Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of checked baggage. It has been over 3 years since the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and baggage screening at commercial airports. This testimony focuses on the progress TSA is making in strengthening airline passenger and checked baggage screening and the challenges that remain. Particularly, this testimony highlights TSA's efforts to (1) enhance the performance, management, and deployment of the transportation security officer (TSO) workforce; (2) strengthen procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage; and (3) leverage and deploy screening technologies."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility for securing air cargo transported into the United States from another country, referred to as inbound air cargo, and preventing implements of terrorism from entering the country. GAO examined (1) what actions DHS has taken to secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all, these efforts could be strengthened; and (2) what practices the air cargo industry and foreign governments have adopted that could enhance DHS's efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and to what extent DHS has worked with foreign governments to enhance their air cargo security efforts. To conduct this study, GAO reviewed relevant DHS documents, interviewed DHS officials, and conducted site visits to seven countries in Europe and Asia."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in fundamental changes in the way the United States screens airport passengers and their property. One of the most significant changes was the shift from using private screeners to using federal screeners at all but five commercial airports in the United States. These five airports are part of a pilot program, where private screeners perform screening functions. The mission of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as defined by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is to test the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors may provide. GAO was asked to describe (1) the challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot program, (2) the operational flexibilities TSA has provided to the private screening companies, and (3) the performance of private and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. This testimony is based on our prior and ongoing work on TSA airport passenger and baggage screeners."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) most visible layer of commercial aviation security is the screening of airline passengers at airport checkpoints, where travelers and their carry-on items are screened for explosives and other dangerous items by transportation security officers (TSO). Several revisions made to checkpoint screening procedures have been scrutinized and questioned by the traveling public and Congress in recent years. For this review, GAO evaluated (1) TSA's decisions to modify passenger screening procedures between April 2005 and December 2005 and in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot, and (2) how TSA monitored TSO compliance with passenger screening procedures. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed TSA documents, interviewed TSA officials and aviation security experts, and visited 25 airports of varying sizes and locations."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "It has been over 3 years since the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and baggage screening at commercial airports. This testimony focuses on the progress TSA is making in strengthening aspects of aviation security and the challenges that remain. Particularly, this testimony highlights (1) progress TSA has made, and challenges it faces, in managing a federalized security workforce--including federal security directors (FSD) and transportation security officers (TSO)--with operational responsibility for ensuring security of passengers and their baggage; and (2) actions TSA has taken, and the challenges it faces, to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight of other airport security activities."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The attempted passenger aircraft bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December 25, 2009, provided a vivid reminder that the civil aviation system remains an attractive terrorist target. To enhance aviation security, in October 2003 the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began testing of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security. The SPOT program utilizes behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers. This testimony provides information on (1) the extent to which TSA has validated the scientific basis for SPOT and (2) other operational challenges. This statement is based on a prior report GAO issued in May 2010 on SPOT, including selected updates made in March 2011. For the updates, GAO reviewed documentation on TSA's progress in implementing the report's recommendations."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple commercial aircraft bound for the United States from the United Kingdom has highlighted both the continued importance of securing the civil aviation system and the potential that improvised explosive devices (IED) may be smuggled onboard passenger aircraft. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has primary responsibility for ensuring the security of civil aviation, which includes the safety of passengers and flight crew. One measure TSA uses to protect the aviation system is prohibiting individuals from carrying items that it determines to be a threat to the aircraft and its passengers into an airport sterile area or onboard an aircraft either in their carry-on bag or on their person. To implement this measure, TSA maintains a prohibited items list that informs both the Transportation Security Officers (TSO) who conduct passenger screening and the traveling public of items that will not be allowed into an airport sterile area or onboard an aircraft. In December 2005, TSA revised its prohibited items list to allow passengers to carry: (1) metal scissors with pointed tips and a blade 4 inches or less …

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the security of the nation's air transportation system, focusing on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to implement and improve security in two key areas: (1) air traffic control computer systems; and (2) airport passenger screening checkpoints."

