This document identifies critical characteristics of components to be dedicated for use in Safety Significant (SS) Systems, Structures, or Components (SSCs). This document identifies the requirements for the components of the common, radiation area, monitor alarm in the WESF pool cell. These are procured as Commercial Grade Items (CGI), with the qualification testing and formal dedication to be performed at the Waste Encapsulation Storage Facility (WESF) for use in safety significant systems. System modifications are to be performed in accordance with the approved design. Components for this change are commercially available and interchangeable with the existing alarm configuration This document focuses on the operational requirements for alarm, declaration of the safety classification, identification of critical characteristics, and interpretation of requirements for procurement. Critical characteristics are identified herein and must be verified, followed by formal dedication, prior to the components being used in safety related applications.

The purpose of this report was to document the process leading to, and the results of, development of radionuclide-, exposure scenario-, and ash thickness-specific Biosphere Dose Conversion Factors (BDCFs) for the postulated postclosure extrusive igneous event (volcanic eruption) at Yucca Mountain. BDCF calculations were done for seventeen radionuclides. The selection of radionuclides included those that may be significant dose contributors during the compliance period of up to 10,000 years, as well as radionuclides of importance for up to 1 million years postclosure. The approach documented in this report takes into account human exposure during three different phases at the time of, and after, volcanic eruption. Calculations of disruptive event BDCFs used the GENII-S computer code in a series of probabilistic realizations to propagate the uncertainties of input parameters into the output. The pathway analysis included consideration of different exposure pathway's contribution to the BDCFs. BDCFs for volcanic eruption, when combined with the concentration of radioactivity deposited by eruption on the soil surface, allow calculation of potential radiation doses to the receptor of interest. Calculation of radioactivity deposition is outside the scope of this report and so is the transport of contaminated ash from the volcano to the location of the …

This is an informal report on preliminary efforts to investigate earthquake focal mechanisms and earth structure in the Anatolian (Turkish) Plateau. Seismic velocity structure of the crust and upper mantle and earthquake focal parameters for event in the Anatolian Plateau are estimated from complete regional waveforms. Focal mechanisms, depths and seismic moments of moderately large crustal events are inferred from long-period (40-100 seconds) waveforms and compared with focal parameters derived from global teleseismic data. Using shorter periods (10-100 seconds) we estimate the shear and compressional velocity structure of the crust and uppermost mantle. Results are broadly consistent with previous studies and imply relatively little crustal thickening beneath the central Anatolian Plateau. Crustal thickness is about 35 km in western Anatolia and greater than 40 km in eastern Anatolia, however the long regional paths require considerable averaging and limit resolution. Crustal velocities are lower than typical continental averages, and even lower than typical active orogens. The mantle P-wave velocity was fixed to 7.9 km/s, in accord with tomographic models. A high sub-Moho Poisson's Ratio of 0.29 was required to fit the Sn-Pn differential times. This is suggestive of high sub-Moho temperatures, high shear wave attenuation and possibly partial melt. The combination …

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The Hazard Analysis Database was developed in conjunction with the hazard analysis activities conducted in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U S . Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, for HNF-SD-WM-SAR-067, Tank Farms Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The FSAR is part of the approved Authorization Basis (AB) for the River Protection Project (RPP). This document describes, identifies, and defines the contents and structure of the Tank Farms FSAR Hazard Analysis Database and documents the configuration control changes made to the database. The Hazard Analysis Database contains the collection of information generated during the initial hazard evaluations and the subsequent hazard and accident analysis activities. The Hazard Analysis Database supports the preparation of Chapters 3 ,4 , and 5 of the Tank Farms FSAR and the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process and consists of two major, interrelated data sets: (1) Hazard Analysis Database: Data from the results of the hazard evaluations, and (2) Hazard Topography Database: Data from the system familiarization and hazard identification.

This report provides Hazardous materials transportation safety - federal program and legislative issues.

This report discusses contribution of technological advancement to economic growth and productivity increases. Because technology can contribute to economic growth and productivity increases, congressional interest has focused on how to augment private-sector technological development.

