This study examines the social and economic characteristics of the men who joined the Confederate Fourteenth Texas Infantry Regiment during the Civil War and provides a narrative history of the regiment's wartime service. The men of the Fourteenth Infantry enlisted in 1862 and helped to turn back the Federal Red River Campaign in April 1864. In creating a portrait of these men, the author used traditional historical sources (letters, diaries, medical records, secondary narratives) as well as statistical data from the 1860 United States census, military service records, and state tax rolls. The thesis places the heretofore unknown story of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry within the overall body of Civil War historiography.

This thesis examines British Foreign Office views of Russia and Anglo-Russian relations prior to the 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente. British diplomatic documents, memoirs, and papers in the Public Record Office reveal diplomatic concern with ending Central Asian tensions. This study examines Anglo-Russian relations from the pre-Lansdowne era, including agreements with Japan (1902) and France (1904), the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, and the shift in Liberal thinking up to the Anglo-Russian Entente. The main reason British diplomats negotiated the Entente was less to end Central Asian friction, this thesis concludes, than the need to check Germany, which some Foreign Office members believed, was bent upon European hegemony.

Many historians have acknowledged the temptation to portray people as they see themselves and wish to be seen, blending history and ideology. The result is "mythistory." Twentieth century Texas writers and historians, remarking upon the exceptional durability of the Texas mythistory that emerged from the nineteenth century, have questioned its resistance to revision throughout the twentieth century. By placing the writing of Texas history within the context of American and European intellectual climates and history writing generally, from the close of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, it is possible to identify a pattern that provides some insight into the popularity and persistence of Texas mythistory.

In late 1861, the Confederate Texas government commissioned Joseph W. Speight to raise an infantry battalion. Speight's Battalion became the Fifteenth Texas Infantry in April 1862, and saw almost no action for the next year as it marched throughout Texas, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory. In May 1863 the regiment was ordered to Louisiana and for the next seven months took an active role against Federal troops in the bayou country. From March to May 1864 the unit helped turn away the Union Red River Campaign. The regiment remained in the trans-Mississippi region until it disbanded in May 1865. The final chapter quantifies age, family status, wealthholdings, and casualties among the regiment's members.

The effect of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the southern planter elite remains a topic of interest to historians. Did the war ruin the planter class? Or, did they maintain economic, geographic, or social persistence? This study focuses on the persistence from 1850 to 1880 of five East Texas large planter families who owned one hundred or more slaves in 1860. An analysis of data primarily from county, state, and federal records formthe basis of this study. Four families persisted as wealthy influential members of their postbellum communities. One family remained geographically persistent but not wealthy. The experiences of these families suggest that large East Texas planter families found it possible to persist in spite of the Civil War and Reconstruction.

The 1944 German Ardennes offensive failed. It was overly ambitious, built on erroneous assumptions, insufficiently supported by logistics, and depended on the weather for success. Yet, the offensive achieved more than it should have given the strength and combat experience of the Allied armies in Europe. Previous attempts to explain the limited success of the German offensive have emphasized the failure of Allied strategic intelligence - Ultra. Intelligence is an accurate, but incomplete explanation for initial German success in the Ardennes. Three conditions allowed the Wehrmacht, approaching its manpower and logistical end, to crush the US First Army. First, coalition warfare so weakened the First Army that it became vulnerable to attack. Second, the Allies failed to develop a unified intelligence network capable of assessing the information that indicated the timing and target of the German attack. Finally, a well-executed German security and deception plan surprised the Allies. The well-executed German offensive manipulated both Allied intelligence and the Anglo-American coalition.

This thesis examines the letters, proclamations, and addresses of the four presidents of the Republic of Texas, David G. Burnet, Sam Houston, Mirabeau B. Lamar, and Anson Jones, to determine how these men faced the major crises of Texas and shaped policy regarding land, relations with Native Americans, finances, internal improvements, annexation by the United States, and foreign relations. Research materials include manuscript and published speeches and letters, diaries, and secondary materials.

Whig campaign strategists in the presidential election of 1840 developed new campaign tactics that included widespread use of campaign songs. They used these songs to sing the praises of their own candidate and policies while at the same time attacking the opposing party's candidate and policies. As early as 1842 these songwriters began writing songs in anticipation of the campaign in 1844. Prior to the nomination of candidates in May, 1844, the Whigs had published several songbooks including hundreds of song titles. In addition to supporting the candidacy of Henry Clay as the Whig candidate, the songs ridiculed several potential Democratic candidates including Martin Van Buren, John C. Calhoun, James Buchanan, and others. Whigs also used imagery to support their candidate and attack the foe. Despite extensive efforts to influence the election with campaign songs, no hard evidence exists that documents the effect of campaign songs, either positively or negatively.