This thesis examines British Foreign Office views of Russia and Anglo-Russian relations prior to the 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente. British diplomatic documents, memoirs, and papers in the Public Record Office reveal diplomatic concern with ending Central Asian tensions. This study examines Anglo-Russian relations from the pre-Lansdowne era, including agreements with Japan (1902) and France (1904), the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, and the shift in Liberal thinking up to the Anglo-Russian Entente. The main reason British diplomats negotiated the Entente was less to end Central Asian friction, this thesis concludes, than the need to check Germany, which some Foreign Office members believed, was bent upon European hegemony.

Many historians have acknowledged the temptation to portray people as they see themselves and wish to be seen, blending history and ideology. The result is "mythistory." Twentieth century Texas writers and historians, remarking upon the exceptional durability of the Texas mythistory that emerged from the nineteenth century, have questioned its resistance to revision throughout the twentieth century. By placing the writing of Texas history within the context of American and European intellectual climates and history writing generally, from the close of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, it is possible to identify a pattern that provides some insight into the popularity and persistence of Texas mythistory.

The 1944 German Ardennes offensive failed. It was overly ambitious, built on erroneous assumptions, insufficiently supported by logistics, and depended on the weather for success. Yet, the offensive achieved more than it should have given the strength and combat experience of the Allied armies in Europe. Previous attempts to explain the limited success of the German offensive have emphasized the failure of Allied strategic intelligence - Ultra. Intelligence is an accurate, but incomplete explanation for initial German success in the Ardennes. Three conditions allowed the Wehrmacht, approaching its manpower and logistical end, to crush the US First Army. First, coalition warfare so weakened the First Army that it became vulnerable to attack. Second, the Allies failed to develop a unified intelligence network capable of assessing the information that indicated the timing and target of the German attack. Finally, a well-executed German security and deception plan surprised the Allies. The well-executed German offensive manipulated both Allied intelligence and the Anglo-American coalition.