The effects of top-level text structure and signaling on the reading recall of Japanese female junior college students studying English as a foreign language were investigated in this study. One hundred thirty-two subjects were selected from a private female junior college in Tokyo. The students were divided into three groups—high, average, and low reading comprehension levels—based on the results of the Test of Reading Comprehension. The instrument used to measure students' recall ability was developed from expository passages taken from a biology textbook. The passages were rearranged to show identifiable top-level structure, collection of description, causation, problem/solution, or comparison. Each passage was divided into two versions: a with-signaling version, in which top-level structure was explicitly stated by signaling words or phrases, and a without-signaling version, where signaling words or phrases were omitted. After the students were stratified on reading comprehension, they were assigned to eight different versions of text—two of each of the four top-level text structures, one with- and one without-signaling. In the recall test, students were instructed to read the text and to remember as much as they could.

This report reviews data that the Administration has provided to Congress on the costs of U.S. forces based abroad and on the value of host nation support contributions. It analyzes the data in order to assess potential defense budget savings from measures now under congressional consideration. The report concludes that, because of shortcomings in the data, estimates of savings in the U.S. defense budget from increased host nation contributions are often overstated. Some commonly accepted assertions frequently cited in the congressional burdensharing debate, therefore, are of doubtful validity.

Announcement for the 10th International Conference on Aids held in Yokohama, Japan. This conference marked the "first time that researchers, public health officials, service providers and activists" would gather in an Asian nation for the Conference.

Letter from Iola Magruder to Rigdon Edwards discussing articles from different news sources, a recent contribution to Texas Women's University, moving into a new house, past involvement with the American Cross and US military, and other events in her life.

In the 1980s, Japan's economy posted strong economic growth, in stark contrast to the more pedestrian growth other developed economies experienced. In this period, referred to as the "bubble" economy, Japan experienced a sharp increase in the values of land and stocks. The fast paced growth came to a halt in 1991, however, as the Ministry of Finance grew concerned over prospects of a rising rate of inflation, and, accordingly, tightened the nation's money supply. Since then, Japanese economic growth has fallen sharply and the economy has experienced asset deflation, rising levels of unemployment, and falling corporate profits and investments.

This report examines: (1) the definition(s) of managed trade, (2) the underlying economic arguments for and against such policies, (3) past U.S. experiences with managed trade, (4) perceptions that Japan is somehow "different" from other trading nations and warrants a distinctive approach to resolving trade disputes, (5) the implications of the Administration's current results oriented approach to U.S.-Japan trade issues, and (6) alternative proposals offered in Congress to resolve trade disputes with Japan.

A prominent feature of Japan's capitalism consists of families of companies called keiretsu that are linked by crossholdings of stock shares, intra-group financing, and certain coordinating mechanisms. Two types of keiretsu exist: large horizontally organized industrial conglomerates, such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo, and vertically integrated manufacturers, such as Toyota, Nippon Steel, and Matsushita Electric. They have become a contentious issue in U.S. trade negotiations with Japan for several reasons.

Japan's top 21 banks have reported Y13.6 trillion (US$136 billion) in non-performing loans, but experts consider the true figure to be in the range of Y40 to Y60 trillion (US$400 to US$600 billion). If 90, Japan's banks may take five to seven more years to write off their bad loans and restore health to their balance sheets. Current write-offs are being financed primarily by sales of stocks held by banks whose values have appreciated. This problem of bad loans is depressing Japan's economic growth rate and making resolution of trade disputes and further opening of Japan's financial markets more difficult.

None

None

Japan-U.S. relations are more uncertain and subject to greater strain today than at any time since World War II. Longstanding military allies and increasingly interdependent economic partners, Japan and the United States have worked closely together to build a strong, multifaceted relationship based on democratic values and interests in world stability and development. But Japan today is our foremost economic and technological competitor. It consistently runs the largest annual international trade surplus with the U.S. ($59 billion in 1993). The end of the Cold War, lackluster international economic conditions, and the focus on economic issues in U.S. politics have raised new questions about the appropriate U.S. policy toward this Asian ally.

Japan-U.S. relations are more uncertain and subject to greater strain today than at any time since World War II. Longstanding military allies and increasingly interdependent economic partners, Japan and the United States have worked closely together to build a strong, multifaceted relationship based on democratic values and interests in world stability and development. But Japan today is our foremost economic and technological competitor.

JETRO, the Japan External Trade Organization, has played a key role in Japan's system for trade promotion. It is a public corporation, a quasi-governmental organization, operating under the general supervision of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).

It has been more than a year since the United States and Japan established their bilateral framework for trade negotiations and other economic relations. The framework set down rules and deadlines to address various economic issues, particularly market access in Japan for U.S. exports and the Japanese global trade surplus. The two sides have failed to reach agreements on any of the major issues. The United States is left with several policy options to resolve the breakdown in trade negotiations.

The United States and Japan have been deadlocked for over a year in an effort to reach agreements under the July 1993 Framework for a New Economic Relationship. The overriding obstacle has concerned the issue of how to measure progress under future agreements to open Japan's market further to foreign goods and services.

