This report describes Iran's influence over the post-Saddam government in Iraq. A key concern is that Iran is extending support for related militias in Iraq that are now responsible for much of the sectarian violence in Iraq.

This report discusses reestablishing normal diplomatic ties with Iraq and setting up the new embassy facilities and regional teams.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. According to its November 30, 2005, "Strategy for Victory," the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without clear signs of security progress -- have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing U.S. goals.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

The following casualty data was compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency's press release. Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003. A detailed casualty summary that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website: [http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm].

This report is on Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.

Elections in 2005 for a transition government (January 30, 2005), a permanent constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) government (December 15) were concluded despite insurgent violence, progressively attracting Sunni participation. On May 20, a unity government was formed as U.S. officials had been urging, but the government has been unable to reduce sectarian violence, and there are growing signs of fragmentation within it.

This report discusses Iraqi government in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Elections in 2005 for a transitional National Assembly and government (January 30, 2005), a permanent constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) Council of Representatives and government (December 15) were concluded despite insurgent violence and attracted progressively increasing Sunni participation. However, escalating sectarian violence and factional infighting have delayed formation of a new government.

Iran's influence over the post-Saddam government in Iraq is substantial because the predominant parties in that government have long enjoyed Tehran's sponsorship. An emerging concern is that Iran's influence has extended to support for militant groups in Iraq. U.S. officials say that sophisticated explosive devices are entering Iraq from Iran, suggesting that Iran, or factions within Iran, are backing Iraqi factions that use violence to oppose the U.S. presence in Iraq.

Since October 2001, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs, or roadside bombs) have been responsible for many of the more than 2,000 combat deaths in Iraq, and 178 combat deaths in Afghanistan. IEDs are hidden behind signs and guardrails, under roadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with these bombs are becoming more numerous and deadly in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective, and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or whenever on patrol. IEDs are increasingly being used in Afghanistan, and DOD reportedly is concerned that they might eventually be more widely used by other insurgents and terrorists worldwide.

Responsibility for overseeing reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq initially fell to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Established in early 2003, ORHA had been replaced by June of that year by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). On June 28, 2004, CPA ceased operations. Whether CPA was a federal agency is unclear. Some executive branch documents supported the notion that it was created by the President. Another possibility is that the authority was created by, or pursuant to, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. This report discusses the issue of CPA's status as an agency, including the uncertain circumstances regarding its creation and demise, as well as relevant legislation and subsequent lawsuits.

This report examines a number of issues being considered by Congress as the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act evolves. In each case, a brief synopsis is provided that includes background information, a comparison of the House and Senate provisions, if any, and a brief discussion of the issue. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided.

This report provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003.

This report presents casualty data compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security. This report discusses security challenges, responses, and policy options.

Following years of authoritarian rule and economic sanctions, the United States and the international community agreed in the spring of 2003 that efforts should be made to rehabilitate economic infrastructure and introduce representative government to post-war Iraq, among other objectives. More recently, the Bush Administration has asserted a “victory” strategy composed of eight objectives, five of which are to: transition Iraq to security self-reliance, help Iraqis form a national compact for democratic government, help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services, help Iraq strengthen its economy, and help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights. To meet these ends, a large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq. This report describes recent developments in this assistance effort.

Following years of authoritarian rule and economic sanctions, the United States and the international community agreed in the spring of 2003 that efforts should be made to rehabilitate economic infrastructure and introduce representative government to post-war Iraq, among other objectives. More recently, the Bush Administration has asserted a “victory” strategy composed of eight objectives, five of which are to: transition Iraq to security self-reliance, help Iraqis form a national compact for democratic government, help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services, help Iraq strengthen its economy, and help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights. To meet these ends, a large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq. This report describes recent developments in this assistance effort.

This report presents casualty data compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases.

This report provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1,2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by burgeoning sectarian violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by burgeoning Sunni-Shiite violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security. This report discusses security challenges, responses, and policy options.

This report presents casualty data compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases.

This report presents casualty data compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases.