This study attempts to explore the factors that contributed to the rise and fall of military regimes in the Sudan from independence in 1956 to 1989. Further, the study tries to identify the factors that led to the collapse of either or both civilian and military regimes. Most of the studies on military politics have focused their research on either military coups or, more recently, on military withdrawal from politics. This work tries to synthesize the study of military coups and military withdrawal from politics into a single theoretical framework.

During the past two decades, extensive research efforts have focused on the conventional wisdom that the economy has a direct influence on a party's destiny. This hypothesis rests on the implicit assumption that the linkages between macroeconomic variables such as inflation and unemployment and party support are direct and unmediated. As the present study indicates, however, objective economic measures only serve as a proxy for the invisible force that drives voters' party support. Once the relevant variables, namely, the perceptual factors of the electorate, are controlled for, variables that describe the state of the objective economy fail to exert their "magic" on political behavior.