Japan's banking sector currently is carrying between $400 billion and $800 billion in non-performing loans that threaten the solvency of certain financial institutions and weaken the Japanese financial system. This problem is of interest to the United States because the stability of Japan's banking system affects the health of that nation's economy, its rate of economic growth, and international capital flows. This, in turn, may affect American exports to, imports from, and investments in Japan. It also has affected Japanese investments in the United States and may affect the resolution of issues being negotiated or recently agreed to with that nation under the Framework Talks.

There have been varying estimates of the number of U.S. automobile dealerships that would be affected by the Administration's recently announced plan to impose a 100-percent tariff on imported Japanese luxury automobiles. This report examines the assumptions which result in some of the differences. also provides a State-by-State estimate of numbers of dealers potentially affected if the higher tariffs are imposed.

Over the past 30 years, U.S. trade negotiators have pressured Japan to open its market to foreign goods and services. These outside pressures, known as gaiatsu in Japan, have been based partly on economically coercive bargaining and partly on invitation. The coercive element, which has entailed threats of retaliatory market constriction should a satisfactory resolution of the market opening dispute not be forthcoming, generally has been a necessary ingredient in obtaining concessions from Japan. The invitational component, which has included requests for U.S. pressures from Japanese interests who favor reforms, generally has facilitated Japanese concessions and made the gaiatsu process unique.

The U.S. Federal Reserve reportedly has an arrangement with the Bank of Japan to provide emergency loans to Japanese banks operating overseas in exchange for U.S. Treasury securities. The collateralized loans would be extended on short notice for banks facing emergency liquidity needs. The purpose of the arrangement is to forestall the possible sale by Japanese banks of large amounts of U.S. Government securities (thereby raising U.S. interest rates) and to boost confidence in Japan's financial system. The loans would not risk U.S. taxpayers' funds. The Chairmen of both House and Senate Banking Committees have made statements about the arrangement, thus making it a matter oflegislative interest.

Recent Japanese political instability has complicated U.S.-Japan relations and posed new challenges to the achievement of important American economic, foreign policy and security objectives. Since July 1993 Japan has been governed by coalitions under three different prime ministers. The first coalition, under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, pushed through electoral and campaign finance reform legislation of potentially long-term significance, but failed to overcome political, bureaucratic and interest group resistance to its economic and administrative reform agenda. Its successor's have appeared to have progressively less power and will to carry out promised reforms or assume international leadership commensurate with Japan's global economic weight.

Japan's uncertain political transition began in July 1993, when the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) -- in power since 1955 -- was replaced by a fragile multiparty coalition. Under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, the coalition faced turmoil in April 1994, when Hosokawa resigned abruptly amid a personal financial scandal. Then-deputy prime minister/foreign minister Tsutomu Hata succeeded, but only at the head of a minority government as the Social Democratic Party (SDP), a key coalition partner, quit the coalition. Though beset by its own internal squabbles, the LDP remained the single largest party in Japan's bicameral Diet, or parliament. In late June, Hata was forced to resign under threat of an LDP-led no-confidence motion.

This report discusses the summit held by President Bill Clinton and other leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on November 19, 1995. The report discusses the primary reason for the summit, an Action Agenda intended to lead to free and open trade and investment among its members. The report also discusses how APEC countries were divided on certain issues going into this summit.

The 1995 U.S.-Japan Financial Services Agreement further liberalizes aspects of Japan's financial markets, particularly in asset management, corporate securities, cross-border financial services, and in providing greater transparency for administrative procedures. Implementation will have to be monitored, however, and some issues still remain unresolved.

Measured in dollars, Japan's global trade surplus stands at a record level. Also in recent months the Japanese yen has appreciated markedly against the dollar. The two events seem to foster a sizable degree of concern among many Americans, perhaps, taken to be evidence of Japan's economic success and the United States' economic failure. Things need not be as they seem, however.

On May 9, 1995, the United States initiated action designed to resolve a dispute with Japan dealing with automobiles and auto parts. In an effort to move negotiations along and resolve a U.S. unfair trade practices case (Section 301) dealing with barriers in the aftermarket for auto parts in Japan, the United States has threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on imports of thirteen Japanese luxury passenger cars (Honda Acura, Nissan Infiniti, Toyota Lexus, Mazda 929 and Millenia, and Mitsubishi Diamante). The decision will be made by June 28, 1995. The United States also is pursuing a broad unfair trading case dealing with access to Japan's automotive market at the World Trade Organization. Japan, meanwhile, has also initiated a case at the WTO challenging the legality of the threatened increase in U.S. tariffs. Consultations under the WTO on these issues began in Geneva on June 12, 1995.