A briefing report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on Balkans security issues, focusing on: (1) the current security situation in the Balkans, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia; (2) the projected security in the region over the next 5 years; (3) factors in the decision to withdraw Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo; and (4) how the executive branch has defined U.S. interests in the region in the National Security Strategy and public statements."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) met the presidentially announced time frame to deploy initial ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) but did not fully identify and plan to resolve implementation issues before deployment. As a result, DOD experienced implementation issues, such as incomplete construction of housing facilities for soldiers arriving at the EPAA radar site in Turkey and incomplete implementing arrangements defining how to operate with allies when certain BMD elements arrived in the host country. U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with other combatant commands, developed criteria to assess whether a BMD capability is ready for operational use to ensure that BMD capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered. However, the assessment criteria used during this process focused on effectiveness, suitability, and interoperability areas—such as whether BMD elements can work together to track ballistic missile threats—and did not explicitly require DOD to comprehensively identify and plan to resolve implementation issues prior to deploying these capabilities. DOD plans to continue to use its existing process to accept BMD capabilities planned for Europe in the future. Without …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "To assist law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requires financial institutions to file suspicious activity reports (SAR) to inform the federal government of transactions related to possible violations of law or regulation. Depository institutions have been concerned about the resources required to file SARs and the extent to which SARs are used. The Subcommittee asked GAO to discuss our February 2009 report on suspicious activity reporting. Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) factors affecting the number of SARs filed, (2) actions agencies have taken to improve the usefulness of SARs, (3) federal agencies' use of SARs, and (4) the effectiveness of the process used to revise SAR forms. To respond to the request, GAO relied primarily on the February 2009 report titled Bank Secrecy Act: Suspicious Activity Report Use Is Increasing, but FinCEN Needs to Further Develop and Document Its Form Revision Process (GAO-09-226), and updated it with additional information provided by FinCEN. In that report, GAO recommended that FinCEN work to further develop a strategy that fully incorporates certain GAO-identified practices to enhance …

A chapter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. government's framework for preventing, detecting, and prosecuting money laundering has been expanding through additional pieces of legislation since the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1970. In recent years, noncompliance with BSA requirements has raised concerns in Congress about the ability of federal banking regulators to oversee compliance at depository institutions and ensure that these institutions have the controls necessary to identify suspicious activity. In light of these concerns, GAO was asked to determine how federal banking regulators examine for BSA compliance and identify and track violations to ensure timely corrective action. GAO also was asked to determine how enforcement actions are taken for violations of the BSA."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 requires individuals to receive credit counseling before filing for bankruptcy and to take a debtor education course before having debts discharged. Concerns were raised that the new requirements could expose consumers to abusive practices by credit counseling agencies or become barriers to filing for bankruptcy. GAO was asked to examine (1) the process of approving counseling and education providers, (2) the content and results of the counseling and education sessions, (3) the fees charged, and (4) the availability of and challenges to accessing services. To address these issues, GAO reviewed Trustee Program data and application case files, and interviewed a wide range of individuals and groups involved in the bankruptcy process."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Over the next 5 years, DOD's overall investments are expected to average $150 billion a year to modernize and transition our forces. In addition, DOD must modernize its forces amid competing demands for federal funds, such as health care and homeland security. Therefore, it is critical that DOD manage its acquisitions in the most cost efficient and effective manner possible. DOD's newest acquisition policy emphasizes the use of evolutionary, knowledge-based concepts that have proven to produce more effective and efficient weapon systems outcomes. However, most DOD programs currently do not employ these practices and, as a result, experience cost increases, schedule delays, and poor product quality and reliability. This testimony compares the best practices for developing new products with the experiences of the F/A-22 program."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Cost growth and schedule delays are prevalent problems in acquiring defense weapon systems. Manufacturing systems has proven difficult, particularly as programs transition to production. In December 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued an updated version of its acquisition policy that reflects earlier consideration of manufacturing risks. A joint defense and industry group developed manufacturing readiness levels (MRL) to support assessments of manufacturing risks. Use of MRLs on all weapon acquisition programs has been proposed. In response to a congressional request, this report assesses the manufacturing problems faced by DOD, how MRLs can address manufacturing problems, how MRLs compare to manufacturing best practices of leading commercial firms, and challenges and barriers to implementing MRLs at DOD. In conducting our work, we contacted DOD, military services, and contractors; held interviews with leading commercial firms; reviewed program documents and policy proposals; and spoke with manufacturing experts."

