This comparative study assesses the state of democracy and examines the process of democratization in the Arab World between the years 1980-1993. It addresses shortcomings in the mainstream democracy literature that excluded the Arab World from the global democratic revolution on political cultural grounds. To fulfil the objectives of this study, I employ both the qualitative and quantitative research approaches to test a number of hypothesized relationships. I hypothesize that transition to democracy is negatively associated with economic development, militarism, U.S. foreign policy, the political economy of oil, and dependency. I contend that emerging civil society institutions so far have had no significant effect on democratization in the Arab World. Finally, I hypothesize that the level of democracy in the Arab World is influenced greatly by the issue of civil rights. In order to investigate the hypothesized relationships, the following data sets have been used: Gastil's Freedom House Data set, "Repression and Freedom in the 1980s" data set, and Vanhanen's 1990 data set. The findings of this study support the aforementioned hypothesized relationships. I find that Arab countries, in general have made modest progress toward democracy, making the Arab World part of the global revolution.

Deficient productive capacity has not yet caused an oil crisis, but that does not mean it never will. Significant increases in world oil demand will have to be met primarily from Persian Gulf supplies. This is a region with a history of wars, illegal occupations, soups, revolutions, sabotage, terrorism, and oil embargoes. To these possibilities may be added growing Islamist movements with various antipathies to the West. If oil production were constrained, oil prices could rise abruptly along with adverse world economic repercussions. If the IEA and EIA are correct on the demand side, deficient world oil productive capacity could cause an oil crisis within 15 years and political disruptions in Saudi Arabia could cause one sooner. However, if the increases in world oil demand were more moderate, and there is long-term relative peace in the Middle East, with increasing foreign participation in upstream oil activities, a business as usual world oil demand and supply situation would be a likely scenario for much of the next century.