverty rates, received roughly the same amount of economic development funding per person living in poverty. Further, when we examined how grant funds are distributed to cities based on their unemployment rates, we also found that some cities with higher unemployment rates received less funding per unemployed person than other cities with lower unemployment rates. However, we did find that a small number of cities (17 out of a total of 465 cities) with the highest unemployment rates received funding that was roughly 40 percent higher than the average for unemployed populations in all cities."