This document contains information about the sampling program at Columbia River during May 5, 1944. Topics discussed include: securing representative samples; analysis of the samples looking at temperature, bacteriological content, dissolved oxygen, and physical tests; and the method and equipment used in the sampling procedure.

This barely legible document describes the canning process, B area activities, and the 200 area activities.

This memorandum discusses the deaeration of process water for the F area at the Hanford Engineer Works. The memorandum is dated July 13, 1944.

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This barely legible document contains information on slug testing results and autoclave performance. Reactor physics, corrosion, chemistry and instrument development are also discussed.

This barely legible document describes the canning process, autoclave tests, slug weight distributions, and general information on progress in the 100 Area to include: Reactor physics, corrosion, instrument development, plant assistance, slug recovery, outgassing, sniffer tests, statistics, and analytical services.

This document is a letter sent on September 6, 1944. The topic of discussion is the chemical composition of the water in the Columbia River. Tests show the amount of metals, dissolved solids, hardness and turbidity of the water before and after laboratory filtration.

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On June 3 the writer was detailed to the 300 Area to study operations in Bldg, 313. Seven days were spent with C shift in the caning and dipping area. In this period, a system of coordinating press cycles was developed to utilize machine time most effectively. Subsequently, a brief amount of time was spent working in a design of the can cleaning area so as to incorporate the aluminum can etching operation and facilitate the handling and flow of materials. The next stage of perhaps a week was devoted to a study of inspection and testing methods. The final period of one week was utilized mainly to develop a method of storing finished material so as to provide the maximum amount of piece-classification flexibility without incurring enormous burdens in the movement of material to later stages of the operation.

Progress on finding suitable water conditions for start-up had been approached as closely as possible with our present equipment and information as to the requirements. The water composition should be attainable that is not corrosive or build up a film rapidly, and we have means available for removal of such films. Slug classification methods were analyzed from a dimensional standpoint. Analysis of current CMX data was undertaken with the objective of establishing allowable variations in pressure drop in W-tubes due to film formation. Calculations were made of the number of slugs which have jacket temperatures in excess of various values, for various loading arrangements. On July 26 the proposed loading of the discharge nozzle is to be checked on CMX tube 1 during an inspection shut-down. Evacuation procedures in the event of a catastrophe in the 100-B area were discussed with W.E. Rapp during a visit to that area on July 19, 1944. Tests for slug leaks will not be less severe with water in the autoclave than with steam, and have a considerable chance to be more decisive, especially if a wetting agent is added to the water. Calculations were made on the sensitivity to be expected from three …

This technical progress letter details Hanford Engineer Works activities for the time period of July 7 through July 13, 1944.

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This report details technical activities of the Hanford Engineer Works for the time period of September 1 through September 7, 1944.

This report details technical activities of the Hanford Engineer Works for the week of October 27, 1944 through November 2, 1944.

This document provides the analytical reports on the aluminum-silicon alloy, tin and copper analytical reports are also provided.

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This document contains data about the Columbia River water acquired January 9, 1944. The discussion includes: laboratory tests for turbidity and flocculation with aluminum.

This report is a discussion between Dr, Robert Stone of Knoxville, Tennessee and Dr. W.D. Norwood, the Medical Superintendent at HAPO, concerning the health hazards involved from working at HAPO and the maximum exposure to gamma radiation which a worker could be exposed to without receiving adverse irreparable damage. (CBS)

This letter was written in 1944 and applies to the amount of radiation a person could be subjected to under emergency, wartime conditions. Mr. Stone recommends to Dr. Norwood that no man should be ordered to expose himself to more than a tolerance dose (0.1r in a 24 hr period) except in the case of an extreme emergency in which time is of the essence. And that before any man is asked to exceed tolerance that a radiation trained physician be called in for consultation. His recommendations to said physician are that: (a) a single exposure of 1r would cause no harm and could be repeated at long intervals, (b) an exposure of 5 to 10r would produce loss of appetite and nausea and would increase the chances of genetic change but would cause no clinically detectable changes after the incident, (C) an exposure of 25r would do the same as (b) but with greater probability -- he would be personally willing to take a 25r exposure to accomplish an extremely important job, (4) in general keep exposures well below tolerance, (5) due to the genetic effects, women of childbearing age and younger men should be subjected to none and …

Information required by operators exposed to radiation hazards is discussed. All areas of the plant are subjected to radiation hazards similar to those in the radium industry. Personnel in these areas are required to wear pencil meters and special badges that are evidently not solely for identification. They are required to submit to medical examinations more stringent and frequent than usual. They are required to wear heavy gloves in one location, thin gloves in another, disposable hats or rubbers in another. They are required to stay away from familiar objects that they could handle a few days before. They observe health instrument men making readings at points not tangibly influenced by the operations. Under these circumstances, operators cannot perform their duties intelligently without being advised of the general nature of the risks involved. Since the general beta and gamma hazard occurs at nearly all points and cannot reasonably be concealed, this is the feature selected for general information. The special hazard of 105 Building can then be concealed, and the origin, but not the nature of the hazard in 231 likewise concealed.

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Hood Worthington reports that slug testing in autoclaves shows improvement to substantiate a meeting on the initial loading of pile B and production for B.F. Babcock report examining five drafts of Operating Standards for the 100 Area. C.W.J. Wende are considering alternative loading schemes due to the observation that lead dummy slugs at the inlet end of a tube may mushroom when subjected to the stress of discharging. J.A. Wheeler reports on heavy metal content of reclaimed slugs compared to normal slugs. Also, temperature measurements on slugs in 105-B and corrosion rates of heavy metals are given. P.F. Gast reports on safety rod control calculations. T.B. Drew report on volume estimations of the B pile and analysis of data from leakage tests. Lastly, W.K. Woods reports on testing of solid aluminium dummies in the W-tube using an electric needle technique to detect motion of the pieces. Water flow considerations are discussed.

This report documents the progress made for the week in each of the following areas: fuel canning operations; reactor operations (100 area); instrumentation development; and fuel reprocessing (200 area). Detailed information is given for each of these areas. Problems encountered are also discussed.

As a starting point for planning the physics measurements to be made during the start up of the pile, this memorandum describes a procedure for each of three cases, a large poisoned pile, running at power with a small unpoisoned pile but marking physics measurements with the large pile before going to power, and a similar case except that the physics measurements on the large pile are done after running with power on the small pile This memorandum should by no means be taken as a final proposal. It has resulted in uncovering shortcomings in instrumentation which have been covered in other memoranda. Estimates of the time required for the physics measurements are given. These will furnish you with a basis for discussion with the Operating Supervision to estimate the total time required for each step.