The website (www.ccasia.teri.res.in) provides a consolidated Internet based information source and platform for discussions on climate change issues in Asia. The effort has been successful in reaching the target audience and in stimulating awareness about the crucial debate on GHG (greenhouse gas) reduction strategies in Asia.

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The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

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Prior to 1978, Dolly Varden Salvelinus malma were classified into an anadromous and interior form. Cavender (1978) classified the interior form as a distinct species, Salvelinus confluentus, the bull trout. Bull trout are large char weighing up to 18 kg and growing to over one meter in length (Goetz 1989). They are distinguished by a broad flat head, large downward curving maxillaries that extend beyond the eye, a well developed fleshy knob and a notch in the lower terminus of the snout, and light colored spots normally smaller than the pupil of the eye (Cavender 1978). Bull trout are found throughout northwestern North America from lat. 41{sup o}N to lat. 60{sup o}N. In Oregon, bull trout were once distributed throughout 12 basins in the Klamath and Columbia River systems including the Clackamas, Santiam, McKenzie and Middle Fork Willamette sub-basins west of the Cascades (Buchanan et al. 1997). However, it is believed bull trout have been extirpated from west of the Cascades with the exception of the McKenzie sub-basin. Before 1963, bull trout in the McKenzie sub-basin were a contiguous population from the mouth to Tamolitch Falls. Following the construction of Cougar and Trail Bridge Reservoirs there are three isolated populations: …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) spends millions of dollars each year to acquire information technology (IT) services through the General Services Administration's (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). However, DOD has not been taking steps critical to ensuring that it gets the best services at the best prices. GAO's review of 22 DOD orders revealed that 17 of them were placed without seeking competitive quotes. GSA's established procedures require that agencies seek competitive quotes to ensure that the government gets the best price for IT services. Many DOD contracting officers were unaware of this requirement and placed orders under FSS contracts without seeking quotes from multiple contractors. The Federal Acquisition Regulation covering FSS contracts does not provide clear guidance to contracting officers on these special ordering procedures."

In 1998 Battelle was selected by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) under a Novel Concepts project grant to continue Phase II research on the feasibility of carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) sequestration in deep saline formations. The focus of this investigation is to conduct detailed laboratory experiments to examine factors that may affect chemical sequestration of CO{sub 2} in deep saline formations. Reactions between sandstone and other geologic media from potential host reservoirs, brine solutions, and CO{sub 2} are being investigated under high-pressure conditions. Some experiments also include sulfur dioxide (SO{sub 2}) gases to evaluate the potential for co-injection of CO{sub 2} and SO{sub 2} related gases in the deep formations. In addition, an assessment of engineering and economic aspects is being conducted. This current Technical Progress Report describes the status of the project as of September 2000. The major activities undertaken during the quarter included several experiments conducted to investigate the effects of pressure, temperature, time, and brine composition on rock samples from potential host reservoirs. Samples (both powder and slab) were taken from the Mt. Simon Sandstone, a potential CO{sub 2} host formation in the Ohio, the Eau Claire Shale, and Rome Dolomite …

The 216-B-3 Pond was a series of ponds for disposal of liquid effluent from past Hanford production facilities. In 1990, groundwater monitoring at B Pond was elevated from "detection" to assessment status because total organic halides and total organic carbon were found to exceed critical means in two wells. Groundwater quality assessment, which ended in 1996, failed to find any specific hazardous waste contaminant that could have accounted for the isolated occurrences of elevated total organic halides and total organic carbon. Hence, the facility was subsequently returned to detection-level monitoring in 1998. Exhaustive groundwater analyses during the assessment period indicated that only two contaminants, tritium and nitrate, could be positively attributed to the B Pond System, with two others (arsenic and I-129) possibly originating from B Pond. Chemical and radiological analyses of soil at the main pond and 216-B-3-3 ditch has not revealed significant contamination. Based on the observed, minor contamination in groundwater and in the soil column, three parameters were selected for site-specific, semiannual monitoring; gross alpha, gross beta, and specific conductance. Total organic halides and total organic carbon are included as constituents because of regulatory requirements. Nitrate, tritium, arsenic, and iodine-129 will be monitored under the aegis of …

This is a report on the Military man power policy and a screening for HIV-1 AIDS that was performed on all officials 1985.

