Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO's prior work has identified several key factors that are important for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to implement its partnership approach with industry to protect critical infrastructure. DHS has made some progress in implementing its partnership approach, but has also experienced challenges coordinating with industry partners that own most of the critical infrastructure."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Although the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) jointly manage international emergency food aid procurement, the agencies disagree about the usefulness of the Web Based Supply Chain Management system (WBSCM) to manage the entire process. WBSCM had significant deficiencies when it was implemented in April 2011, which led USAID to discontinue using it to procure ocean freight for bulk commodities, manage prepositioned or stockpiled commodity inventory, and track food aid shipments. For example, WBSCM was slow and time consuming to use and its process to procure ocean freight for bulk commodities was not compatible with USAID's process to negotiate contracts with ocean freight vendors. USDA currently uses WBSCM to procure food aid commodities, while USAID procures ocean freight using other systems not connected to WBSCM. Since March 2012, USDA has made changes to WBSCM, and USDA officials assert that these changes address some of the problems that led to USAID's decision to discontinue use of the system."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In April 2012, GAO found that the Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not report any aggregated data on attorney fee claims and payments made under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) and other fee-shifting statutes for fiscal years 2000 through 2010, but USDA and other key departments involved—the Departments of the Treasury and Justice—maintained certain data on individual cases or payments in several internal agency databases. However, collectively, these data did not capture all claims and payments. USDA officials stated at the time that given the decentralized nature of the department and the absence of an external requirement to track or report on attorney fee information, the information was not centrally tracked and decisions about whether to track attorney fee data and the manner in which to do so were best handled at the agency level. Officials from 29 of the 33 USDA agencies GAO contacted for its April 2012 report stated that they did not track or could not readily provide GAO with this information. The remaining 4 USDA agencies had mechanisms to track information on attorney fees, were able to compile this information manually, or …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) used the urgency exception to a limited extent, but the reliability of some federal procurement data elements is questionable. For fiscal years 2010 through 2012, obligations reported under urgent noncompetitive contracts ranged from less than 1 percent to about 12 percent of all noncompetitive contract obligations. During that time, DOD obligated $12.5 billion noncompetitively to procure goods and services using the urgency exception, while State and USAID obligated $582 million and about $20 million respectively, almost exclusively to procure services. Among the items procured were personal armor, guard services and communications equipment to support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. GAO found coding errors that raise concerns about the reliability of federal procurement data on the use of the urgency exception. Nearly half—28 of the 62 contracts in GAO's sample—were incorrectly coded as having used the urgency exception when they did not. GAO found that 20 of the 28 miscoded contracts were awarded using procedures that are more simple and separate from the requirements related to the use of the urgency exception. …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Delays in developmental flight testing of the F-35's critical software may hinder delivery of the warfighting capabilities the military services expect. F-35 developmental flight testing comprises two key areas: mission systems and flight sciences. Mission systems testing verifies that the software-intensive systems that provide critical warfighting capabilities function properly and meet requirements, while flight sciences testing verifies the aircraft's basic flying capabilities. Challenges in development and testing of mission systems software continued through 2013, due largely to delays in software delivery, limited capability in the software when delivered, and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software versions. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) predicts delivery of warfighting capabilities could be delayed by as much as 13 months. Delays of this magnitude will likely limit the warfighting capabilities that are delivered to support the military services' initial operational capabilities—the first of which is scheduled for July 2015—and at this time it is not clear what those specific capabilities will be because testing is still ongoing. In addition, delays could increase the already significant concurrency between testing and aircraft procurement and result in additional cost growth. …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Private entities GAO reviewed for this study selected a range of measures and benchmarks to assess physician group performance, and provided feedback reports to physicians more than once a year. Private entities almost exclusively focused their feedback efforts on primary care physician groups participating in medical homes and accountable care organizations, which hold physicians responsible for the quality and cost of all services provided. They limited their feedback reporting to those with a sufficient number of enrollees to ensure the reliability of reported measures. The entities decided on the number and type of measures for their reports, and compared each group's performance to multiple benchmarks, including peer group averages or past performance. All the entities used quality measures, and some also used utilization or cost measures. Because of the variety of quality measures and benchmarks, feedback report content differed across the entities. Some entities noted that in addition to national benchmarks, they compared results to state or regional level rates to reflect local patterns of care which may be more relevant to their physicians. Most health insurers spent from 4 to 6 months to generate their …