The U.S.-Japan framework talks were initiated in July 1993. The automotive negotiations between Japan and the United States focused on sales of U.S. vehicles in Japan; sales of U.S.-made original equipment parts in Japan and to Japanese transplants in the United States; and deregulation of the market for replacement parts in Japan. An unresolved dispute over shock absorbers and other replacement parts resulted in the United States launching a formal investigation of Japanese market barriers to imported car parts under Section 301 on Oct. 1, 1994.

Japan is one of the world's largest wood importers, with two-thirds of its imports as logs (unprocessed timber). Southeast Asia has been the largest log supplier, but supplies (and exports to Japan) have been declining. The United States has become a more important supplier, but concerns about declining domestic timber supplies have led to proposals to prohibit or to tax log exports. Opponents suggest that Japan would simply turn to other sources to replace U.S. logs. One question in this debate is where the alternative sources of logs or wood products might be.

The surprise election of Socialist Party leader Tomiichi Murayama as Prime Minister on June 29, 1994, reflects an ongoing process of change and realignment in Japanese politics that, in the short term, has made the management of U.S.-Japan relations significantly more difficult and impeded the resolution of important issues. Although Murayama has pledged continuity in U.S.-Japan relations, and key cabinet posts have been given to senior LDP leaders with experience in dealing with Washington, his election could have a number of negative implications for U.S. interests. Among other possibilities, the change could temporarily set back the cause of political reform in Japan, further delay the recovery of the Japanese economy from a three-year long slump, pose new obstacles to trade negotiations aimed at more fully opening Japanese markets to U.S. goods and services, and bring into question Tokyo's cooperation under certain scenarios on the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The likely hiatus in major decisionmaking may continue at least until the next general election.

Japan's politics and government are undergoing a historic transition. The 38-year one-party rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came to an end on July 18, 1993, when the party was voted out of power, even as it remained the single largest party in the lower house of Japan's bicameral Diet, or parliament. Seven non-communist parties, with little in common save their shared interest in dethroning the LDP, formed a shaky coalition.

Japan's current political instability began in July 1993, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) -- in power since 1955 - was voted out and replaced by a fragile multiparty coalition government under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa. The new government faced turmoil in April 1994, when Hosokawa suddenly resigned amid a personal financial scandal. Then-deputy prime minister/foreign minister Tsutomu Hata succeeded, but only at the head of a minority government after the Socialist party, a key coalition partner, quit the Hata coalition. Although beset by its own internal squabbles, the LDP remained the single largest party in Japan's bicameral Diet, or parliament. In late June, Hata was forced to resign under threat of an LDP-led no-confidence motion.

Japan's current political instability began in July 1993, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) -- in power since 1955 -- was voted out and replaced by a fragile multiparty coalition government under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa. The new government faced turmoil in April 1994, when Hosokawa suddenly resigned amid a personal financial scandal. Then-deputy prime minister/foreign minister Tsutomu Hata succeeded, but only at the head of a minority government after the Socialist party, a key coalition partner, quit the coalition. Although beset by its own internal squabbles, the LDP remained the single largest party in Japan's bicameral Diet, or parliament. In late June, Hata was forced to resign under threat of an LDP-led no confidence motion.

The Japanese economy has been in recession for three years, making it the longest recession in Japan's post-war experience. Groups within and outside Japan are calling on Japan to adopt aggressive fiscal policy measures to boost the Japanese economy and to aid in the recovery of the world economy. Japan has enacted a number of limited measures to stimulate, but it is unlikely to move more aggressively to adopt deficit-financing measures to stimulate its economy for a number of reasons: political and government leaders oppose deficit financing in principle; and under present economic conditions, Japanese officials are more concerned with the effects a fiscal stimulus program will have on the yen, on Japan's trade account, and on its economic recovery.

The dollar declined abruptly in value against the yen in the second quarter of 1994, spurring the central banks of seventeen nations to coordinate a series of intervention efforts in the world's currency trading markets. In addition, the dollar's decline sparked discussions of the possible policy moves the United States and other nations might take to stem the fluctuations in the value of the dollar. Economic theory and empirical evidence indicate that the underlying movement of the exchange rate is tied to the long-term, macroeconomic movements of the economy, or to the combined movements of the economies of different countries, such as the United States and Japan. These macroeconomic factors account for at least half of the overall movement of exchange rates.

In a world in which economic and trade performance are fast gaining acceptance as important components of national power and well being, Congress has become increasingly interested in the comparative success of U.S. business in the vast, rapidly growing Asia-Pacific region. For the most part, Congress has tended to view Japan as the main competitor of the United States in Asian markets and the standard against which U.S. success is measured. The stakes for the United States are considerable. Exclusive of Japan, the Asia-Pacific region accounted for $ 92 billion in U.S. exports in 1993 and $ 138 billion in imports, or about 20 percent of total U.S. exports and 24 percent of U.S. global imports. A number of projections indicate that Asia will account for the largest share of world trade growth in the next decade. Japan's growing economic presence has been accompanied by a relative increase in its political influence vis-a-vis that of the United States, a factor of considerable long term significance for U.S. interests, and it would appear the availability of alternative Asian markets has strengthened Japan's resistance to U.S. trade demands.