In Situ Gaseous Reduction is a technology currently being developed by DOE for the remediation of soil waste sites contaminated with hexavalent chromium. This document presents the results of recent characterization activities undertaken at several of the soil waste sites at Hanford that contain siginficant levels of hexavalent chromium contamination. The objective of this study is to select a site for initial deployment of the technology at the Hanford Site.

In Situ Gaseous Reduction is a technology currently being developed by DOE for the remediation of soil waste sites contaminated with hexavalent chromium. This document presents the results of recent characterization activities undertaken at several of the soil waste sites at Hanford that contain significant levels of hexavalent chromium contamination. The objective of this study is to select a site for initial deployment of the technology at the Hanford Site.

During a review of the H-Canyon authorization basis, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) staff members questioned the margin of safety associated with a postulated tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP)/nitric acid runaway reaction due to the inadvertent heating of a canyon tank containing greater than 3000 lbs (1362 kg) of TBP. The margin of safety was partially based on experiments and calculations performed by the Actinide Technology Section (ATS) to support deletion of indication of tank agitation as a Safety Class System. In the technical basis for deletion of this system, ATS personnel conservatively calculated the equilibrium temperature distribution of a canyon tank containing TBP and nitric acid layers which were inadvertently heated by a steam jet left on following a transfer. The maximum calculated temperature (128 degrees C) was compared to the minimum initiation temperature for a runaway reaction (greater than 130 degrees C) documented by experimental work in the mid 195 0s. In this work, the initiation temperature as a function of nitric acid concentration was measured for 0 and 20 wt percent dissolved solids. The DNFSB staff members were concerned that data for 0 wt percent dissolved solids were not conservative given the facts that data for 20 wt …

This document provides the procedures and guidelines necessary for computer software configuration management activities during the operation and maintenance phases of the Saltwell Leak Detector Stations as required by HNF-PRO-309, Rev. 1, Computer Software Quality Assurance, Section 2.4, Software Configuration Management. The software configuration management plan (SCMP) integrates technical and administrative controls to establish and maintain technical consistency among requirements, physical configuration, and documentation for the Saltwell Leak Detector Station Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) software during the Hanford application, operations and maintenance. This SCMP establishes the Saltwell Leak Detector Station PLC Software Baseline, status changes to that baseline, and ensures that software meets design and operational requirements and is tested in accordance with their design basis.

This document provides configuration management for the Distributed Control System (DCS), the Gaseous Effluent Monitoring System (GEMS-100) System, the Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), the Canister Receiving Crane (CRC) CRN-001 PLC, and both North and South vestibule door interlock system PLCs at the Canister Storage Building (CSB). This procedure identifies and defines software configuration items in the CSB control and monitoring systems, and defines configuration control throughout the system life cycle. Components of this control include: configuration status accounting; physical protection and control; and verification of the completeness and correctness of these items.

The Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) is located in the 200 East Area adjacent to B Plant on the Hanford Site north of Richland, Washington. The current WESF mission is to receive and store the cesium and strontium capsules that were manufactured at WESF in a safe manner and in compliance with all applicable rules and regulations. The scope of WESF operations is currently limited to receipt, inspection, decontamination, storage, and surveillance of capsules in addition to facility maintenance activities. The capsules are expected to be stored at WESF until the year 2017, at which time they will have been transferred for ultimate disposition. The WESF facility was designed and constructed to process, encapsulate, and store the extracted long-lived radionuclides, {sup 90}Sr and {sup 137}Cs, from wastes generated during the chemical processing of defense fuel on the Hanford Site thus ensuring isolation of hazardous radioisotopes from the environment. The construction of WESF started in 1971 and was completed in 1973. Some of the {sup 137}Cs capsules were leased by private irradiators or transferred to other programs. All leased capsules have been returned to WESF. Capsules transferred to other programs will not be returned except for the seven powder and …

This report documents the hazards assessment for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) located on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site. This hazards assessment was conducted to provide the emergency planning technical basis for WESF. DOE Orders require an emergency planning hazards assessment for each facility that has the potential to reach or exceed the lowest level emergency classification.