Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses (1) the relationship between Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits of taxpayers and other programs IRS uses to ensure that taxpayers' returns are accurate and (2) how IRS is managing the increased workload in two of its programs--offers-in-compromise and innocent spouse claims. IRS audited more than 600,000 taxpayers in fiscal year 2000, either face-to-face or through the mail. IRS has several programs that use computerized screening procedures to review all tax returns to detect certain types of errors. These programs result in millions of contacts with taxpayers to inform them of adjustments IRS made to their liabilities, seek explanations for errors IRS believes were made, or ask taxpayers to check whether they erred on their returns. The programs vary in their similarity to audits; some of the programs are most similar to audits that IRS conducts through the mail. The programs that IRS uses to detect errors on tax returns rely completely on information that taxpayers report on the tax returns and that IRS receives from third parties. Therefore, audits remain an important tax enforcement tool. Several factors suggest that IRS may be gaining better management …

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses GAO's analysis of security audits at federal agencies. The widespread interconnectivity of computers poses significant risks to federal computer systems and the operations and the infrastructures they support. GAO's evaluations show that federal computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that continue to put critical operations and assets at risk. GAO found weaknesses in following six areas: (1) security program management, (2) access controls, (3) software development and change controls, (4) segregation of duties, (5) operating systems controls, and (6) service continuity. Weaknesses in these areas place a broad range of critical operations and assets at risk for fraud, misuse, and disruption. Federal agencies have tried to address these problems, and many have good remedial efforts underway. However, these efforts will not be fully effective and lasting unless they are supported by a strong agencywide security management framework. Establishing such a management framework requires that agencies take a comprehensive approach that involves both (1) senior agency program managers who understand which aspects of their missions are the most critical and sensitive and (2) technical experts who know the agencies' systems and can suggest appropriate technical security …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "To determine the number and type of munitions needed, the military annually evaluates its munition requirements using a multiphase analytical process. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working to ensure that the requirements determination process yields accurate numbers and the types of munitions needed to defeat threats specified in the Defense Planning Guidance. Although DOD has made progress and has identified specific areas still requiring attention, there is no clear plan with time frames for resolving key issues. Some of these issues have only been partially completed and others are in the early stages of evolution. Specifically, target templates have not been completed and munitions effectiveness data has not been updated, nor have decisions been made on more detailed warfighting scenarios and the ranking of scenarios. Consequently, the reliability of the services' munitions requirements remain uncertain and could affect munitions planning, programming, budgeting, and industrial production base decisions. Until these issues are resolved and a revised Capabilities-Based Management Requirements instruction is issued, the accuracy of the munitions requirements will remain uncertain."