A chapter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "GAO examined how best practices could help the Department of Defense (DOD) maximize the benefits of integrated product teams in its development of weapon systems. GAO conducted eight case studies--three from leading commercial firms; four from DOD programs experiencing cost, schedule, and performance problems; and one from a DOD program that has been meeting its objectives. GAO found that effective integrated product teams can make significant development decisions quickly and without relying on heavy consultations with organizations outside of the team. These teams have developed and delivered superior products within predicted time frames and budgets--often cutting calendar time in half compared with earlier products delivered without such teams. Officials from the more successful programs GAO reviewed--three commercial and one from DOD--all cited integrated product teams as a main factor in achieving such results. GAO found that the teams did not operate as effectively in the four DOD programs that were not meeting cost and schedule objectives. Their decision-making processes were sequential and involved many outside consultations for information and approval."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on small business bid protests that have been filed in district courts and the United States Court of Federal Claims (COFC) since the Administration Dispute Resolution Act took effect on December 31, 1996, focusing on the: (1) number of bid protest cases filed in the U.S. district courts and COFC between January 1, 1997, and April 30, 1999, that were filed by small businesses, the type of agencies involved, and the amount of the procurement at issue; (2) perceived advantages and disadvantages for small businesses filing bid protest cases in each judicial forum; and (3) characteristics of district court and COFC bid protest cases, particularly those filed by small businesses, that could be used to assess these perceived advantages and disadvantages."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The federal government spends more than $230 billion annually for products and services to conduct its operations. Through its purchasing decisions, it has the opportunity to affirm its policies and goals, including those related to purchases of biobased products, as set out in the 2002 farm bill. A biobased product is a commercial or industrial product, other than food or feed that is composed of, in whole or part, biological products, renewable domestic agricultural materials, or forestry materials. GAO examined (1) actions the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other agencies have taken to carry out farm bill requirements for purchasing biobased products, (2) additional actions that may be needed to implement the requirements, and (3) views of stakeholders on the need for and costs of testing biobased products. GAO interviewed officials from USDA, major procuring agencies, testing entities, interested associations, and 15 manufacturers of biobased products."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed efforts to reduce the threat of biological weapons proliferation from the former Soviet Union, focusing on: (1) the potential threats that the former Soviet biological weapons institutes could pose to the United States; (2) current and future U.S. efforts to address these threats; and (3) risks associated with the expanded U.S. effort and executive branch plans to mitigate them."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Biomonitoring, which measures chemicals in people's tissues or body fluids, has shown that the U.S. population is widely exposed to chemicals used in everyday products. Some of these have the potential to cause cancer or birth defects. Moreover, children may be more vulnerable to harm from these chemicals than adults. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to control chemicals that pose unreasonable health risks. GAO was asked to review the (1) extent to which EPA incorporates information from biomonitoring studies into its assessments of chemicals, (2) steps that EPA has taken to improve the usefulness of biomonitoring data, and (3) extent to which EPA has the authority under TSCA to require chemical companies to develop and submit biomonitoring data to EPA."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Much of the response to a bioterrorist attack would occur at the local level. Many local areas and their supporting state agencies, however, may not be adequately prepared to respond to such an attack. In the Public Health Improvement Act that was passed in 2000, Congress directed GAO to examine state and local preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. In this report GAO provides information on state and local preparedness and state and local concerns regarding the federal role in funding and improving preparedness. To gather this information, GAO visited seven cities and their respective state governments, reviewed documents, and interviewed officials. Cities are not identified because of the sensitive nature of this issue."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland fire seasons in the past 50 years--almost 7 million acres burned. These fires included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in the past century--the Biscuit Fire. Following a lightning storm, five fires were discovered in the Siskiyou National Forest over a 3- day period beginning July 13. These fires eventually burned together to form the Biscuit Fire, which burned nearly 500,000 acres in southern Oregon and Northern California and cost over $150 million to extinguish. GAO evaluated (1) whether policies and procedures were in place for acquiring needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when the fire was first identified; (2) what resource management issues, if any, affected the ability of personnel to fight the fire; and (3) what differences, if any, existed in key certification standards for personnel among federal and state agencies and whether these differences affected efforts to respond to the fire. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service stated that the …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 mandated that GAO examine the costs and benefits of an increased Department of Defense (DOD) role to help secure the southwest land border. This mandate directed that GAO report on, among other things, the potential deployment of additional units, increased use of ground-based mobile surveillance systems, use of mobile patrols by military personnel, and an increased deployment of unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft in national airspace. In September 2011, GAO reported that DOD estimated a total cost of about $1.35 billion for two separate border operations—Operation Jump Start and Operation Phalanx—conducted by National Guard forces in Title 32 status from June 2006 to July 2008 and from June 2010 through September 30, 2011, respectively. Further, DOD estimated that it has cost about $10 million each year since 1989 to use active duty Title 10 forces nationwide, through its Joint Task Force-North, in support of drug law enforcement agencies with some additional operational costs borne by the military services. Agency officials stated multiple benefits from DOD’s increased border role, such as assistance to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is coordinating in a variety of ways with tribes, such as through joint operations and shared facilities and Operation Stonegarden--a DHS grant program intended to enhance coordination among local, tribal, territorial, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in securing United States borders. However, the Border Patrol and tribes face coordination challenges. Officials from five tribes reported information-sharing challenges with the Border Patrol, such as not receiving notification of federal activity on their lands. Border Patrol officials reported challenges navigating tribal rules and decisions. Border Patrol and DHS have existing agreements with some, but not all, tribes to address specific border security issues, such as for the establishment of a law enforcement center on tribal lands. These agreements could serve as models for developing additional agreements between the Border Patrol and other tribes on their specific border security coordination challenges. Written government-to-government agreements could assist Border Patrol and tribal officials with enhancing their coordination, consistent with practices for sustaining effective coordination. DHS established an office to coordinate the components' tribal outreach efforts, which has taken actions such as monthly teleconferences with …